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Preface
I never planned to study strategic voting. I just dislike not being able to …nish a
project I have once started. This thesis has come about because I have thought
for a long time that there is something seriously wrong with the methodology of
social choice and the theory of strategic voting. In particular, I have always been
puzzled by the reluctance of theorists working in these …elds to provide models
in which voters’ intensities of preference have a role, even though they clearly
seem to a¤ect voters’ behaviour. However, I realised early on that scholars in
these …elds are used to discussing philosophical and methodological issues by
way of constructing formal models. Merely pointing out that this particular
behavioural assumption concerning preference intensity is unrealistic would not
have been very convincing without an account of how changing it a¤ects our
view of strategic voting. I therefore began this project of ’philosophy of science
in practice’ about a decade ago. Despite the fact that three of the essays are
written with an audience of economists in mind, I consider this work mainly a
methodological one.
I have studied strategic voting because I believe I have something important
to say about it, and because I …nd it theoretically intriguing. These motivations,
viz. theoretical curiosity and stubbornness I have inherited from my father
Pekka T. Lehtinen. I believe he has had the most important in‡uence on my
work, despite the fact that as a biologist he is unlikely to understand my topic
very well. I thank him for having set the example for critical thinking and
un‡inching search for knowledge.
There are many people who have been helpful along the way. The philosophy
departments at the University of Helsinki and Erasmus Institute for Philosophy
and Economics (EIPE) have provided stimulating environments for intellectual
development. I want to mention Tomi Kokkonen, Jani Raerinne, Tarja Knuut-
tila, Erika Mattila, Matti Sintonen, Janne Hiipakka, Hanne Ahonen and Pekka
Mäkelä from the former and Emrah Aydinonat, Jorma Sappinen, Caterina Mar-
chionni, G½ulbahar Tezel Pot, and Peter Marks from the latter even though all
of them have not been directly involved with the development of this thesis. I
had the opportunity to use supercomputers at the Finnish Centre for Scienti…c
Computing. This research was made possible by …nancial aid from the Yrjö
Jahnsson Foundation, EIPE, and the Academy of Finland.
The body of the thesis consists of a compilation of scienti…c publications.
They are listed here:
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² Chapter 1: Lehtinen, Aki (2006): "Signal extraction for simulated games
with a large number of players", Computational Statistics and Data Analy-
sis, vol. 50, pp. 2495-2507.
² Chapter 2: Lehtinen, Aki (2007): "The welfare consequences of strate-
gic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas", Theory and
Decision, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 1-40.
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I continue to enjoy working with Jaakko as much as I did when we wrote
the paper included in this collection. I would like to thank Markus Haavio
and Ruurik Holm for helpful comments on the …rst and the second and Petri
Ylikoski for the fourth essay. Olli Serimaa and Antti Nevanlinna helped me with
computer programming for the second and the third essay. Hannu Nurmi and
Martin van Hees have commented extensively on all the chapters, including the
concluding …fth essay. Cecilia Therman and Joan Nordlund have checked the
language of almost all essays. (You will easily …nd out which essays have not
passed through their …nishing touch.) My supervisors Jack Vromen and Uskali
Mäki have really done their best given the di¢culty of some of the topics in
the thesis. They have both been intellectually extremely important to me, but
paradoxically enough, their in‡uence and helpfulness may be even more evident
in my future intellectual endeavours.
PhDs are not produced without love. Thank you äiti, and thank you Cecilia.
Chapter 1
Introduction
An incomplete information framework for study-
ing the welfare consequences of strategic voting
Arrow’s theorem (1963) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973,
Satterthwaite 1975) have long been regarded as cornerstones of social choice
theory. The former is often interpreted as demonstrating that there is no perfect
voting rule. The latter states, roughly, that all voting rules are vulnerable to
strategic misrepresentation of preferences: at least one individual voter always
has an incentive to vote strategically, and no voting rule is strategy-proof. Under
most voting rules strategic voting means giving one’s vote to an alternative that
is not considered the best. It has been taken for granted in the vast literature
on strategy-proofness that strategic voting is to be avoided as far as possible.
However, there are very few contributions that endeavour to evaluate its welfare
consequences in an explicit and welfarist way. This is precisely the gap that this
PhD thesis endeavours to …ll.
Assume that there are three parties: Right, Center, and Left. Voter X prefers
Right to Center and Center to Left, but he believes that Right has the least
chance of winning. If he greatly prefers Right to Center and is almost indi¤erent
between Center and Left, he is less likely to switch his vote from Right to Center
than if he slightly prefers Right to Center but abhors Left. (Downs 1957, p. 49)
This intuitive reasoning behind a strategic vote is so familiar that any layman
can recognise it. Downs expresses the idea that preference intensities for the
choice alternatives, and beliefs concerning their chances of winning, are crucial.
Given how obvious the logic of beliefs and intensities is, it may be surprising that
models of strategic voting that do not take preference intensities and incomplete
information into account continue to be accepted for publication (e.g., Felsenthal
1996, Saari 2003b).
Using mere preference orderings in a voting model implies making an as-
sumption that is known not to correspond to the facts. To be sure, the reason
for neglecting intensities in the current mainstream literature on social choice
vii
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does not derive from the belief that they are behaviourally or normatively ir-
relevant. It is rather that they are considered relevant in both senses, but they
have not been used because they have been considered epistemologically prob-
lematic, or because it has been too di¢cult to construct mathematical models
in which their behavioural consequences can be studied.
Models of incomplete information that formulate conditions for strategic
voting for individual voters have been around for decades. McKelvey and Or-
deshook’s (1972) model for the plurality rule was the …rst, Merrill (1981a, 1981b)
formulated similar conditions for the Borda rule and approval voting, while
Enelow (1981) and Ordeshook & Palfrey (1988) devised such models for amend-
ment agendas.
This literature explicitly models preference intensities, but it has not been
integrated with exercises in normative social choice in which voting rules are
characterised and critically compared in terms of their properties. Most the-
ories of normative social choice have thus been behaviourally simple: voters
are typically assumed to record their preference ordering sincerely. The reason
for this, I presume, is that formulating strategic-voting conditions for individual
voters is not su¢cient for characterising the consequences of strategic behaviour
at the aggregate level. The models referred to above take preferences and beliefs
as exogenously given. An account of deriving or determining voters’ beliefs in a
reasonable way is thus necessary. Black (1978) and Ho¤man (1982) show how to
compute so-called pivot probabilities, but these contributions do not show how
to aggregate voters’ decisions. What is needed is either equilibrium analysis or
computer simulation.
I have chosen to work with computer simulations for two reasons. First, since
the problem of multiple equilibria is ubiquitous in voting contexts, it is usually
impossible to derive the beliefs from of a game-theoretical solution concept in a
reasonable way. Secondly, since the methods for computing pivot probabilities
are already very complex, building tractable analytical models of strategic voting
has thus far been beyond the capacities of even the best game theorists.1
The main methodological contribution of this thesis is to provide an incomplete-
information framework in which the welfare consequences of strategic voting can
be systematically evaluated.
Desiderata for models that aim to normatively
evaluate the consequences of strategic voting
Since preference intensities inevitably a¤ect voting outcomes, they should also
be taken into account in evaluating the welfare consequences of strategic vot-
ing. If and when voters themselves consider preference intensities important,
they need to be taken into account both in modelling voting games and in eval-
uating the outcomes. Essays two and three are based on the idea of bringing
preference intensities into a framework that uni…es the positive assumptions con-
1See, however, Myerson & Weber (1993) and Myatt (2007).
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cerning voter behaviour, and the normative evaluation of the outcomes through
the notion of a utilitarian winner. In short, the idea is to simply see how tak-
ing intensities into account a¤ects the normative evaluation of strategic voting
and voting rules. Taking preference intensities into account in an evaluation
of the welfare consequences of strategic voting implies using utilitarian crite-
ria. Given that the intuition behind strategic voting so self-evidently relies on
preference intensities, it is unlikely that nobody has happened to think of study-
ing its intensity-related welfare consequences: it is rather that there has been
an articulated methodological unwillingness to do so. The epistemological and
philosophical problems concerning the sum-of-utilities criterion were the very
starting point of social choice theory.
How should the desirability of strategic voting be evaluated and investigated?
I will brie‡y describe the existing approaches, and then present my own proposal.
The approach that most social choice theorists have used is the intuitive one
of assuming that since strategic voting means ‘misrepresenting’ or ‘lying’ about
one’s true preference ordering, it should be ruled out as far as possible.
Kelly (1988, p. 103) provides a list of explicit arguments upon which intuitive
judgments rely, and which is applicable to the strategy-proofness condition.2
1. Manipulation introduces an element of randomness into collective deci-
sions.
2. Unequal manipulative skills may lead to the destruction of our e¤orts to
design rules with an equal treatment of individuals.
3. Voters are led to waste resources in manipulation calculations.
4. We are led to try to reduce manipulation by others of us by concealing our
preferences, thus reducing the ‡ow of information that might help in collective
decision-making.
5. Manipulation by representatives blurs their voting record and makes it
di¢cult for us to determine if they are really representing our interests.
None of these arguments refers to how well individual preferences are satis…ed
when people vote strategically rather than sincerely. The arguments are not
welfarist. It is clear that points 2, 3, 4 and 5 are more relevant to the voting
behaviour of parliamentary representatives than to citizens’ voting behaviour
in mass elections. Therefore, in order to evaluate whether strategic voting is
bene…cial or harmful in parliaments or courts, we need some further knowledge
about the relevance of the …ve arguments compared to a utilitarian evaluation
of its consequences. In the case of mass elections, none of the arguments seems
to be compelling. An increasing number of scholars have stated that they do
not consider strategic voting morally questionable.3 This may signal the fact
that Satterthwaite’s arguments are no longer fully accepted.
The voting models discussed in this thesis provide a framework for turning
arguments 1, 2, and 4 into open research questions. This is a …rst step in for-
2 These arguments were originally presented in Mark Satterthwaite’s PhD dissertation: The
Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure (University of Wisconsin, 1973). See Van Hees
& Dowding (forthcoming) for a comprehensive discussion.
3 See Kolm (1996), Buchanan & Yoon (2006), and for a more detailed argument Van Hees
& Dowding (forthcoming).
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mally studying the importance of these arguments, and the possible di¤erences
between voting rules. Although this thesis does not o¤er tools for studying ar-
guments 3 and 5, there seems to be no reason to suppose that they, in turn,
could not be turned into empirical questions.
The literature on the uncovered set, the Banks set, and related works (Miller
1980, Banks 1985) have given a somewhat more positive assessment of strategic
voting because it has been shown that it restricts the set of outcomes a monopoly
agenda setter may achieve to a small subset of the outcome space. A third
approach proceeds by constructing models of strategic voting, and then studying
whether some axiomatic conditions are satis…ed under various voting rules (e.g.,
Felsenthal 1990). Usually the results of these exercises show that very few
conditions are satis…ed if the voters engage in strategic behaviour. Since voting
rules satisfy very few axioms if the voters may vote strategically, all of these
approaches su¤er from the fact that comparisons between di¤erent voting rules
are di¢cult to evaluate.4
It is impossible to obtain information on von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
in such a way that attitudes towards risk are not involved. One reason for the
unwillingness to use preference intensities in normative voting models is based
on the idea that since von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities incorporate attitudes
towards risk, they are not suitable for normative assessments. However, it is
not necessary to assume that attitudes towards risk are an intrinsic property of
preferences. I do not need to join the general philosophical discussion concern-
ing whether attitudes towards risk should be seen as belonging to a person’s
preferences here.5 It su¢ces for my purposes to say that since those attitudes
are irrelevant in terms of normatively evaluating the outcomes in voting games,
voters’ utilities should not incorporate attitudes towards risk. These attitudes
are relevant only to the choices they make, and should be modelled through
beliefs rather than through preferences in voting models. The …rst essay shows
how to do this.6
Table 1.1 summarises the desiderata for voting models.
The second column ‘Is ? relevant for evaluating the outcomes normatively’
4We must bear in mind that the use of strategy-proofness is not restricted to voting the-
ory. It has become an integral part of the implementation-theoretical toolbox through the
revelation principle, according to which truth-telling, direct revelation mechanisms can gen-
erally be designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium outcome of other mechanisms. This can
be proven in a large category of mechanism-design cases. It is used most often to prove some-
thing about the whole class of mechanism equilibria, by selecting the simple direct revelation
mechanism, proving a result about that, and applying the revelation principle to assert that
the result is true for all mechanisms in that context. Insofar as the principle is used merely
as a mathematical tool in deriving theorems, my results have no relevance for the revelation
principle. However, since the sum of utility provides a social welfare function, the …nding that
strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency provides a case in which the intuition behind
the revelation principle is falsi…ed. These results do not provide a counter-example for this
principle, however, because the models in which utilitarian e¢ciency is increased are not based
on game-theoretical equilibria.
5Hansson (1988) and Rabin (2000) have argued that risk-aversion ought not to be concep-
tualised in terms of utility functions.
6 It is clear that this model cannot measure attitudes towards risk in terms of the traditional
Arrow-Pratt coe¢cient because it is de…ned in terms of the utility function.
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Is X relevant Is it desirable to include
for evaluating the X in a realistic model
X outcomes normatively? of voter decisions?
intensity yes yes
risk attitudes no yes
beliefs no yes
Table 1.1: Desiderata for models of strategic voting
has a ‘yes’ entry if an item ? (intensity, risk attitude, or beliefs) ought to be
taken into account in evaluating voting outcomes, and the third column has a
‘yes’ entry if a voting model represents real-world voting realistically only by
including ?. Let me emphasise that when I talk about beliefs here, I only
mean beliefs concerning the winning prospects of the various alternatives,and
they should not be understood here as concerning the content of the policy
alternatives or the characteristics of a candidate. The same comment applies to
attitudes towards risk. It is clear that they should be included in, say, evaluating
whether a new nuclear power plant should be built. They are thus irrelevant
for normative evaluations only insofar as they a¤ect voters’ beliefs concerning
other voters’ voting behaviour, but since they inevitably a¤ect the outcomes,
the third column has a ‘yes’ entry. Risk attitudes, beliefs and intensities should
be included in a realistic model of the behaviour of voters, but only preference
intensities should be taken into account in evaluating voting outcomes.
In the framework that I am proposing the welfare consequences of strategic
voting are evaluated by comparing voting outcomes under sincere and strate-
gic voting behaviour. Given a welfarist standpoint, this would seem to be the
obvious way of evaluating strategic voting. The structure of a model aimed at
evaluating the welfare consequences of strategic voting on the basis of individual
preferences has to be the following. It has to specify two di¤erent behavioural as-
sumptions, expected utility- maximising (strategic) behaviour and sincere voting
behaviour, and to compare the utilitarian e¢ciency under these two behavioural
assumptions with a …xed set of preferences. If utilitarian e¢ciency is higher un-
der strategic behaviour than under sincere behaviour, strategic voting may be
said to be welfare-increasing compared to sincere voting. If the converse holds,
strategic voting is welfare-decreasing.
Computer simulations are particularly well-suited for such analysis because
they allow the generation of a …xed set of preferences and comparison of the out-
comes of two di¤erent behavioural assumptions. Since voters’ preferences have
to be …xed for this kind of comparison, there has to be a behaviour-independent
way of evaluating the alternatives. It must be possible to compare the alterna-
tives in terms of voters’ utilities. However, in that case the alternatives cannot
be compared without making interpersonal comparisons of voters’ utilities con-
cerning them. The welfare consequences of strategic voting thus cannot be
evaluated in a welfarist manner without making interpersonal comparisons. A
model in which the welfare consequences of voting rules and strategic voting
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are evaluated has to separate the analysis of voting behaviour and of normative
judgements concerning the outcomes.
The signal extraction model of incomplete infor-
mation
The …rst essay, ‘Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number
of players’, provides one possible way of modelling incomplete information in
mass elections; it describes a signal extraction model embedded in a computer-
simulation framework. The main result of this paper is an expression for an
agent’s belief, given that he or she has obtained a perturbed signal concerning
the preference pro…le. This result is directly applied in the second essay, and it
was instrumental in developing the signal extraction model for the third essay.
In computer simulations voters are assumed to derive their beliefs using statisti-
cal signal extraction. Nothing in this model restricts its use to voting contexts,
but having been formulated for the impartial anonymous culture (IAC) assump-
tion it is likely to be particularly suitable for studying voting. IAC states that
each possible event, such as a voter’s type, is equally likely to occur.
In incomplete information models of voting, voters need to formulate beliefs
concerning how other voters are likely to vote. There is thus a need for assigning
probabilities to the agents in one way or another. The IAC assumption, com-
bined with the usual common prior assumption, does not lead to very interesting
results in voting theory because it means that all voters have the same priors
for the relevant quantities. A Bayesian model does not provide any advantage
over a complete information model in such circumstances because uniform pri-
ors imply that all voters always vote sincerely unless, of course, they learn from
previous voting choices and thereby formulate posterior probabilities.
My model solves this problem by assuming that voters obtain a perturbed
signal of the preference or utility pro…le. In other words, a voter pro…le is
…rst generated by computer, and each voter is given a perturbed signal of the
relevant aspects of this realised pro…le. Typically, the relevant aspect is whether
an alternative has a chance of winning.
Voters formulate their probabilities by considering the perturbed signal as
the mean of the relevant random variable. They also need to assume some-
thing about the variance of the distribution of errors with which their signals
are perturbed. This variance of the error distribution is taken as an exogenous
variable in the simulations. Thus, using the incomplete information model in
voting simulations amounts to testing how the reliability of the perturbed sig-
nals a¤ects the results. The parameter value that describes reliability could be
assumed to be known or not known by the voters. If they do not know it, the
expected value could also be taken as an exogenous parameter that is tested in
the simulations. The expected value of the reliability is called the degree of con-
…dence in the signals because this term best conveys the intuitive interpretation
of this parameter.
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This method is particularly suitable for modelling a large number of hetero-
geneous agents. The crux of the model is that the voters’ beliefs can be derived
by characterising the reliability of their signals and their con…dence in them.
As the signals are randomly perturbed, each agent obtains a somewhat di¤er-
ent signal, and thus derives a somewhat di¤erent belief. This facilitates the
avoidance of the unhappy consequences of the standard Bayesian assumption of
common priors. The model does not violate this assumption, however, because
the priors could be considered as common before the agents obtain their signal.
Voting theorists have often expressed concern over the gap between com-
plete information models and the paucity of information with which real voters
are assumed to operate. The signal extraction model goes a long way towards
solving this problem because it can be used to model informational conditions
ranging from very close to complete information to wildly inaccurate informa-
tion. Furthermore, since voters’ degree of con…dence in their signals may be
separately modelled, it also allows for studying setups in which voters are hesi-
tant to engage in strategic voting because they believe that their information is
not fully reliable.
The welfare consequences of strategic voting un-
der the Borda rule and in parliamentary agendas
Essays two and three show how intensities a¤ect voting outcomes by formulating
expected-utility conditions for strategic voting under some commonly used vot-
ing rules, and evaluate its welfare consequences. The second essay ‘The welfare
consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas ’
shows that if voters engage in strategic behaviour under amendment and elimi-
nation agendas, their average utility is higher than if they always vote sincerely.
The third essay ‘The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men’ provides a
similar study of the Borda count. Here the outcomes are evaluated in terms of
utilitarian e¢ciency, i.e., the frequency with which the utilitarian winner (the
alternative with the highest sum of utility) is selected. The main …nding in these
essays is that strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency and average utility.
Given a utilitarian evaluation of voting outcomes, strategic voting turns out to
be bene…cial rather than harmful. This result prompts a new interpretation of
the aforementioned theorems: if strategic voting is bene…cial, it is no longer
reasonable to interpret them as implying that there is something wrong with
voting rules.
The main reason for this result is what I call the counterbalancing of strategic
votes. In an electorate with a large number of voters who make their decisions
based on incomplete information some individuals typically have an incentive to
vote strategically for an alternative, say ?, but at the same time, others have an
incentive to strategically desert this very same alternative ? by voting for some
other alternative ?. The conditions for voting strategically in terms of the struc-
ture of voters’ preferences and their information are di¤erent in di¤erent voting
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rules, but they always indicate that, ceteris paribus, an alternative that has a
large sum of utility is likely to obtain many and lose few strategic votes. Thus,
many strategic votes for the utilitarian winner are likely to be counterbalanced
by few strategic votes against.
The remaining three essays comprising the thesis provide the necessary philo-
sophical and methodological support for the voting models. The rest of this in-
troduction describes how essays one, four, and …ve relate to the voting models.
Unrealistic assumptions in rational choice theory
There are two epistemological di¢culties concerning preference intensities. The
…rst is that it is di¢cult to observe intensities, even intrapersonal ones. One
particular formulation of this argument is that it is impossible to distinguish
between intensities and attitudes towards risk in the reference-lottery tech-
nique (see e.g., Hirshleifer & Riley 1992) that lies behind the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility construction. The second is that since it is impossible to
observe interpersonal di¤erences in preference intensities, interpersonal compar-
isons are meaningless with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and are gener-
ally considered to be methodologically questionable because it is not possible to
derive such comparisons from individual choices.
The fourth essay ‘Unrealistic assumptions in rational choice theory’ is re-
lated to models of strategic voting in two ways. First, the concept of utilitar-
ian e¢ciency presupposes interpersonal comparability of preference intensities,
and the results of the voting models thus critically hinge on the possibility of
responding to the criticism in a satisfactory way. The …nding that strategic
voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency was tested for robustness with respect to
di¤erent interpersonal comparisons of intensities.7 The results of such robust-
ness analysis reported in essay two show that although the exact numerical
results are a¤ected by di¤erent interpersonal comparisons, strategic voting re-
mains welfare-increasing if the interpersonal variation is not allowed to exceed
the one-man-one-vote principle too frequently. This essay provides a theoretical
justi…cation for robustness by explicating its epistemic credentials.
Secondly, the essay provides support for a particular assumption upon which
voting simulation models are based; the IAC. As a description of real electorates
this assumption is wildly inaccurate. However, its use may be perfectly legiti-
mate if the purpose of the theory employing it is to provide an account of how
two or more alternative institutions are able to cope with a particular problem.
The purpose of some assumptions is to exaggerate some characteristic in order
to bring it into focus. In the case of strategic-voting models, the IAC assumption
is used because it maximises the number of simulated games in which strategic
7By di¤erent interpersonal comparisons I mean di¤erent numerical values for the parame-
ters that de…ne a voter’s preference scale. The di¤erent comparisons are all de…ned within full
cardinal comparability. It is thus not a matter of di¤erent comparability assumptions in the
sense of allowable transformations for utility functions as in standard accounts of interpersonal
comparisons, but rather a question of di¤erent ‘actual’ comparisons given full comparability.
See e.g., Blackorby & Bossert (2006) for a recent survey on interpersonal comparisons.
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voting may a¤ect the results. It is thus used because it distorts reality in the
right way: it allows for studying the welfare consequences of strategic voting. It
must thus be borne in mind that the voting models presented in this thesis are
not meant to be realistic with respect to how commonly strategic voting occurs.
The concluding essay: a methodological critique
of social choice theory
The concluding …fth essay is entitled ‘A farewell to IIA’. Conclusions from the
voting models are drawn, and supporting arguments provided. The discussion
focuses on two perennial questions in social choice theory: intensities of prefer-
ence and the normative validity of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) condition (Arrow 1963). I would never have ventured to resurrect a topic
that had been extensively discussed decades previously, if I did not have some-
thing new and important to say about it.
A further aim in this essay is to contribute to the current discussion on the
IIA condition. Donald Saari (1998, 2001) argued that it is not acceptable be-
cause a voting rule that satis…es it cannot di¤erentiate between rational and
irrational voters. There are, however, those who continue to think that it is ac-
ceptable, mainly on the grounds that it is closely related to precluding strategic
voting (e.g., Risse 2004), and strategic voting is considered undesirable.
Saari uses his arguments against IIA in defence of the Borda rule and as
an attack on the majority rule with various agendas, i.e., the rules that are
discussed in this thesis. It is well-known that the Borda rule violates IIA, but
since it asks voters to provide a full ordering of the alternatives, it collects
information on the transitivity of the preferences.
It is shown in this essay that the independence condition is violated under the
majority rule with an amendment agenda if voters engage in strategic behaviour.
Given that IIA is also violated under a voting rule in which it is commonly
thought to be satis…ed, it is evident, and hardly requires proof, that it is violated
under all commonly used voting rules. This has implications for the recent
debate between Saari (2006, 2003b) and Risse (2001, 2004, 2005): IIA is violated
under all voting rules if voters are rational. Furthermore, if voters engage in
strategic behaviour, even the majority rule discloses connecting information
between pairs of alternatives.
Therefore, Saari’s argument against IIA is not valid qua the argument for
the Borda rule and against other voting rules. On the other hand, the Borda
rule is commonly taken to be highly vulnerable to strategic voting, and this
has been considered the main argument against it.8 The third essay shows that
strategic voting is also bene…cial under the Borda rule. The whole discussion of
IIA and the comparison of voting rules must thus be rethought. It is worthwhile
emphasising that my argument is directed against the common interpretation
of impossibility theorems rather than for or against any particular voting rule.
8 Saari (2006) does not accept this judgment, however.
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Indeed, my point is that it is not possible to use IIA for arguing for or against
any such rule.
What has traditionally been considered the main justi…cation for IIA is
invalid. The strongest argument for it has been that it is closely related to
precluding the strategic misrepresentation of preferences, and this misrepresen-
tation has been considered undesirable. My results show that strategic voting
results in better outcomes in terms of utilitarian e¢ciency than sincere voting,
and therefore this argument fails. My argument boils down to the old criticism
that IIA does not take preference intensities into account. Mackie (2003) pro-
vides a recent version of this criticism. What I have done is to show that this
argument need not rest on the mere intuition that intensities are important.
If the welfare consequences of strategic voting are explicitly studied, it turns
out that violating IIA through strategic voting has bene…cial intensity-related
consequences at the aggregate level.
I thus argue that IIA ought to be violated under many commonly used
voting rules. Providing further support for this claim entails going through
the various arguments that have been presented for the IIA condition. The
essay is organised around three of these: the observability, the epistemological-
moral and the strategic-voting arguments. I have discussed the last of these
above. The moral part of the epistemological-moral argument is the idea that
cardinal von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities should not be used in social-welfare
judgments because they incorporate attitudes towards risk, and these attitudes
are morally irrelevant in such judgments. The epistemological part is that it
is not possible to distinguish between attitudes towards risk and intensities in
individual behaviour.
This argument is perfectly acceptable. However, the methodological injunc-
tion to use only preference orderings in evaluating the alternatives follows from
it only if it is possible to obtain reliable information on preference orderings.
The observability argument must thus be discussed. The postulation here is
that it is not possible to obtain reliable information on preference orderings ei-
ther in a voting context. The main reason for this lies in strategic voting itself:
even though voters are able to explicitly express only their preference orderings
under most voting rules, their choices are also in‡uenced by their preference
intensities. If we observe that a voter gives his or her support to ?, this does
not necessarily mean that this alternative stands highest in his or her preference
ordering. It is, of course, easier to obtain information on individual preference
orderings than on preference intensities and interpersonal comparisons. How-
ever, given that it is impossible to obtain fully reliable information on preference
orderings, and given that collecting information on real preference pro…les is not
part of the practice of theorists endeavouring to provide normative comparisons
concerning voting rules, the injunction to restrict the preference information to
orderings is without proper warrant.
The thesis amounts to a fundamental methodological criticism of social
choice theory. Since strategy-proofness and IIA are not normatively acceptable,
social choice theorists have been trying to answer the wrong question. The bulk
of the current literature on strategic voting represents attempts to …nd strategy-
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proof mechanisms, or to determine the degree to which di¤erent voting rules can
be manipulated. The simulation results presented in these essays on strategic
voting show that these questions are misguided and provide misleading results
on voting rules. The important task here is to determine the circumstances
in which strategic voting is welfare-increasing or welfare-diminishing. The cir-
cumstances include di¤erent voting rules, and assumptions concerning voters’
information and the utility pro…le.
Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem are logically unas-
sailable in the sense of being deductive. Their interpretation, however, is a
di¤erent matter. They are not false, but their current interpretation is mislead-
ing. Arrow’s theorem cannot show that all voting rules are problematic if one of
its conditions is not normatively compelling. Whether the fact that all voting
rules are vulnerable to strategic voting is a good or a bad thing is something
that only research can establish. Under all voting rules I have studied thus far,
strategic voting is bene…cial.
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Chapter 2
Signal extraction for
simulated games with a
large number of players
Abstract
A signal extraction problem in simulated games is studied. A mod-
elling technique is proposed for deriving beliefs for players in sim-
ulated games. Since standard Bayesian games provide conditions
for beliefs on the basis of the common prior assumption, they do
not allow for non-uniform beliefs unless the game has some dynamic
structure that allows for learning. The framework presented allows
for deriving beliefs by characterizing the reliability of the signals,
and the players’ degree of con…dence in these signals. This makes it
particularly suitable for games with a large number of heterogenous
players.
Keywords: Signal extraction; Simulated games; Beliefs; Heteroge-
neous players
2.1 Introduction
In standard Bayesian incomplete information models, the players’ actions are
independent of the realisations of random variables, because they are assumed
to know the probability distributions for the relevant random variables, but not
the realisations of these variables (e.g., Harsanyi 1967-8, 1995). These models
assume that the players start with common priors and update them with Bayes’
rule as the play unfolds. Bayesian models have proven to be very useful in
game theory but they are not applicable in all circumstances. For example, in
games where the players do not have the opportunity of updating their beliefs
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by observing other players’ choices, they may update their beliefs only if they
obtain a signal that contains some valuable information for them.
A decade ago Carlsson & van Damme (1993) proposed an alternative to
the Bayesian approach of analysing incomplete information in games; the global
games.1
In this paper, we will propose a modelling technique that is similar to global
games and to statistical signal extraction in that the players are assumed to
observe a perturbed signal of the underlying true game. However, instead of
presenting an analytical model, our model is best applied in simulated games
with a large number of heterogenous players.
A model where the players receive perturbed signals concerning the true
game2 is particularly appropriate when the preference pro…le (the set of pref-
erences for all players) is drawn from some symmetric distribution, and the
players need to know something beyond their priors about the characteristics
of a large population of heterogenous players. We will study a setting where
such characteristics include the realised distribution of players, i.e. the number
of players with some particular type of preferences. More particularly, we will
show how to derive beliefs in simulated games where the pro…le of player types
is generated with a uniform distribution such that each player type is equally
likely.
It is di¢cult to model the beliefs of a large number of heterogenous players
because it is practically impossible to collect information on such beliefs. Our
approach provides one possible way of dealing with such situations, because we
characterise the players’ information by the reliability of signals they receive,
and by the degree of con…dence that they have for these signals. The frame-
work allows us to derive beliefs for a large number of players with heterogenous
preferences who receive di¤erent signals.
Since the terms ’reliability’ and ’degree of con…dence’ have various meanings
in di¤erent frameworks, let us emphasize at the outset that the reliability of the
players’ information is a property of the signals rather than an intentional state
of the players in our model. It is formalised as the standard deviation of the
perturbations. The degree of con…dence also concerns the signals rather than
the beliefs derived from them. The degree of con…dence a¤ects the players’
beliefs, but it is conceptually and formally di¤erent from those beliefs. The
degree of con…dence can, however, be considered as a subjective property of the
players.
An obvious area of application for such models is voting theory where simu-
lations with the uniform distribution on player types is known as the impartial
culture assumption.3 In principle, the technique is general enough to be ap-
1See Morris and Shin (2003) for a review of the literature on global games. Frankel et al.
(2003) generalise the results of Hansson and van Damme to arbitrary numbers of players and
actions.
2Such models are not to be confused with signaling models, where the players themselves
send signals.
3See Tsetlin, Regenwetter & Grofman (2003) and Gehrlein (2002) for recent discussions of
impartial culture.
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plicable in any situation with a large number of players, but the fact that we
derive beliefs for players whose types are drawn from a uniform distribution of
course limits the applicability of the model.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2.2 delineates the sim-
ilarities and di¤erences of our approach to global games. Section 2.3 describes
the signals. The beliefs are derived from these signals in appendix A. In section
2.4 we discuss how the reliability of the signals and the players’ con…dence in
these signals a¤ect the beliefs. Section 2.5 compares our concept of the degree
of con…dence to some previous conceptualizations.
2.2 Global games
A global game (Carlsson and van Damme 1993) is an incomplete information
game where the actual payo¤ structure is determined by a random draw from a
given class of games and where each player makes a noisy signal of the selected
game.
Consider a situation in which the players know that some game in the class
of games ? will be played, but they do not know which one. A class of games
is a set of games with a set of players ? (? = 1? 2? ???? ?) and a set of possible
payo¤ pro…les ¦.
Initially, the players have common prior beliefs represented by a probability
distribution with support on ?. Before choosing an action, each player gets
additional private information in the form of a perturbed signal of the actual
game ? to be played. The resulting incomplete information game is thus called
a global game. It can be described by the following steps:
1. Nature selects a game ? from ?.
2. Each player observes ? with some noise.
3. Players choose actions simultaneously.
4. Payo¤s are determined by ? and by the player’s choices.
Player ?:s signal is described by a random variable ??? which is de…ned by:
??? = ? + ????
where ?? is a realisation of a random variable ?, and ? is a scale parameter. The
players are thus assumed to observe the realisation of a random variable ?, plus
an error term ???. The players’ signals are correlated, because they are noisy
signals of the true game.
Our approach di¤ers from global games as follows. First, most contributions
in global games derive limit uniqueness results assuming that ? approaches zero.
In this sense the signals in global games are ’close’ to being correct, whereas
in our approach parameter ? may in principle be of any size whatsoever. Our
players are thus allowed to be ’less’ informed than the players in global games.
Second, it is usually assumed in global games that as ? ! 0? each player
becomes certain that she and her opponent have observed the true game. In
contrast, we may consider parameter ? as unobservable and not necessarily
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known. Therefore, even if the perturbance term were zero, we need not assume
the players are certain that they have observed the true game.
Third, our model is better suited for situations with parametric rationality
than strategic rationality (Elster 1983). We derive beliefs for the players on
the basis of what they know about the payo¤ pro…le, but we do not derive
equilibrium strategies. Our model of signals and beliefs can be used together
with di¤erent models that formulate the players’ expected utilities. Since we
do not present any particular application in this paper, we will not present
an account for how the players can take other players’ optimal strategies into
account.4
2.3 The signals
The players’ preferences are de…ned on a set ? of items. ? contains some items
that the players rank or compare with each other. The most typical application
of such a model is one where the players are interested in whether a majority
of players prefer ? to ? or vice versa. The model is obviously applicable to any
number of pairwise comparisons of items.
Let ? denote the number of players and ??(? Â ?) the number of players
who prefer item ? to item ? (?? ? 2 ?) in a simulated game ?. Since all the
symbols will be de…ned for a given simulated game ?, we will not subscript our
variables by the ’?’ in the sequel.
Let ??(? Â ?) = 1? if player ? prefers ? to ?, and ??(? Â ?) = 0? if player ?
prefers ? to ?. In this simple setting, a player’s type refers merely to whether she
prefers ? to ?. Since we assume that the pro…le of player types for a simulated
game ? is generated with impartial culture, each type is equally likely. ?(? Â ?)
can thus be viewed as a sum of ? Bernoulli trials, ?(? Â ?) = P??=1 ??(? Â ?),
and the probability ? that such a Bernoulli trial results in the outcome ??(? Â
?) = 1 is 12 .
The players are assumed to obtain a perturbed signal of the number of
players who prefer ? to ?. One way of writing the signal is as follows:
??? =
?(? Â ?)
?
+ ???? (2.1)
where ? is a scaling factor and ?? is a realisation of a random variable ? . ? re‡ects
the reliability of the signal. In this paper we will assume that the variable ? is
standard normal; ? » ?(0? 1).
What we want to do is to derive the probability that the number of players
who prefer ? to ? is larger than ?
2
, given a signal ??? . Let ??(?? ?) denote such
4For an example of how this can be done, see Lehtinen (2006b).
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a probability for player ?:
??(?? ?) = ????(?(? Â ?) ? ?(? Â ?)) (2.2)
= ????(?(? Â ?) ? ?
2
) (2.3)
= ????(
2?(? Â ?)
?(? Â ?) + ?(? Â ?) ? 1)? (2.4)
The derivation of such probabilities requires knowledge of the variance of the
variable ?(? Â ?). In simulated games generated with the impartial culture
assumption, this variance is ??2.
Since ?(? Â ?) is the sum of ? Bernoulli trials, the Central Limit Theorem
implies that the random variable ?(? Â ?)?? can be approximated with a
normally distributed random variable N (? Â ?). Naturally, invoking the central
limit theorem restricts the applicability of this model to games with a relatively
large number of players.
Let us write ?? = ??? The signal can now be written as a sum of two normally
distributed random variables:
??? = N (? Â ?) +??? (2.5)
Before deriving beliefs from such signals, let us point out that it will usually be
more convenient to use a standardized sum of Bernoulli trials, ?(? Â ?)? instead
of the variable ?(? Â ?) itself. The standardised sum is given by:
?(? Â ?) = ?(? Â ?) ¡??p
??2
? (2.6)
In models with impartial culture ? = 12 ? so that this is
?(? Â ?) = 2?(? Â ?) ¡?p
?
? (2.7)
A standardised signal of player ? is then given by
??? =
2?(? Â ?) ¡?p
?
+ ? ¢ ?? (2.8)
= ?(? Â ?) +??? (2.9)
Deriving the beliefs from such signals involves standard statistical inference.
The derivation is relegated to an Appendix because it is somewhat tedious.
Equation A.13 in Appendix A shows that the players’ beliefs are given by:
??(?? ?) = 1 ¡ ©
µ
¡ 1
?
p
1 + ?2
???
¶
? (2.10)
6 SIGNAL EXTRACTION FOR SIMULATED GAMES
2.4 Reliability of signals and con…dence
We will now consider how the degree of con…dence and the reliability of the
signals are interpreted in our model. Let us de…ne the random variable ? as
follows: ? = (?(? Â ?)j? = ??? ). ? is the conditional value of the standardised
variable ?(? Â ?), given the signal ??? . Inserting the standard deviations ?? = ??
and ?? = 1 into equation (A.8) in the appendix gives the density of variable ?:
??(?) =
p
1 + ?2p
2??
exp
Ã
¡1
2
(1 + ?2)
?2
µ
?¡ ?
?
?
(1 + ?2)
¶2!
? (2.11)
The expected value of ? is thus
? [?] = ? [?(? Â ?)j? = ??? ] =
???
(1 + ?2)
? (2.12)
Equation (2.12) has a natural interpretation. The smaller the variance
¡
?2
¢
of
the error term ?? the more exact information the signal provides of the variable
?(? Â ?)? and the more it will be rational to update the beliefs.
Note that
???
?!0
? [?(? Â ?)j? = ??? ] = ??? ? (2.13)
Hence, as the error term ? (= ???) approaches zero, the signal provides more
and more exact information on the ratio 2?(?Â?)?(?Â?)+?(?Â?) or the corresponding
standardised ratio 2?(?Â?)¡?p
?
. Furthermore,
???
?!1? [?(? Â ?)j? = ?
?
? ] = 0? (2.14)
Hence, as the variance of the error term approaches in…nity, the expected
value of the conditional value of the standardised variable ? approaches zero.
This means that the signals become more and more uninformative as the vari-
ance of the perturbations increases.
It may not be realistic to assume that the players know the reliability ? of
their signals. In such cases the players may be assumed to formulate expecta-
tions ??(?) concerning the reliability of their signals ?. The player’s beliefs can
then be derived using a modi…ed version of equation 2.10:
??(?? ?) = 1 ¡ ©
0@¡ 1
? (?)
q
1 +? (?)2
???
1A ? (2.15)
Let us say that ? denotes the reliability of signals, and ??(?) the degree of
con…dence in these signals. Considering equation 2.8, we may now de…ne the
following concepts:
De…nition 1 The reliability of signals? ?? is the standard deviation of the
perturbation of the signals ??? (? = 1? ?????).
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De…nition 2 The degree of con…dence in the signals is the expectation of
the reliability of the signals E(?).
Here is how the proposed model can be used in computer simulations. We
can test how the outcomes di¤er when we keep the preference pro…le …xed, but
vary the reliability of the signals and the degree of con…dence. It is usually
convenient to assume that all players and player types have the same reliability
of signals and the same degree of con…dence, but this is by no means necessary. It
is also possible to study cases where the players are systematically over-con…dent
(? (?) ? ?) or under-con…dent (? (?) ? ?).
De…nition 3 The players have a correct degree of con…dence if their degree
of con…dence in their signals equals the degree of reliability of these signals;
??(?) = ?? for all ? 2 ?.
The correct degree of con…dence means that the players’ beliefs about the
quality of their signals re‡ects the real quality of those signals. The standard
way of distinguishing between objective and subjective interpretations of prob-
abilities is to say that probabilities can be interpreted as objective if they are
based on a known probabilistic process. Probabilities are subjective if they are
not based on such processes. It may thus be said that models assuming correct
degree of con…dence incorporate objectively interpreted probabilities.
The smaller ? is, the more reliable a player’s signals are, and the smaller
??(?) is, the greater the player’s degree of con…dence in her signals. If ? = 0 for
all ? 2 ? , we say that the players have perfectly reliable information. However, if
the players are not assumed to know the value of ?? even though the players have
the same signals as they would have in a corresponding complete information
game, this does not yet imply that they act in the same way as players with
complete information.
If ? = ??(?) = 0 for all players, i.e. if the players have both perfectly reliable
information and a correct degree of con…dence in their signals, the players’
signals correspond to the knowledge of players in a corresponding complete
information game. In this sense, complete information games can be viewed as
a special case of our information model. To see this, note …rst that8<: ??(?? ?) ?
1
2 , ??? ? 0
??(?? ?) = 12 , ??? = 0
??(?? ?) ? 12 , ??? ? 0?
With ? = ?(?)? and inserting 2.8 into 2.15, we have
???
?(?)!0
??(?? ?) = ???
?(?)!0
8<:1 ¡ ©
0@¡ 1
? (?)
q
1 + ? (?)2
·
2?(? Â ?) ¡?p
?
+ ? ¢ ??
¸1A9=;
= 1 , 2?(? Â ?) ¡?p
?
? 0
= 0 , 2?(? Â ?) ¡?p
?
? 0?
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Even if ? 6= 0, it is possible that a player’s perturbed signal corresponds exactly
to the true value of the variable ?, if ?? happens to be exactly zero. This is
very unlikely, of course, because the perturbations are normally distributed. If
?? = 0, and ??(?) 6= 0? player ?’s signal is essentially the same as in a corre-
sponding complete information game, but she will not act as if she had complete
information, because player ?’s beliefs are not degenerate (0 or 1) when she does
not have full con…dence in her signals. In other words, if a player happens to
guess the ratio 2?(?Â?)¡?p
?
correctly, she is not willing to act on the basis of this
guess if she believes it is based on highly dubious evidence.
2.5 Relation to some previous literature
Many previous accounts have considered the degree of con…dence in one’s beliefs.
Here, however, we model the degree of con…dence in one’s signals. This is why
we need not invoke second-order beliefs (e.g., Marschak 1975, Borch 1975),
or intervals of beliefs (e.g., Good 1962, Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1982) to take
into account the players’ con…dence. These approaches su¤er from well-known
weaknesses. The degree of con…dence should already be taken into account in the
…rst-order probabilities and thus the second-order probabilities are super‡uous
(see Savage 1954, p. 58, de Finetti 1977). If the upper and lower probabilities
in the interval do not yield the same recommendations for action, there is no
evident way to choose between the di¤erent actions (e.g., Skyrms 1990, p. 113).
Second-order beliefs and intervals of beliefs have been proposed as a solution
to Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox. The literature that has tried to respond to Ells-
berg’s experiments5 has been concerned with two related concepts; the degree
of con…dence in one’s probability judgments and the ambiguity of the players’
information. Our approach is not designed nor suitable for modelling ambiguity
because the players are always assumed to know the form of the distribution
that is of interest to them. At the same time, the degree of con…dence has a
natural interpretation in our model.
Savage (1954, p. 68) denies that the degree of con…dence in one’s information
can have an e¤ect on a person’s judgment of probabilities: ”...the particular per-
sonalistic view sponsored here does not leave room for optimism or pessimism,
however these traits be interpreted, to play any role in the person’s judgment
of probabilities”. But since we model the degree of con…dence in the signals
rather than the degree of con…dence in the probability judgments, we arrive at
unique probabilities that may be used in standard expected utility calculations.
This is why we can sidestep Skyrms’ criticism even though we explicitly model
the players’ degree of con…dence.
5See also the papers on the third kind of solution; non-additive probabilities (Gilboa 1987),
(Schmeidler 1989).
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2.6 Conclusions
Our account of perturbed signals is particularly well suited for modelling situa-
tions where a large number of players have heterogenous preferences and beliefs.
It is designed to be used as a part of a larger expected utility model, where the
minor di¤erences in the players’ beliefs play an important role.
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Chapter 3
The welfare consequences of
strategic voting in two
commonly used
parliamentary agendas
Abstract
This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in
two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the av-
erage utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural
assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere be-
haviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with
expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting be-
haviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting in-
creases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensi-
ties correlates with voter types. (JEL classi…cation numbers: D71,
D81)
Keywords: strategic voting; agendas; welfare; simulation; counter-
balancing
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether strategic voting is bene…cial or harmful in two
commonly used parliamentary voting rules; amendment and elimination agen-
das. It is widely acknowledged that strategic voting may be bene…cial because
it may contain the power of an agenda-setter1 but usually the possibility of
strategic voting is considered an undesirable characteristic of a social decision
1 See Miller (1980), Shepsle & Weingast (1984), and Banks (1985).
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mechanism.2 Thus far, however, the welfare consequences of strategic voting
have not been studied by explicitly comparing strategic voting behaviour with
sincere voting behaviour (but see Chen & Yang 2002).3
The welfare consequences of strategic voting are evaluated by comparing
voters’ average utility obtained with Expected Utility maximising voting behav-
iour (EU behaviour) and with Sincere Voting behaviour (SV behaviour). In SV
behaviour all voters always vote sincerely. In EU behaviour, voters may vote
strategically or sincerely in any given stage of voting depending on the expected
utility of the choice options. If the average utility obtained with EU behaviour is
higher than with SV behaviour, strategic voting is said to be welfare-increasing.
Otherwise it is welfare-decreasing.
The idea that strategic voting may result in better outcomes than sincere
voting on the aggregate level may be surprising because strategic voting means
voting for an alternative that is not highest in one’s preference order. The
mechanism of counterbalancing of strategic votes explains why, when, and how
strategic voting may lead to desirable outcomes on the aggregate level. In a large
group of voters, there are usually incentives to vote strategically both for and
against a given alternative. Strategic votes for an alternative are counterbal-
anced by strategic votes against this same alternative. An intensively supported
alternative gets more strategic votes than a less intensively supported alterna-
tive.4 Strategic voting thus increases the chance that an intensively supported
alternative beats an alternative which has less intense support but a broader
base of supporters. If an intensively supported alternative would lose against an
alternative with a larger number of supporters in a sincere pair-wise …rst-round
vote between the two, strategic voting may increase welfare by increasing the
chance that an intensively supported alternative is selected in an early stage of
voting.
Some scholars have lamented that the widespread use of majority rule has
not been properly explained, particularly in view of the negative impossibility
and instability (McKelvey 1976, Scho…eld 1978) results in social choice theory. It
has been widely acknowledged that preference intensities are relevant for social
welfare judgements5 , but there are very few models that explicitly try to study
how these intensities a¤ect voting outcomes (but see Blais & Nadeau 1996).
The traditional criticism of majority rule is that it does not take into account
preference intensities. The results presented here provide a more positive per-
spective on majority rule than many previous results in voting theory because
it will be shown that strategic voting not only may, but is likely to be bene…cial
in the sense that the outcomes re‡ect preference intensities if and only if voters
vote strategically.
2However, Miller (1977) shows, by way of an example, that strategic voting may select the
Condorcet winner when sincere voting does not. The Condorcet winner is an alternative that
the majority of voters prefer to all other alternatives.
3Vote-trading is also a way to vote strategically, and its welfare consequences have been
investigated. See Shepsle & Weingast (1994) for a fairly recent review.
4The literature on vote-trading has also acknowledged that strategic voting allows for
expressing preference intensities (see e.g., Stratmann 1997).
5See e.g. Hildreth (1953), Coleman (1966) and Mackay (1980, p. 42).
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Preference intensities in agenda voting can be explicitly modelled only in
a model with incomplete information. The model of incomplete information is
based on statistical signal extraction since voters obtain noisy signals of the true
structure of the game, and formulate beliefs on the basis of these signals6 . The
signal extraction model is explained in more detail in Lehtinen (2006a). The
model has been applied to Borda rule (Lehtinen forthcoming) and to plurality
and runo¤ rules (Lehtinen 2006b).
Instead of presenting an analytical model, computer simulations are used
for modelling voters’ belief formation and behaviour. Simulations are used for
the following reasons. First, welfare-increasing strategic voting is what the
literature on computer simulations calls an “emergent property”, it emerges only
when the individual votes are combined. The mechanism of counterbalancing
strategic votes explains why an “invisible hand” result is obtained. Although
it may be possible to derive such a result analytically, it is very di¢cult to
analyse the interaction of hundreds of heterogeneous voters with an analytical
model. Second, the purpose of the simulations is to examine how much voters’
preference intensities must correlate with voter types, and how reliable must
voters’ signals be, in order for strategic voting to be welfare-increasing. This is
why the degree of reliability and the degree of correlation are taken as exogenous
parameters.
The existence of a Condorcet winner (CW) is usually considered su¢cient
for satisfactory performance in majority rule. If there is a Condorcet winner
among the alternatives, this alternative will be the outcome under amendment
agendas if all voters vote sincerely (Black 1958), or if they maximise utility
with complete information.7 However, various results have established that the
existence of a Condorcet winner is highly unlikely, especially if the number of
alternatives and/or voters is large.8
Simulation approaches to voting have evaluated and compared voting rules
by investigating how frequently a Condorcet winner is chosen in a voting rule
(assuming that it exists), or by investigating how frequently a utilitarian winner
(the alternative with the largest sum of utility) is chosen (see e.g. Merrill 1988).
All well-known incomplete information models of strategic voting in majority
rule (Enelow 1981, Jung 1987, Ordeshook & Palfrey 1988) assume that voters
condition their choices on the possibility that they are pivotal in the sense that
they make their choices by comparing the expected utility of voting for each
of the alternatives. Enelow’s model di¤ers from the other models, however,
in that it does not assume that the voters formulate beliefs by conditioning
on the assumption of being pivotal in the …rst round of voting. If a voter
who conditions her choices on being pivotal has poor knowledge of the type
6 This model of incomplete information is also similar to global games (Carlsson & van
Damme 1993). See Morris & Shin (2003) for a review. See also Frankel, Morris & Pauzner
(2003).
7 See McKelvey & Niemi (1978), Moulin (1979), and Sloth (1993).
8 See McKelvey (1990) and Austen-Smith & Banks (1999) for surveys on the analytical
literature on the existence of a Condorcet winner. Mueller (1989) and Gehrlein (2002) provide
overviews of the simulation approaches.
14 WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC VOTING
distribution of voters, she may well obtain a worse outcome for herself by voting
strategically than she would have obtained by voting sincerely. Therefore, while
conditioning one’s choice on being pivotal is rational, conditioning one’s beliefs
on being pivotal is irrational.
The paper is organised as follows. EU behaviour under amendment agen-
das is based on Enelow’s (1981) expected utility model, which is introduced in
section 3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 presents a similar expected utility model for elimi-
nation agendas. These basic building blocks are su¢cient for understanding the
logic of the welfare consequences of strategic voting. Simple examples in section
3.3 show that the utilitarian winner rather than the Condorcet winner may be
selected if voters engage in strategic voting under incomplete information.
In the rest of the paper, the circumstances in which strategic voting increases
or diminishes welfare are investigated using computer simulation. A model of in-
complete information is introduced in section 3.4 by describing the assumptions
related to voters’ signals and beliefs.
Section 3.5 explains in detail how the counterbalancing of strategic votes
a¤ects the welfare consequences of strategic voting. Section 3.6 describes the
structure of the simulation framework. The behavioural assumptions of EU
behaviour and SV behaviour are analysed with setups. A setup is a collection
of assumptions on voters’ preferences, beliefs, behaviour, and the institutional
structure. This section also establishes the criteria for evaluating voting out-
comes.
Section 3.7 presents simulation results. Since the results depend on a utili-
tarian welfare function, it will be necessary to discuss interpersonal comparisons
of utilities. Section 3.7.3 presents simulation results with various di¤erent in-
terpersonal comparisons. The results from these various setups indicate that
strategic voting increases welfare irrespective of what kinds of interpersonal
comparisons are made. The purpose of these simulations is thus to show that
the results are robust with respect to interpersonal comparisons. Section 3.8
presents the conclusions.
3.2 Expected utility models for agendas
3.2.1 Amendment agendas: Enelow’s model
Let ? = f?? ?? ?g denote a set of available alternatives9 , ? = f1? 2? ???? ?? ?????g a
set of voters, and ?? voters ?’s utility. Let U1, U2, and U3 denote the utilities for
the best, second-best, and the worst alternatives, respectively. (The subscript i
denoting the individual is dropped here in order to avoid clutter.) The possible
voter types are shown in Table 3.1.
Let us say that ?2 denotes a voter’s intensity of preference. There are six
di¤erent types of voters, ?1? ?2? ???? ?6. A voter’s type refers only to his or her
9Only the case with three alternatives is studied in this paper. Extending the model
to any number of alternatives is possible but so complicated that it requires another paper
(Lehtinen 2002).
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type of voter
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 utility
x y z x y z ?1
y z x z x y ?2
z x y y z x ?3
Table 3.1: Voter types and utilities with three alternatives
order of preferences here, it does not include a speci…cation of his or her beliefs.
All preferences are assumed to be strict.
Alternatives are put to a sequence of pair-wise majority comparisons in an
amendment agenda or in an elimination agenda.10 An amendment agenda is
constructed as follows: two alternatives (say ? and ?) are put to a majority
vote against each other in the …rst round of voting. The winner of this …rst
contest is then put to vote against the third alternative (?) in a second round
of voting. Figure 3.1 presents this amendment agenda. Since path-dependence
is not studied in this paper, other possible voting orders in amendment agendas
are not shown here.
Figure 3.1: An amendment agenda with three alternatives
Voter ?’s subjective probability that a given alternative ? beats ? (?? ? 2 ?)
in a pair-wise second-round contest is denoted ?? (???). In the …rst round of
voting, voters’ choice options are lotteries on the second-round outcomes.
In the …rst round of voting, voters choose by evaluating lotteries (?? ?;
?? (???) ? 1¡ ?? (???)) and (?? ?; ?? (???) ? 1¡ ?? (???)). Maximizing expected
10 See Ordeshook (1986), Ordeshook & Schwartz (1987), and Miller (1995) for discussions
on di¤erent agendas.
16 WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC VOTING
utility implies giving one’s vote for the branch of the voting tree with the great-
est expected utility. A voter will vote for the upper branch (i.e. for x) if
?? (???)??(?) + (1 ¡ ?? (???))??(?) (3.1)
¸ ?? (???)??(?) + (1 ¡ ?? (???))??(?)?
If the expected utility is the same for the two branches, the voter is assumed
to vote sincerely. Voters of types 2 and 4 have a dominant strategy to vote
sincerely (Farquharson 1969). Enelow uses a zero-one normalization for utili-
ties for formulating the model. Although this normalization is not used in the
simulations, the examples presented in later sections are formulated using this
normalization in order to simplify the presentation.
3.2.2 Elimination agendas
Although most of this paper is concerned with amendment agendas, elimination
agendas are also brie‡y considered. Under an elimination agenda, alternative ?
…rst put to vote against the other alternatives. If ? wins it is elected, if not, the
winner is decided by a pairwise vote between ? and ?. This agenda is denoted
([?] ??) ? and is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: An elimination agenda with three alternatives
The expected utility of voting for the upper branch is ?? (?) ? and the ex-
pected utility of voting for the lower branch is ?? (???)?? (?)+[1 ¡ ?? (???)]?? (?).
A voter thus votes for the upper branch if
?? (?) ¸ ?? (???)?? (?) + [1 ¡ ?? (???)]?? (?) ? (3.2)
Voter types 1, 2, 4, and 6 have dominant strategies to vote sincerely (see e.g.,
Miller 1995, pp. 48-52).
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3.3 The logic of the welfare consequences of strate-
gic voting: three examples
In the examples that follow, we will say that a voter’s beliefs are reasonable if
they could have been derived from relatively reliable signals. The purpose of
using the term “reasonable” here is that it is merely a shorthand for “could have
been derived from relatively reliable signals”. The examples below are meant to
provide an intuitive understanding of how the quality of the beliefs a¤ects the
voting outcomes. The term “reasonable beliefs” does not have any role in the
theory and nothing depends on it. It is thus introduced merely for the heuristic
purpose of making the logic of the model more salient. The following examples
involve only three voters, but the model of incomplete information is based on
applying the Central Limit Theorem, and it is thus not directly applicable for a
society of three voters.11 This is why the signal extraction model is not used in
discussing the examples here. It is hoped, however, that these examples provide
the reader with an easier access to the intuition of the model than one with a
large amount of voters. The signal extraction model is introduced in section
3.4. Section 3.5.1 will then present another example with 29 voters in which
this signal extraction model is used for determining voters’ beliefs.
If the Condorcet winner (CW) is not the same alternative as the utilitarian
winner (UW), the latter ought to be selected according to the utilitarian welfare
criterion. Strategic voting may lead to the choice of the UW even if some
other alternative is a CW, but this usually requires that most voters’ beliefs are
reasonable.
Example 1 illustrates such a situation. Assume that the preferences of three
voters ?, ?, and ?, can be described with Table 3.2.
A B C
y (1) y (1) x (1)
x (0.9) x (0.9) z (0.9)
z (0) z (0) y (0)
Table 3.2: Example 1
? is the utilitarian winner here. The numbers in parentheses denote voters’
utilities for the alternatives. If they vote sincerely, ? will beat ? in the …rst
round and ? in the second round, and the Condorcet winner, ?, is chosen.
Assume now that all three voters have identical beliefs such that ? (???) =
0?9, and ? (???) = 0?7. Voters thus consider it likely that ? beats ?, but even
more likely that ? beats ? in the second round of voting.
Let ? ?(?) denote a type ? voter’s utility for alternative ?. Voters ? and ? are
of type 5. They will vote strategically for ? in the …rst round if ? (???)?5 (?)+
11 This approximation restricts the applicability of the model to situations with a fairly large
number of voters. Thirty observations is sometimes given as a very rough guess on the validity
of the Central Limit Theorem.
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0 ? ? (???) ¢ 1 + 0 $ ?5(?) ? ?(???)?(???) , i.e. if 0?9 ? 0?70?9 = 0?7778. Since
this is true, ? and ? will vote strategically for ? in the …rst round of voting.
Voter ? has a weakly dominant strategy to vote for ? in the …rst round of
voting. ? is the outcome if all voters maximise expected utility because it beats
? in the …rst round and ? in the second round. The utilitarian winner ? is thus
chosen if voters maximise expected utility, but the Condorcet winner ? is chosen
if all voters vote sincerely. Example 1 also shows that a Condorcet winner
is not necessarily chosen in majority rule, and that this may happen under
fairly reasonable assumptions on voters’ beliefs. This result has already been
proven by Ordeshook & Palfrey (1988), but their model is based on implausible
assumptions. In particular, given that they assume incomplete information, it is
implausible to assume that the players condition their beliefs on the assumption
that exactly three of the six possible types of players may be playing the voting
game.
Consider now an example in which voters’ beliefs are not reasonable. Let
the preferences of three voters ?, ? and ? be as follows:
D E F
x (1) y (1) x (1)
y (0.9) z (0.9) z (0.9)
z (0) x (0) y (0)
Table 3.3: Example 2
Here ? = ?? = ?? . Let us now assume that voters have identical beliefs
such that ? (???) = 0?3 and ? (???) = 0?7. They now believe that ? will
beat ? in the second round even though ? = ?? = ?? , and ? is the worst
alternative in utilitarian terms. ? (???) is reasonable, because ? beats ? in the
second round if it survives the …rst. Voter ? will vote strategically for ? in the
…rst round, because ?1(?) = 0?9 is larger than ?(???)?(???) = 0?428. Voter ? has a
weakly dominant strategy to vote for ? in the …rst round. Voter ? has a weakly
dominant strategy to vote sincerely for ? in the …rst round. Thus, if all voters
maximise expected utility, ? beats ? in the …rst and ? in the second round, and
emerges as the outcome. Here strategic voting leads to an outcome (?) which is
worse in utilitarian terms than the outcome if all voters vote sincerely (?).
Examples 1 and 2 illustrate that the welfare consequences of strategic voting
depend on how accurate voters’ beliefs are. If they are clearly inaccurate, as
in example 2, strategic voting can diminish welfare, but if they are relatively
accurate, as in example 1, strategic voting may increase welfare. If voters have
complete information, the Condorcet winner wins in both cases. Hence, strategic
voting with incomplete information may increase welfare when compared to
strategic voting with complete information (example 1). However, strategic
voting with complete information never has the catastrophic consequences that
strategic voting with incomplete and poor information may have (example 2).
These examples also show that if a voter thinks that her information is highly
unreliable, she should not take the risk of voting strategically because she might
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well obtain a worse outcome for herself. In example 2, voter ? obtained a worse
outcome (?) by voting strategically than she would have obtained if she had
voted sincerely (?). Furthermore, the bene…t from this “foolish” strategic voting
accrued to voter ? (who voted sincerely), who obtained a better outcome than
she would have obtained if ? had voted sincerely.
In example 1, the strategic voting of ? and ? resulted in an outcome that has
a lower utility for them than the alternative that would have been chosen if they
had voted sincerely. Nevertheless, their actions increased the average utility
of all voters because voter ?’s utility increases more than their own utility
decreases. Hence, EU behaviour may be welfare-increasing on the aggregate
level even though those who vote strategically may diminish their own utility.
Strategic voting may also be welfare-increasing and increase the utility of
those who engage in it. The famous Condorcet paradox in example 3 illustrates
such a case.
G H I
x (1) y (1) z (1)
y (0.8) z (0.1) x (0.9)
z (0) x (0) y (0)
Table 3.4: Example 3
If voters engage in SV behaviour, ? beats ? in the …rst round, and ? beats
? in the second. If they maximise expected utility with ? (???) = 0?1 and
? (???) = 0?9, G votes strategically for ? in the …rst round (0?8 ? 0?1
0?9 ), and
the others continue to vote sincerely. ? beats ? in the …rst round and ? in the
second. Voter G obtains a better result for herself than she would have obtained
by voting sincerely. ? is also better than ? in terms of the sum of utility. Notice,
however, that ? is not a utilitarian winner. Strategic voting resulted in a clearly
better outcome than sincere voting, but the utilitarian winner was not selected.
3.4 A model of incomplete information in sim-
ulated voting games
The previous section showed that in some situations strategic voting is welfare-
increasing and in some others it is not. These examples may provide some insight
into the logic of strategic voting, but it will be important to know whether
strategic voting is typically bene…cial or not. The examples were also silent on
how voters are assumed to formulate their beliefs. Let us now give an account
of the voters’ beliefs in a framework of simulated voting games.
A standard Bayesian model of incomplete information would assume that
the players start with common priors and update them with Bayes’ rule. Voters
may be able to update their beliefs after the …rst round of voting, but they
are not able to bene…t from these updated beliefs when there are only three
alternatives because all voters vote sincerely in the second round of voting. The
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model can be extended to four or more alternatives, but introducing an updating
model is beyond the scope of this paper because four or more alternatives also
bring other complications that should be dealt with.12
A model that starts with common priors does not provide interesting results
under amendment agendas with three alternatives because all priors before the
…rst round of voting would be equal to 1
2
if voters knew that all voter types are
equally likely. It can be checked that all voters will vote sincerely if this value
1
2 is inserted into the condition that determines strategic voting presented in
equation 3.1. For these reasons, voters need to have some information on the
preferences of the other voters before the …rst round of voting.
Voters are thus assumed to obtain perturbed signals of the other voters’
preferences before the …rst round of voting. They formulate beliefs on the basis
of these noisy signals. This information model is embedded in simulated games
for which the voter types are generated with the impartial anonymous culture
(IAC) assumption. This assumption means that each voter type is equally
likely. If the preferences for a pair of alternatives ? and ? is considered, it
means that each voter is equally likely to prefer ? to ? as the reverse. The IAC
assumption over-emphasises the prevalence of strategic voting when compared
to real-world situations. The use of this assumption is legitimate in this model,
however, because the purpose is not to evaluate how common strategic voting is,
but rather what its consequences are when it occurs and is signi…cant. The IAC
assumption is the best possible assumption for this purpose because it generates
the maximum amount of very tight elections and thereby a maximum amount
of cases in which strategic voting matters.13
A simulated game ? consists of a set of utilities created by a random number
generator, beliefs based on these utilities, voters’ perturbed signals, and voting
outcomes under the di¤erent behavioural assumptions. Let Â?? denote voter ?’s
preference relation in a simulated game ?. Let ??(? Â ?) denote the number
of voters who prefer alternative ? to alternative ? in simulated game ?, and
?? (? Â ?) the amount of voters with opposite preferences. If alternatives ? and
? are put to vote against each other in the last round, ? beats ? if ?? (? Â ?) ?
?? (? Â ?).
Since all the symbols to be de…ned in what follows concern a single simulated
game ?, the superscript will be omitted in the sequel. Let ??(? Â ?) = 1? if voter
? prefers ? to ?, and ??(? Â ?) = 0? if voter ? prefers ? to ?. Then ?(? Â ?)
can be viewed as a sum of ? Bernoulli trials. The total number of supporters
for ? against ? is thus given by ?(? Â ?) = P??=1 ??(? Â ?). Let ? denote the
probability that such a Bernoulli trial results in the outcome that ??(? Â ?) = 1.
The impartial culture implies that ? = 12 . ?(? Â ?) can thus be viewed as a
random variable with a binary distribution ?(? Â ?) » ?(?? 1
2
).
12 It is argued in (Lehtinen 2002) that updating is di¢cult even if there are more than three
alternatives. See also Enelow & Hinich (1983).
13See Krehbiel & Rivers (1990), Eckel & Holt (1989), Calvert & Fenno (1994), Volden
(1998), Wilkerson (1999), and Gilmour (2001) for discussions on the prevalence of strategic
voting. See Tsetlin, Regenwetter & Grofman (2003) and Gehrlein (2002) for recent discussions
of impartial culture.
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3.4.1 Signals
The voters are assumed to obtain a perturbed signal of the number of voters
who prefer ? to ?. It will be more convenient to use a standardized sum of
Bernoulli trials ?(? Â ?) instead of the variable ?(? Â ?) itself:
?(? Â ?) = ?(? Â ?) ¡??p
??2
? (3.3)
Since ? = 1
2
? this is ?(? Â ?) = 2?(?Â?)¡?p
?
. A signal of voter ? concerning the
preferences of all voters for alternatives ? and ? , ??(?? ?), is given by
??(?? ?) =
2?(? Â ?) ¡?p
?
+ ? ¢ ?? (?? ?) ? (3.4)
where ?? (?? ?) is a realization of an i.i.d. standard normal random variable, and
? is a scaling factor that re‡ects the reliability of the signals. Let ?? (?? ?) =
? ¢ ?? (?? ?) ? The signal can then be written as follows:
??(?? ?) = ?(? Â ?) +?? (?? ?) ? (3.5)
The brief term “signal” is used here, even though the longer expression “a voter’s
conception of an aspect of the game to be played” would be more accurate. A
voter’s conception of the game may be the result of several observations.
A signal is the only constraint imposed on a voter’s beliefs. In particular,
beliefs that constitute a cycle are allowed; ?? (???) ? 12 , ?? (???) ?
1
2 , and
?? (???) ? 12 . The reason for this is that if the underlying preferences are
cyclical, the beliefs for them may well be cyclical as well.
Deriving beliefs from these signals involves applying the Central Limit The-
orem and standard statistical inference. Voters are thus modelled as amateur
econometricians involved in a signal extraction problem. Lehtinen (2006a) shows
that voters’ beliefs are given by equations (3?6) and (3?7).
??(???) = 1 ¡ ©
µ¡??(?? ?)
?
p
1 + ?2
¶
? (3.6)
and
??(???) = 1 ¡ ©
µ¡??(?? ?)
?
p
1 + ?2
¶
? (3.7)
Voters are assumed to know that the voter types are drawn from a uniform
distibution. Hence, they cannot use their own type for deriving a belief about
others because their own type does not provide them with new information.
Let us say that ? is the reliability of the signals ? The smaller ? is, the more
reliable a voter’s signals are. In this paper, voters are assumed to know the
reliability of their signals. This assumption can be relaxed as explained in
Lehtinen (2006a).
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3.5 Counterbalancing of strategic votes
The mechanism of counterbalancing strategic votes explains when and why
strategic voting is welfare-increasing. Four di¤erent types of voters may vote
strategically under amendment agendas. Voters of types 5 and 6 may vote
strategically for ?, while voters of types 1 and 3 may vote strategically for ?.
Let us now reformulate equation 3.1 as follows:
?? = ?? (???)??(?) + (1 ¡ ?? (???))??(?) (3.8)
¡ ?? (???)??(?) ¡ (1 ¡ ?? (???))??(?)?
This equation says that if L? ¸0, the voter votes for the upper branch (x). It is
easy to see that ??????(?) ? 0, and that
???
???(?)
? 0. The signs of these derivatives
mean that the higher is the utility of y for voters of type 1 and 3, the more
likely they are to vote strategically for ?. Similarly, the higher the utility of ?
for voters of type 5 and 6, the more likely they are to vote strategically for ?.
Hence, if the utility for ? is almost as high as the utility of ? for many voters
of types 5 and 6, and if the utility of ? is signi…cantly lower than the utility of
? for many voters of types 1 and 3, a larger number of voters of types 5 and 6
than of types 1 and 3 vote strategically. This means that ? gets more strategic
votes than ?. Furthermore, strategic votes for ? are at the same time strategic
votes against ?.
Ceteris paribus, if many ?5(?) and ?6(?) are almost as high as ?5(?) and
?6(?)? respectively, and if many ?1(?) and ?3(?) are signi…cantly higher than
?1(?) and ?3(?)? respectively, the sum of utility for alternative ? is relatively
large, and the sum of utility for alternative ? is relatively small. Hence, under
these assumptions on individual utilities, ? is likely to have a larger sum of
utility than ?. Counterbalancing means that both ? and ? will obtain strategic
votes, but ? is likely to obtain more strategic votes than ? if it has a larger sum
of utilities than ?.
3.5.1 An example of counterbalancing
Consider now an example that purports to show how counterbalancing a¤ects
the voting results. There are 29 voters whose utilities are the result of a simu-
lation. Their signals were formulated with ? = 1. Table 3.5 on page 23 displays
voters’ types (t), decisions (D), preference intensities ?2??, beliefs (p?(xBz) and
p?(yBz)), perturbation terms (R?(x,z) and and R?(y,z)), and expected utilities
for the two branches of a voting tree (EU?(U) for Upper (a vote for ?) and
EU?(L) for Lower (a vote for ?)). When a voter votes sincerely ? = ? , and
when a voter votes strategically ? = ? .
The sums of utilities are ? (?)=15.43, ? (?)=13.88, and ? (?)=12.85. ? is
the Condorcet winner because
?1 + ?3 + ?4 = ?(? Â ?) = 6 + 2 + 5 = 13?
?2 + ?5 + ?6 = ?(? Â ?) = 7 + 4 + 5 = 16?
?1 + ?4 + ?5 = ?(? Â ?) = 6 + 5 + 4 = 15?
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no. t D ?2?? p?(xBz) p?(yBz) ??(?? ?) ??(?? ?) EU?(U) EU?(L)
1 1 S 0.22 0.41 0.86 -0.53 0.59 0.41 0.19
2 1 T 0.6 0.37 0.62 -0.66 -0.49 0.37 0.37
3 1 S 0.42 0.68 0.52 0.47 -0.87 0.68 0.22
4 1 S 0.23 0.96 0.79 2.3 0.22 0.96 0.18
5 1 S 0.25 0.7 0.7 0.57 -0.18 0.7 0.17
6 1 S 0.58 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.44 0.76 0.49
7 2 S 0.67 0.49 0.96 -0.22 1.55 0.34 0.99
8 2 S 0.56 0.86 0.4 1.35 -1.3 0.08 0.73
9 2 S 0.66 0.66 0.96 0.41 1.63 0.22 0.99
10 2 S 0.81 0.53 0.86 -0.08 0.6 0.38 0.97
11 2 S 0.57 0.44 0.88 -0.41 0.71 0.32 0.95
12 2 S 0.39 0.41 0.83 -0.52 0.41 0.23 0.90
13 2 S 0.14 0.68 0.82 0.49 0.36 0.04 0.84
14 3 S 0.74 0.46 0.32 -0.33 -1.58 0.88 0.68
15 3 S 0.61 0.95 0.96 2.14 1.54 0.63 0.04
16 4 S 0.36 0.9 0.55 1.6 -0.76 0.93 0.16
17 4 S 0.05 0.44 0.73 -0.41 -0.04 0.47 0.01
18 4 S 0.5 0.58 0.87 0.09 0.66 0.79 0.07
19 4 S 0.8 0.86 0.45 1.37 -1.09 0.97 0.44
20 4 S 0.34 0.78 0.76 0.9 0.07 0.85 0.08
21 5 T 0.72 0.83 0.5 1.18 -0.93 0.6 0.50
22 5 T 0.88 0.66 0.52 0.4 -0.85 0.58 0.52
23 5 S 0.85 0.18 0.86 -1.48 0.6 0.15 0.86
24 5 S 0.63 0.31 0.46 -0.88 -1.09 0.2 0.46
25 6 S 0.53 0.68 0.74 0.47 -0.01 0.32 0.65
26 6 T 0.42 0.38 0.86 -0.63 0.63 0.62 0.50
27 6 T 0.03 0.13 0.4 -1.77 -1.28 0.87 0.61
28 6 S 0.08 0.36 0.35 -0.71 -1.47 0.64 0.68
29 6 S 0.52 0.74 0.33 0.73 -1.54 0.26 0.84
Table 3.5: Example 4
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?2 + ?3 + ?6 = ?(? Â ?) = 7 + 2 + 5 = 14?
?1 + ?2 + ?5 = ?(? Â ?) = 6 + 7 + 4 = 17? and
?3 + ?4 + ?6 = ?(? Â ?) = 2 + 5 + 5 = 12?
The standardized numbers of voters are ?(? Â ?)=2??(?Â?)¡?p
?
=2¢15¡29p
29
=
0.185 70¼0.19, and ?(? Â ?) = 2??(?Â?)¡?p
?
= 0?92848 ¼ 0?93. If a voter would
have obtained a perfectly reliable signal (R?=0), he or she would have formulated
the following probabilities ? (???)=1 ¡ ©
³
¡0?19
1
p
1+12
´
=0.55, and ? (???)=1 ¡
©
³
¡0?93
1
p
1+12
´
=0.74. Probabilities that are close to these values could be con-
sidered “reasonable”. It should now be easier to understand why the inexact
notion of reasonable beliefs was used and what it could mean. One might argue
that reasonable beliefs are those that correspond to reality, and that this would
mean that reasonable beliefs must be degenerate zeros or ones. But if you know
that the signals on which your probabilities are based are not fully reliable, it is
not rational to assign probabilities one and zero to anything of concern to you.
Furthermore, we have seen that if a voter engages in strategic voting with poor
information, she may lose rather than gain in utility by doing so. It is natural
to take perfectly reliable signals as a measuring rod for what counts as a reason-
able belief. A voter’s belief is the more reasonable, the closer her signals are to
being perfectly reliable. It seems plausible to say that there is a continuum of
beliefs from reasonable to (highly) unreasonable between the extremes of, say,
(? = 0?01? ? = 0) and (? = 100? ? = 100) or (? = 100? ? = ¡100), even though
there are no non-arbitrary values of R? and ? that make a belief based on these
parameters reasonable.
To see how the actual beliefs are derived in this example, consider voter 2
as an example. Applying equation 3.4, it is seen that ??(?? ?) =
2?(?Â?)¡?p
?
+
? ¢ ?? (?? ?) = 0.19+1¢(¡0?66) = ¡0?47. Applying equation 3.6 it is seen that
p2(xBz)=1 ¡ ©
³
¡??(???)
?
p
1+?2
´
= 1 ¡ ©
³
0?47p
2
´
= ?3698 ¼ ?37? A similar calculation
applies to p2(yBz).
This example is analogous to example 1 in that the Condorcet winner ?
is chosen with SV behaviour, but the utilitarian winner ? is chosen with EU
behaviour. Voter 2 gives a strategic vote for ?, but this is counterbalanced by
four strategic votes for ? by voters 21, 22, 26, and 27. The fact that ? receives
more strategic votes is not a coincidence. The average preference intensity for ?
(0.7383) is clearly higher than that for ? (0.3527). In contrast, the perturbations
are distributed relatively equally for all voter types. What matters for the voter’s
choice is not only the size of the perturbations, but also whether the perturbation
for ?(? Â ?) mutually reinforces the perturbation for ?(? Â ?), i.e. whether
the sign of the two perturbations is the same or not. If j? (?? ?) ¡? (?? ?) j ? 1
is taken as a criterion, voters 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, and
29 have mutually reinforcing perturbations.
Of these, voters 1, 14, 21, 22, and 26 have perturbations that increase the
probability of voting strategically as compared with zero perturbations. Con-
sidering only the beliefs, voters 1 and 14 could have voted strategically for ?? but
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they voted sincerely. Notice that voter 1’s intensity for ? (0?22) is relatively low,
and voter 14’s intensity for ? (0?74) is relatively high. In contrast, voters 21, 22,
and 26 do vote strategically because the intensities for ? (?21(?) = 0?72? and
?22(?) = 0?83) are relatively high, and the intensity for ? (?26(?) = 0?42) rel-
atively low. Counterbalancing thus implies that alternatives with high average
utility will get more and lose less strategic votes than other alternatives.
3.6 Simulation and setups
A simulated EU-game ? consists of a pro…le of utilities, ¦?(ª) = f??1 , ??2 ,...,???g?
as determined by a rule ª, and a pro…le of beliefs computed on the basis of ?
and ¦?(ª). All simulations had ? = 201 voters.
An expected utility setup (EU-setup) is a collection of assumptions ? =
fI? ?? ¦(ª)? ?? ?? ?? ???g. There are ? = 10000 simulated games in a setup.
I =f?1,?2,...,??,...,??g is a collection of ? sets of voters, and ¦(ª) = f¦1,¦2,...,
¦?g is a collection of utility pro…les, one set for each simulated game. ? is an
agenda. C and IPC denote parameters that will be explained shortly.
In what will be called uniform setups, the rule ª that determines voters’
types and preference intensities is a combination of the impartial culture as-
sumption and the assumption that the utilities are derived from a uniform dis-
tribution on [0,1]. Since the logic of counterbalancing suggests that strategic
voting should be more welfare-increasing if there are systematic di¤erences be-
tween voters’ relative utilities that are not re‡ected in the preference orderings,
setups in which the preference intensities for the second-best alternatives are
systematically di¤erent for di¤erent voter types will be studied. In order to
generate such setups with correlation between preference intensities and voter
types without a¤ecting the interpersonal comparisons or the preference order-
ings, the individual utilities were derived in the following way.
U1, U2, and U3 were …rst generated from the uniform distribution on [0,1]
for each voter, but U2 was not used for any purpose. Instead, a standardized
utility e?2 for the second-best alternative was generated from the uniform distri-
bution on [0,1]. This standardized utility expresses what a voter’s utility for the
second-best alternative would be if his or her scale of utility was [0,1]. These
standardized second-best utilities will be referred to as intrapersonal intensi-
ties. In setups with intensity correlation, these intensities were multiplied with
a parameter C, 0.5?C·1 for those who put ? second (voter types 1 and 6) so
that the new correlated intensities e???12 and e???62 were given bye??2 = ? e?2?
To compensate the decreases in utility for voter types 1 and 6, the intensities
for voters of type 3 and 5 (i.e. for ?) were given bye??2 = 1 ¡ ? e?2?
These adjustments make the average utilities for ? higher and the average util-
ities for ? lower than in the uniform setups while keeping the overall average
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utility …xed. In uniform setups, ? = 1. C thus denotes the degree of correlation
between preference intensities and voter types.
These standardized intensities were then scaled back into the original [?3? ?1]
utility scale. Let ?¤2 denote a voter’s intensity expressed in terms of the original
[?3? ?1] scale. Since the relationship between the standardized intrapersonal
utility for the second-best alternative and the original scale of utility is given by
e??2 = 1 ¡ ?1 ¡?¤2?1 ¡ ?3 ? (3.9)
?¤2 is given by:
?¤2 = ?3 + e??2 (?1 ¡ ?3)? (3.10)
3.6.1 Criteria for evaluating the welfare consequences of
strategic voting
The shorter expression S(?? ?) will be used to refer to an EU-setup, because
an EU-setup is essentially a set of simulated games in which the reliability of
signals ? and the degree of correlation C are the same for all voters. The winner
of voting is denoted? ??? in a simulated SV-game, and?
?
?? (?? ?) in a simulated
EU-game. Let ? ?(? ??? ? ?? ?) and ?
?(? ??? ) denote voter ?’s utility in simulated
game ? in an EU-setup and a SV-setup, respectively. The Average Utility in an
EU-setup S(???), ???? (?), is:
???? (?? ?) =
P?
?=1
P?
?=1?
?(? ??? ? ???)
? ¤? ? (3.11)
The Average Utility in the SV-setup, ???? , is:
???? =
P?
?=1
P?
?=1?
?(? ??? )
? ¤? ? (3.12)
EU behaviour is welfare-increasing in setup ?(???) if the average utility of
all voters is larger in this EU-setup than in the SV-setup:
???? (?? ?) ? ???? (3.13)
If the converse holds, EU behaviour is welfare-decreasing. Let us also say
that strategic voting is welfare-increasing in a setup if EU behaviour is welfare-
increasing in that setup.
3.7 Simulation results
3.7.1 Amendment agendas
Figure 3.3 displays average utilities from setups with ? = [0,0.4,..., 1.6] and
C=[1,..,0.5].14
14The results are presented only as graphs here. All numerical results in tabular form, as
well as the FORTRAN codes to generate them are available from the author on request.
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Figure 3.3: Average utilities in amendment agendas
Since the variance of ?(? Â ?) is 1, the reliability of the voters’ signals with
? = 1?6 is very low; chance is more important in determining the signal than
the real preference pro…le in setups with ? ? 1. Such a large range of parameter
values were studied in order to ensure that the relevant parameter range, and
more, is covered.
The following observations can be made from these simulation results. EU
behaviour increases welfare in almost all setups. In uniform setups the aver-
age utilities are virtually the same under the two behavioural assumptions. As
expected, welfare-increasing strategic voting becomes more and more impor-
tant as the correlation between voter types and preference intensities increases.
EU behaviour with complete information (? = 0) yields lower average utilities
than EU behaviour with incomplete information. As long as information is not
complete, the quality of voters’ information does not seem to be particularly
important for the results. In fact, the average utilities are highest when the
perturbations are large and when the correlation is strong.
What happens if the intensity for ? rather than ? is decreased (or increased)
in setups with intensity correlation? The results from such a setup are presented
in Figure 3.4.
The di¤erence in average utilities between SV behaviour and EU behaviour
is now considerably lower. Furthermore, the average utilities are lower under
both behavioural assumptions. These results can be explained as follows. Since
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Figure 3.4: Average utilities in setups in which the intensities of ? are high and
the intensities of ? low.
the utility of ? is low, it is natural that the average utilities are lower; ? always
participates in the second-round contest, and wins one-half of them. The di¤er-
ence in average utility between the two behavioural assumptions is now lower
because in the setups with low utilities for ?, strategic voting is e¤ective in
eliminating ? in the …rst voting round, but in the latter setups this matters less
because the low-utility ? is always waiting in the second round of voting. If the
roles of ? and ? are reversed by decreasing the intensities for ? and increasing
the intensities for ?, the results are again similar to the ones presented in Figure
3.3. They are presented in Figure 3.5.
As expected, the average utilities under EU behaviour remain similar to what
they were in previous setups, but now the average utility under SV behaviour
increases slightly with an increase in the degree of correlation.
3.7.2 Counterbalancing once again
Uniformly distributed preference intensities generate very small di¤erences in
intensities between the di¤erent voter types. This is why uniform setups provide
the least favourable comparison between EU behaviour and SV behaviour.
It can be seen from Figure 3.3 that even a very weak correlation between
intensities and voter types makes strategic voting welfare-increasing in all setups.
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Figure 3.5: Average utilities in amendment agendas when the intensities of ?
are high and the intensities of ? are low
It is reasonable to assume that typically some amendments are widely endorsed
as second-best alternatives. The setups with somewhat high correlation may
well represent the reality better than the setups with weak correlation.
Let us now look at the logic of counterbalancing by considering some compar-
isons between uniform and correlated setups. Let ? (» ?)? denote the number
of voters who prefer ? to ?, but who vote for ? in simulated game ?. The av-
erage percentage of votes against candidate ? is the relative frequency of voters
who prefer ? to ? but who vote strategically for ?. The average percentage of
votes against alternative ?, ??? is thus given by
?? =
?X
?=1
? (» ?)?
? ¤? ¤ 100? (3.14)
Let ? (» ?)? denote the number of voters who prefer ? to ?, but who vote for
? in simulated game ?. The average percentage of votes for alternative ?, ???
is given by
?? =
?X
?=1
? (» ?)?
? ¤? ¤ 100? (3.15)
Since a strategic vote for ? is simultaneously a strategic vote against ?? AX and
FX also provide the percentages of strategic votes for and against ?. Figure 3.6
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displays the average percentages of strategic votes for and against ? in various
setups.
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Figure 3.6: Strategic votes for and against ? and ? in various setups
It is to be expected that in uniform setups where all preference intensities
are taken from the uniform distribution, all candidates should obtain and lose
about the same amount of strategic votes. Figure 3.6 shows that this is indeed
the case. Furthermore, the more there is correlation between voter types and
preference intensities, the more ? loses and the more ? gains strategic votes.
3.7.3 Robustness with respect to interpersonal compar-
isons
Since the results are based on average utilities, it is necessary to make inter-
personal comparisons of utilities. Furthermore, interpersonal comparisons of
preference intensities are also needed because it is necessary to assume that one
person’s utility may be added to another person’s utility. In the simulations
conducted thus far, random interpersonal comparisons of preference intensities
have been used because the utilities have been derived from the uniform distrib-
ution on the [0,1] interval. This particular assumption creates some variation in
the minimum and maximum values of utilities for di¤erent voters. If it is con-
sidered likely and important that di¤erent individuals in fact attach di¤erent
importance to the di¤erent issues, this way of modeling is justi…able. Another
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possibility is to derive the utilities in such a way that the maximum and min-
imum utilities are given the values 1 and 0, respectively, and the utility for
the second-best alternative is something in between these extremes. This way
of modeling may be justi…ed on the normative grounds that each voter should
have the same weight in determining the best outcome. It could be seen as an
expression of the one-man one-vote principle that takes preference intensities
into account.
Irrespective of the way of modeling chosen, it may be argued that our choice
of interpersonal comparisons is arbitrary. This arbitrariness ultimately derives
from the fact that it is impossible to obtain exact information on individual
di¤erences in utilities. Epistemological considerations thus indicate that we
will never know which interpersonal comparison is correct. Unfortunately, the
results depend crucially on interpersonal comparisons of preference intensities.
These are generally considered as the most suspect kinds of comparisons.
Strategic voting is bene…cial only because it allows voters to express inten-
sities indirectly even in voting rules in which such information is not explicitly
collected. Therefore, if only ordinal welfare measures are used, it is to be ex-
pected that strategic voting is welfare-decreasing. Consider, however, what us-
ing only ordinal welfare measures implies if the expected utility model of voter
behaviour is accepted. It implies that using intensity-based welfare measures
are not accepted even though one acknowledges the relevance of intensities for
individual voters’ behaviour. But if intensities are important for the individuals,
they should be normatively important for the whole electorate.
Fortunately, it is possible to accommodate the criticism that our choice of
interpersonal comparisons is arbitrary. If the result that strategic voting in-
creases average utility obtains with all di¤erent and at least mildly reasonable
interpersonal comparisons, then this result does not depend on any particular
interpersonal comparison. If the result is robust to interpersonal comparisons
in such a way, we can be assured that we know something more about the con-
sequences of strategic voting even though we do not know which interpersonal
comparison is correct.
Several di¤erent variations on interpersonal comparisons were thus tried in
order to see whether the results are robust or not.15 In order to retain com-
parability to previous results, all these variations need to change interpersonal
comparisons without changing the preference orderings, the intra individual pref-
erence intensities, or the average utility of all alternatives. It is thus necessary
to hold the parameters that determine individual behaviour …xed in evaluating
robustness to interpersonal comparisons.
One interpersonal comparability variation is to preserve the original prefer-
ence orderings and relative intraindividual intensities but redraw the minimum
and maximum values for the utility scales (i.e. U3 and U1) randomly from the
same uniform distribution as before. The results from this variation are almost
identical to those presented before, and will therefore not be presented. This
15 The idea of simulating di¤erent interpersonal comparisons was suggested to me by Emrah
Aydinonat.
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variation is admittedly quite slight because it merely changes the realizations of
the random variables in one particular random assignment of utilities.
In order to make more dramatic changes, the utility scales must be changed
in such a way that they are systematically di¤erent between di¤erent voter types.
The utilities of voters of types 1, 3, 5, and 6 were again changed. The average
utility for each voter type was retained, but the utility scale, i.e. the di¤erence
between the maximum and minimum utilities was made smaller (larger) for vot-
ers of types 1 and 6, and the utility scale for voters of type 3 and 5 was made
larger (smaller). The utility scales of those who put alternative ? second were
thus shrunk and the utility scales of those who put alternative ? second were
stretched. Bearing in mind that in setups with correlated intensities the inten-
sities for ? are higher than for ? on average, this variation e¤ectively diminishes
the importance of those who put ? second and increases the importance of those
who put ? second. This variation on interpersonal comparisons will be referred
to as the “mutually reinforcing correlation setup” because the intrapersonal
intensities are high on average for the same voter types whose interpersonal
intensities weigh most in the sum of utilities. A second variation reverses the
interpersonal correlation but retains the intrapersonal correlation by stretching
the scales for voters of types 1 and 6, and shrinking the scales for voters of types
3 and 5. The second variation will be referred to as the “negative correlation
setup”.
Let IPC denote a parameter that re‡ects how much voters’ scales are shrunk
or stretched. The original utilities are ?1? ?¤2 , and ?3. Let ?1 and ?3 denote
the maximum and minimum utilities for voters of types one and six after their
scales have been shrunk (?1 ? ?1 and ?3 ? ?3). Since the idea is to subtract
as much from U1 as is added to U3, ?3 ¡?3 = ?1 ¡?1. ?1 (and ?3) is obtained
by adding to (subtracting from) the midpoint of the utility scale ?1+?32 a part
of the individual’s scale ???¢(?1¡?3)2 so that
?1 =
[?1 +?3 + ??? ¢ (?1 ¡ ?3)]
2
? (3.16)
and
?3 =
[?1 +?3 ¡ ??? ¢ (?1 ¡?3)]
2
= ?1 +?3 ¡ ?1? (3.17)
Similarly, let ?1 and ?3 denote the maximum and minimum utilities for voters
of types three and …ve after their utility scales have been stretched. The idea
now is to add as much, on average, to U1 as was subtracted from voters of types
one and six. Thus, the di¤erence between ?1¡?32 and
???¢(?1¡?3)
2 is added to
the original U1 so that
?1 = ?1 +
(1 ¡ ???)(?1 ¡ ?3)
2
= 2 ¢ ?1 ¡ ?1? (3.18)
Again it is required that ?3 ¡?3 = ?1 ¡?1 so that
?3 = ?3 ¡?1 + ?1 = ?3 ¡ ?1 +?1? (3.19)
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What remains is to rescale the interpersonal intensities in such a way that their
intrapersonal relative values remain unchanged. Let ???????2 and ?
???????
2 denote
these two intensities. Then
???????2 = ?3 + ?
¤
2 (?1 ¡?3)? (3.20)
and
????????2 = ?3 +?
¤
2 (?1 ¡ ?3)? (3.21)
In the mutually reinforcing correlation setup voter types 1 and 6 have utilities
(?1? ?
??????
2 ? ?3), voter types 3 and 5 have utilities (?1? ?
???????
2 ? ?3), and voter
types 2 and 4 have utilities (?1? ?2? ?3).
The results from these two setups with ? = 0?4 are displayed in Figures 3.7
and 3.8. The results are similar with other values of ?.
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Figure 3.7: Average utilities in mutually reinforcing correlation setups
As expected, the more the interpersonal intensities correlate with the intrap-
ersonal intensities (i.e. the smaller IPC and C are), the higher are the average
utilities in the mutually reinforcing correlation setup. This result can be ex-
plained as follows. The lower IPC is, the more the utilities of voter types 3 and
5 weigh in the sum of utility. Since these voters put ? second, and since the
sum of utility of all these voters is higher for ? than for ? or ?, the average
utility is higher for ? than it was without the reinforcing correlation. Since
these voters also vote strategically for ?, their actions make the average util-
ity relatively high. As Figure 3.8 shows, reversing the interpersonal correlation
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Figure 3.8: Average utilities in setups negative correlation setups
while keeping the intrapersonal correlation makes average utilities lower. No-
tice, however, that EU behaviour remains welfare-increasing even in negative
correlation setups.
Yet another interpersonal comparison consists in making all three utilities
higher for some voter types than for some others. In “shift ? upwards setups”
the utility of voter types 3 and 5 was diminished by substracting the parameter
IPC from their utilities and the utility of voter types 1 and 6 was increased by
adding IPC to their utilities. In “shift ? upwards setups” the roles of the voter
types were again reversed. The results from these two setups are displayed in
Figures 3.9 and 3.10.
It is easy to see that the intrapersonal di¤erences in these setups are much
more important than the interpersonal ones. There is a slight di¤erence however.
Shifting the utilities of voter types 3 and 5 upwards, and those of types 1 and
6 downwards increases average utilities slightly. Reversing the voter types has
the opposite e¤ect. These results can be explained as follows. Voters of types 3
and 5 put alternative ? second. Increasing their utilities increases their weight
in the sum of utility. Such a shift slightly increases average utilities under EU
behaviour because voter types 3 and 5 also vote strategically for ?.
The simulation results from the setups studying di¤erent interpersonal com-
parisons can be summarized as follows. Making di¤erent interpersonal com-
parisons does change the results, but EU behaviour remains welfare-increasing
3.7. SIMULATION RESULTS 35
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0.512
0.514
0.516
0.518
0.52
0.522
0.524
0.526
0.528
C
A
U
EU
,A
U
SV
AUSV(IPC=1)
AUSV(IPC=0.5)
AUEU(IPC=1)
AUEU(IPC=0.5)
Figure 3.9: Average utilities for setups with an upward shift in utility for voter
types 1 and 6
with each di¤erent interpersonal comparison. The results are thus robust with
respect to interpersonal comparisons.
3.7.4 Elimination agendas
The important di¤erence between elimination agendas and amendment agendas
is that in the former fewer voter types may have an incentive to vote strategically.
Figure 3.11 displays the simulation results with an elimination agenda ([?] ??).It
is easy to see from this Figure that strategic voting is welfare-increasing in all
setups under elimination agendas if the preference intensities for alternative ?
are systematically higher than for ? and ?. It is relatively easy to explain why
strategic voting is welfare-increasing under elimination agendas when the in-
tensities for ? are high. The average utility under SV behaviour is relatively
low because alternative ? is seldom selected, but, at the same time, there is
approximately an equal number of supporters for each of the three alternatives.
Hence, under elimination agenda ([?] ??), strategic voting may cause ? to be
selected, and this is what increases average utility in the EU-setups when com-
pared to the SV-setup. ? is not the only alternative that obtains strategic votes,
but under agenda ([?] ??) ? it is likely to be the only alternative for which the
strategic votes matter; if ? or ? is intensively preferred, it will be selected also
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Figure 3.10: Average utilities in setups with an upward shift in the utilities of
voter types 3 and 5
under sincere behaviour.
However, if the average utility for ? is decreased, and that of ? (or ?) in-
creased, the results are quite di¤erent. Figure 3.12 shows average utilities under
elimination agendas when the intensities correlate with the voter types such
that the intensities of ? are decreased and the intensities of ? increased.
EU behaviour is now welfare-increasing only if the degree of correlation is
not very high. Notice, however, that the average utilities under EU behaviour
in two two di¤erent cases are very similar. The main di¤erence lies in the
average utility under SV behaviour. The average utilities under SV behaviour
are low under elimination agendas when the intensities of ? are high because
these high intensities are not re‡ected in voters’ sincere behaviour in any way.
Strategic voting thus at least gives a chance to an alternative that is introduced
early under an elimination agenda. When the intensities of ? are lower and the
intensities of ? higher, ? is selected just as seldom as in all SV-setups. However,
since the high-utility ? always participates in the second-round contest, the
average utility becomes relatively high under SV behaviour. In setups with
strong correlation, and in which the intensities of ? are low, strategic voting
decreases average utility because the strategic votes for the alternative that has
a low sum of utility on the average are more likely to matter than the strategic
votes for the other alternatives.
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Figure 3.11: Average utilities in an elimination agenda when the intensities of
? are high
There is one important quali…cation to the results from both voting rules.
If some voter types engage in EU behaviour and some in SV behaviour, the
systematic absence of balancing strategic votes suggests that the welfare con-
sequences of strategic voting are less bene…cial or welfare-decreasing.16 This is
an important consideration, because it may well be reasonable to assume that
some voter types are more prone to strategic voting than some others. The
complexity of this matter, however, prevents us from presenting a discussion of
it here.
3.8 Conclusions
The main conclusion that may be drawn from the simulation results is that
welfare-increasing strategic voting is not a mere theoretical possibility in par-
liamentary voting. Indeed, it may well be the typical case.
The most important and widely discussed condition in Arrow’s (1963) im-
possibility theorem is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). IIA is
16 If some voters engage in EU-behaviour and some others in SV-behaviour, but engaging
in EU-behaviour does not correlate with being of a certain voter type, the simulation results
are similar (but weaker) to the results obtained here.
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Figure 3.12: Average utilities in elimination agendas when the intensities for ?
are low
closely connected to strategy-proofness.17 The idea that strategic voting should
be precluded in a voting rule is the only justi…cation for strategy-proofness, and
a crucial argument for IIA (e.g. Blin 1976). The results imply that the precise
interpretation of these conditions may need to be re-evaluated in voting theory
because the results presented here indicate that strategic voting may well be
bene…cial. Imagine that there was a strategy-proof voting rule. By de…nition,
this would mean that voters would not have an incentive for changing their be-
haviour by voting strategically. Strategic voting could not be welfare-increasing
or welfare-decreasing because the individuals would not have an incentive to
engage in it. The point is that it is not possible to determine whether strategic
voting and thereby strategy-proofness are desirable or not, a priori, without ex-
plicitly investigating the welfare consequences of strategic voting in each voting
rule. The possibility that strategic voting is bene…cial implies that the rationale
for the so called manipulability measures (e.g. Saari 1990b, Smith 1999) is put
into question. The important question to study is not which voting rules are
best in selecting outcomes that are “close” to those that would have ensued from
sincere voting, but rather which rules result in best outcomes when individuals
vote strategically.
In some contexts (other than voting) strategy-proofness may be intrinsically
17See Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975) and Blin & Satterthwaite (1978).
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important because it may be important to know the preferences of every agent.
It should be borne in mind that the results here concern only two speci…c,
although commonly used voting rules, whereas the scope of the impossibility
theorems is considerably broader.
Strategic voting increases average utility compared to sincere voting because
the former allows preference intensities to in‡uence voting outcomes but the
latter does not. Uniform setups yield the worst possible welfare consequences
of strategic voting because the intensity di¤erences between the alternatives are
as small as they can possibly be. If the correlation between voter types and
intensities is strong, strategic voting is very clearly welfare-increasing. This
result also shows that if voters vote strategically, the criticism that majority
rule does not take preference intensities into account is false. Furthermore, the
larger the di¤erences in the intensities are, the more welfare-increasing strategic
voting is. If the correlation of intensities is strong, welfare-increasing strategic
voting does not even require reliable signals.
A particular con…guration of utilities under elimination agendas provides an
exception. If the intensities for the alternative that may be eliminated on the
…rst round are low on the average, strategic voting may be welfare-decreasing.
We have seen, however, that even in this case the average utilities under EU
behaviour are relatively high. It is just that the average utilities under SV
behaviour are even higher because the unpopular alternative will often be elim-
inated with a sincere vote.
These …ndings suggest that strategic voting is a virtue rather than a vice in
commonly used parliamentary agendas if all voters engage in expected utility
maximising behaviour.
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Chapter 4
The Borda rule is also
intended for dishonest men
Abstract
his paper examines the welfare consequences of strategic voting un-
der the Borda rule in a comparison of utilitarian e¢ciencies in sim-
ulated voting games under two behavioural assumptions: expected
utility- maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Utilitarian ef-
…ciency is higher in the former than in the latter. Strategic voting
increases utilitarian e¢ciency particularly if the distribution of pref-
erence intensities correlates with voter types. The Borda rule is
shown to have two advantages: strategic voting is bene…cial even
if some but not all voter types engage in strategic behaviour, and
even if the voters’ information is based on unreliable signals. (JEL
classi…cation numbers: D71, D81)
Keywords: Strategic voting; Borda rule; Welfare; Simulation
4.1 Introduction
One of the main criticisms of the Borda rule is that it is highly susceptible to
strategic voting.1 Voting strategically for (against) a candidate means giving a
higher (lower) Borda score than the voter’s preference ordering would imply.2
Borda is famous for having exclaimed, “My scheme is intended only for honest
men” (quoted in Black 1958, p. 182), when the susceptibility of his rule to
strategic manipulation was pointed out.
1 See e.g., Saari 1990b, Smith 1999, Favardin et al. 2002, and Taylor (2005).
2 Strategic manipulation of the Borda rule by introducing a new alternative, and manipu-
lation by coalitions are not considered in this paper. See Dummett (1998) and Saari (1990a)
on the former and Lepelley & Mbih (1994) and Lepelley & Valognes (2003) on the latter.
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This paper examines the welfare consequences of strategic voting under the
Borda rule by means of computer simulations. As in (2006b, 2007), the wel-
fare consequences of strategic voting are evaluated by comparing the utilitarian
e¢ciency obtained with Expected Utility- maximising voting behaviour (EU be-
haviour) and with Sincere Voting behaviour (SV behaviour). In the former all
voters always vote sincerely, while in the latter the voters may vote strategically
or sincerely depending on their preferences and beliefs. Utilitarian e¢ciency
is de…ned as the percentage of simulated voting games in which the candidate
with the highest utility sum (the utilitarian winner) is selected.
The main …nding is that strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency com-
pared with sincere voting behaviour when the voters engage in expected utility-
maximising behaviour under conditions of incomplete information. Under the
utilitarian evaluation of voting outcomes, what has been thought of as a major
disadvantage of the Borda rule turns out to be an argument for it. However,
since strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency in most of the commonly
used voting rules (Lehtinen 2006b, 2007), the results reported here do not pro-
vide an unambiguous argument for using the Borda rule instead of some other
voting rule. On the other hand, and in contradistinction to the majority rule
in amendment agendas, it will be shown that the Borda rule yields high utili-
tarian e¢ciencies even when voters’ information on other voters’ preferences is
fairly unreliable, and even if some but not all voter types engage in strategic
behaviour.
Proponents of the Borda rule have traditionally argued that it selects fair
compromises as outcomes. Indeed, Borda himself seems to have defended it by
referring to cardinal utilities. He argued that, given three candidates and in the
absence of further knowledge, preference for the second-best candidate could be
assumed to be midway between the best and the worst (de Borda 1995[1784],
p. 85). I will show that strategic voting is less welfare-increasing precisely
when the utilities for the voters’ second-best candidates are, on average, midway
between the worst and the best. It is also less welfare-increasing when the
utilities for the middle candidates are uniformly distributed in the interval [0? 1]
between the worst and the best candidates, but most welfare-increasing when
the second-placed utilities for some candidates are typically higher than the
average of the uniform distribution (i.e. higher than one half), and the second-
placed utilities for some other candidates are typically lower than this average.
Computer simulations that feature such assumptions are described as setups with
correlation between preference orderings (voter types) and intensities, because
the preference intensities (utilities for the second-best candidates) correlate with
the voter types in the sense that voters with given preference orderings have
typically a high or low utility for their middle candidate.
It will be shown that strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency mainly
because it allows the voters to express intensities of preference, thereby providing
fuller information on such intensities than sincere voting.3 This suggests that
3Donald Saari (e.g., 2001; 2003b; 2003a; 2006) has consistently argued in favour of using
the Borda rule instead of majority rule. One of his arguments is that the latter throws away
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the Borda rule may not need to be made fuzzy (Marchant 2000, García-Lapresta
& Martínez-Panero 2002) or probabilistic (Heckelman 2003) in order to yield
information on intensities.
Under many voting rules, strategic voting may be considerably less welfare-
increasing or welfare-diminishing if some but not all voter types engage in strate-
gic behaviour (see Lehtinen 2006b, 2007). I will argue that the bene…cial welfare
consequences of strategic voting under the Borda rule do not depend crucially
on the assumption that all voter types engage in strategic behaviour: unlike
other voting rules, it is fairly robust to this kind of heterogeneity in behavioural
disposition.
Since the results of this study concern utilitarian e¢ciencies, they rely on full
interpersonal comparability of preference intensities. Given that assumptions of
such interpersonal comparability are generally considered to be suspect, it is
necessary to justify their use. The main justi…cation is that the results are
highly robust with respect to di¤erent interpersonal comparisons.
The model of incomplete information is based on statistical signal extraction
in the sense that voters are assumed to obtain noisy signals concerning the pref-
erence pro…le before they vote, and they derive their beliefs concerning whether
one candidate has a higher Borda score than another from these signals. These
beliefs are then used in an expected utility model of voting. The model is not
game-theoretical in the sense that the voters are not assumed to be able to take
other voters’ strategic choices into account when they formulate their beliefs
concerning the expected Borda scores. Since the determination of these beliefs
is independent of the determination of the actions, I will explain, for expository
reasons, ‘where the beliefs come from’ only after giving an account of how voters
act with their given beliefs.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 4.2 formulates an ex-
pected utility model of strategic voting under the Borda rule. Sections 4.3 and
4.6.3 explain the logic of the model in terms of why utilitarian winners are likely
to obtain many and lose few strategic votes by explaining the ’counterbalancing’
of strategic votes. In section 4.4 I describe the incomplete information model
by showing how to derive beliefs from perturbed signals concerning the prefer-
ence pro…le. Section 4.5 describes the simulation framework and setups, and
section 4.6 presents the simulation results. Section 4.7 provides a discussion on
interpersonal comparisons, and section 4.8 concludes the paper.
information but the former does not.
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4.2 A model of strategic voting under the Borda
rule
Let X={x,y,z} denote the set of candidates with generic members ? and ?.4 Let
1, 2, and 3 denote an individual voter’s best, second-best, and worst candidate.
Let U?1, U
?
2, and U
?
3 denote voter ?’s utility for his or her best, second-best
and worst candidate, respectively. The six possible types of voters and their
preference orderings are presented in Table 4.1 below. I will refer to a voter’s
type of voter
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ? ?
x y z x y z ?1
y z x z x y ?2
z x y y z x ?3
Table 4.1: Voter types and utilities
utility for her second-best candidate U?2 as intensity of preference.
The Borda rule is de…ned as follows.5 Let ? denote the number of candidates.
Voters are asked to provide a full ranking list of all candidates, assigning n-1
marks for the top candidate, n-2 for the second ,.., 0 for the worst candidate.
The Borda winner is de…ned as the candidate who obtains the largest sum of
marks, i.e. the largest Borda score.
Voters are assumed to have beliefs concerning whether any given candidate
? will obtain a higher Borda score than another candidate ?. How these beliefs
are derived is explained in the next section. Let ??(12) denote voter i’s (degree
of) belief that the candidate he or she considers the best will obtain a higher
Borda score than the second-best candidate: ??(13) and ??(23) are similarly
de…ned. Reporting the ordering 123 then means voting sincerely, and reporting
any other ordering means voting strategically.
There are two possible motivations for voting strategically in Borda rule.6
Situation 1 A voter do not like his or her second-best candidate very much. In
order to increase the victory chances of the candidate he or she condiders
best, he or she gives the lowest score to the second-best candidate. He or
she must simultaneously believe that his or her strategic vote is not likely
to make the worst candidate win. The voter must thus believe that his
or her best and second-best candidates are the most likely winners, and
4The present model is restricted to three candidates. The framework of this paper (the
signal extraction information model) could easily be extended to incorporate more than three
candidates, all that is needed is an account of expected utility maximization with more than
three candidates.
5See Pattanaik (2002) for a review of the axiomatic literature on the Borda rule and other
positional methods.
6To the best of my knowledge, there are no incomplete-information models of strategic
voting in the Borda rule. Black (1976) and Ludwin (1978) provide an account that resembles
the …rst situation, and Felsenthal (1996) considers a case that resembles the second.
THE BORDA RULE 45
that the race between them is tight. The voter thus weighs the chance
of the most preferred candidate winning the whole contest if he or she
votes strategically, against the chance that putting the worst candidate
second and the second-best candidate third will bring victory to the worst
candidate.
² This situation is characterised by the following kinds of beliefs and pref-
erences: p?(13) high, p?(23) high, p?(12) close to 12 , and U
?
2 low.
² When a voter votes according this motivation, he or she reports 132 instead
of 123.
Situation 2 A voter believes that his or her best candidate does not have a
chance of winning, but that his or her second-best candidate will have
a close race with the worst candidate, and he or she has fairly strong
positive feelings about the second-best candidate. In order to increase the
chance that this second-best candidate will win, he or she puts it …rst, the
best candidate second, and the worst candidate last. The trade-o¤ is now
between the chance that the second-best candidate will be selected and
the possibility of an error of judgment in that the best candidate would
have won after all, had he or she not been strategically deserted by the
voter.
² This situation is characterised by the following kinds of beliefs and pref-
erences: p?(12) low, p?(13) low, p?(23) close to 12 , and U
?
2 high
² When a voter votes with this motivation, she reports 213 instead of 123.
Let us now consider some examples in order to check that these behav-
iour rules are rational. Suppose that p?(12)=1, p?(13)=0.8 and p?(23)=0.7.7
Since the voter believes that his or her most preferred candidate is sure to
obtain a higher Borda score than the second-best candidate, there is no need
for strategic voting. Note, however, that a rational voter could not have this
combination of beliefs because they are not transitive. Since the …nal Borda
scores always constitute a transitive ordering, voters’ beliefs about these scores
must be transitive. Here the voter expects the aggregate Borda ordering to be
123 such that p?(12)=1 and p?(13)=0.8, but these beliefs are not transitive be-
cause p?(12)?p?(13). Let us update the beliefs so as to end up with p?(12)=1,
p?(13)=1 and p?(23)=0.7. In this case the beliefs are consistent with the transi-
tivity restriction, but it does not seem to make much sense to vote strategically
because the voter’s best candidate is selected in any case. What if p?(12)=0,
p?(13)=0.8 and p?(23)=0.7? It now seems that strategic voting makes no sense
because the voter’s best candidate does not have a chance of beating his or her
second-best candidate, but a strategic vote for the worst candidate might bring
7 An anonymous referee proposed this example as a criticism of an earlier and admittedly
incorrect model of strategic voting under the Borda rule. Since the example led me to construct
an entirely new model, my gratitude to the referee is hereby acknowledged.
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victory to this candidate. Thus, the race between a voter’s most preferred and
second-best candidate must be tight.
Note that in situation 1 the voter believes that the worst candidate does not
have a chance of winning, and in situation 2 that the best candidate does not
have a chance of winning. If the second-best candidate does not have a chance
of winning, there is no point in strategic voting because it may only increase the
chance that his or her worst candidate wins (situation 1) or increase the chance
of victory for the worst candidate (situation 2).
Voters are assumed to make their choice between sincere and strategic voting
on the basis of whether the expected utility gain from voting strategically is
higher than the expected utility loss. A standard starting point in voting models
is that voters should condition their strategic vote on its being pivotal. As
Myatt and Fisher (2002) pointed out in the context of the plurality rule, what
is important is the relative rather than the absolute probability of being pivotal.
In the model under discussion, and in situation 1, the voters condition their
choice on the probability that they are pivotal between the best and second-
best candidates (i.e. an individual voter’s best and second-best candidates),
and between the second-best and worst candidates. In situation 2 the relative
probability concerns being pivotal between the second-best and the worst and
between the best and the second-best.
Let us now formulate a decision rule that adequately re‡ects the trade-o¤s.
Voters assess the possible utility gain (PUG) and the possible utility loss (PUL)
from voting strategically against the probability of realisation. PUG is the
potential gain in utility from voting strategically, and PUL is the potential loss
in utility incurred by voting strategically if the probability estimates turn out
to be incorrect.
In situation 1, a voter’s PUG is the di¤erence in utility between the best
and second-best candidate: ??1 ¡ ? ?2. This gain is most relevant when the
race between the two is tight. (In what follows, the superscript denoting the
individual voter is dropped from all expressions in order to avoid clutter.) What
is thus needed is a function ? that correctly weighs the utility gain depending
on how likely it is to materialise. The following functional form gives weight 1
to the utility gain when p(12)= 1
2
? and weight 0 when p(12)=0 or p(12)=1:
? = 1 ¡ 2(j?(12) ¡ 1
2
j)?
where the vertical bars denote absolute values. The expected utility gain from
reporting 132 ??(?) is thus
??(?) = [1 ¡ 2(j?(12) ¡ 1
2
j)](?1 ¡ ?2)? (4.1)
The possible utility loss from voting strategically depends on which candidate
is expected to win. If the voter expects the aggregate Borda ordering to be 123,
it is ?1 ¡?3, and if she expects it to be 213, it is ?2 ¡?3. Given that the voters
do not know whether the best or the second candidate will win, but they have
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beliefs about it, they need to weigh the losses against the probability that the
best candidate will beat the second-best candidate. The expected utility loss is
thus
?? (?) = ? (12) [1 ¡ ?(13)][1 ¡ ?(23)](?1 ¡ ?3) +
[1 ¡ ? (12)][1 ¡ ?(13)][1 ¡ ?(23)](?2 ¡?3)? (4.2)
A voter thus votes strategically by reporting the ordering 132 if
??(?) ¡ ??(?) ? ?1? (4.3)
?1 is a parameter that re‡ects the voters’ propensity to engage in strategic
voting. This can be expressed as follows:
[1 ¡ 2(j?(12) ¡ 1
2
j)](?1 ¡ ?2)
¡? (12) [1 ¡ ?(13)][1 ¡ ?(23)](?1 ¡?3)
¡ [1 ¡ ? (12)] [1 ¡ ?(13)][1 ¡ ?(23)](?2 ¡ ?3) ? ?1? (4.4)
Let us now consider situation 2. The PUG is ?2 ¡?3? and the PUL is ?1 ¡?2.
The expected utility gain from strategic voting is
?? (?) = [1 ¡ 2(j?(23) ¡ 1
2
j)](?2 ¡ ?3)?
and the expected utility loss is
?? (?) = ?(12)?(13) (?1 ¡ ?2) ?
A voter votes strategically by reporting 213 if
[1 ¡ 2(j?(23) ¡ 1
2
j)](?2 ¡ ?3) ¡ ?(12)?(13) (?1 ¡ ?2) ? ?2?8 (4.5)
4.3 The logic of the model: counterbalancing
f a strategic vote is based on poor information, it may be counter-productive.
Assume, for example, that a voter expects the Borda ordering to be 123 with,
say, p(12)=0.7, p(13)=0.8 and p(23)=0.7. Let ?1 = 0?9, ?2 = 0?5, ?3 = 0?1,
and ?1 = 0? He or she will then vote strategically by reporting 132 because
applying equation 4.4 yields [1 ¡ 2 ¤ (0?7 ¡ 1
2
)] ¤ (0?9 ¡ 0?5) ¡ 0?7 ¤ [1 ¡ 0?8] ¤
[1 ¡ 0?7] ¤ [0?9 ¡ 0?1] ¡ [1 ¡ 0?7] ¤ [1 ¡ 0?8] ¤ [0?5 ¡ 0?1] = 0?1824 ? 0. However,
if he or she was wrong about the likely outcomes, the strategic vote will bring
about the worst outcome! It is the very nature of uncertainty that something
that is considered unlikely but possible may happen. However, it is not likely
8 It is possible to give parameters ?1 and ?2 di¤erent values, but in this paper they were
assumed to be the same in all except the simulations in which one of them was so large (i.e.
at least 1) that there was no strategic voting in that situation.
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that a voter will obtain a worse outcome by voting strategically than by voting
sincerely. In most cases a strategic vote bene…ts both the voter and the whole
electorate. The explanation lies in the counter-balancing of strategic votes.
Under incomplete information, some voters may have the strategic incentive
to decrease the Borda score for candidate ? and increase that of ? while at the
same time some others may have the incentive to increase the score of candidate
? and decrease that of candidate ?. It follows from the set out above that voting
strategically for a candidate is more likely when the preference intensity for
that candidate is high than when it is low. Table 4.2 summarises the e¤ects of
strategic voting by all voter types by showing the candidate whose Borda score
is increased (") or decreased (#) when a voter of a given type gives a strategic
vote.
voter type 1 2 3 4 5 6
situation 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
" z y x z y x y z z x x y
# y x z y x z z x x y y z
Table 4.2: Directions of change due to strategic voting
For example, if type-one voters vote strategically, they do so by increasing
the Borda score for ? at the expense of ? in situation 1, and by increasing the
score of ? at the expense of ? in situation 2.
Consider situation 1. Let us assume that the intensities for candidate ? are
higher on average than those for candidate ?. The simulations with intensity
correlation formalise these assumptions, the implication being that ? is likely
to be the utilitarian winner, and ? the worst candidate in utilitarian terms. If
type-one or type-six voters vote strategically in situation 1, their vote decreases
the Borda score of ?, and increases that of ? and ?, respectively, while strategic
voting by type-three or type-…ve voters decreases the Borda score of ?, and
increases that of ? and ?, respectively.
Equation 4.4 implies that, under the above assumptions, type-one and type-
six voters are likely to vote strategically more often than those of types three
and …ve. For example, a type-three voter will vote strategically by reporting ???
rather than ??? if ?3 = [1¡2(j?(??)- 12 j)] [? (?) -? (?)]-[1-?(??)]?(??)? (??)[U(?)-
U(?)] ¡? (??) ?(??)? (??) [?(?)-? (?)] ? ?1. Since [1 ¡ 2(j?(??) ¡ 12 j)] ¸ 0 and
? (??) ?(??)? (??) ¸ 0 for all possible values of the probabilities, ??3??(?) ? 0?
Thus, the higher the intensity for ?, U?(x), the less likely this person is to
vote strategically against ? by reporting zyx rather than the sincere zxy. Simi-
larly, since ?5 = [1 ¡ 2(j?(??) ¡ 12 j)] [? (?) ¡? (?)] ¡ [1 ¡ ?(??)] [1 ¡ ?(??)][1 ¡
? (??)][? (?) ¡ ? (?)]¡? (??) [1 ¡ ?(??)][1 ¡ ? (??)][?(?) ¡ ? (?)], ??5??(?) ? 0,
there will be few voters of type …ve who report yzx rather than yxz if their
intensity for ? is high on average. On the other hand, for voters of type one
?1 = [1 ¡ 2(j?(??) ¡ 12 j)] [?(?) ¡ ? (?)] ¡ ? (??) [1 ¡ ?(??)][1 ¡ ?(??)](? (?) ¡
? (?))¡ [1 ¡ ? (??)] [1¡?(??)][1¡?(??)](?(?)¡?(?)) so that ??1??(?) ? 0. Thus,
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the smaller U(y) is, the more likely it is that these voters will vote strategically
for ? and against ? by reporting xzy. A similar argument shows that ??6??(?) ? 0.
Let us now turn to situation 2. A high average intensity for ? implies that
many type-three and -…ve voters will vote strategically by raising the Borda
score of ? at the expense of ? and ?. A low average intensity for y implies that few
voters of types one and six will vote strategically. They are thus likely to refrain
from making ?’s Borda score higher. Consider again a type-three voter as an
example. Since ?[1¡2(j?(??)¡
1
2 j)][?(?)-?(?)]¡[1-?(??)][1-?(??)][?(?)-?(?)]
??(?) =[1-2(j?(??)-
1
2
j)]+[1-?(??)] [1-?(??)] ? 0 for all values of the probabilities, the higher the
intensity for ?, the more likely this voter is to vote strategically for ? by reporting
??? in situation 2. Thus, a high average value of U?(x) in this case implies that
many of these voters will vote strategically for ? by reporting ???. Similar
arguments show that many type-…ve voters will vote strategically by reporting
xyz, and that few voters of types one and six will vote strategically by reporting
yxz or yzx, respectively.
In conclusion, relatively many strategic votes for the utilitarian winner ?
are likely to be counter-balanced by relatively few strategic votes against it. I
will return to the matter of counter-balancing in section 4.6.3.
4.4 The voters’ signals and beliefs
The basic idea behind this information model is that voters formulate probabili-
ties based on noisy signals concerning other voters’ preferences, i.e. a preference
pro…le. In real life voters obtain this kind of information from opinion polls, tele-
vision broadcasts and conversations with friends, for example. All these possible
sources of information are assumed to be modeled by the noisy signals. This
signal-extraction framework allows the derivation of a heterogeneous set of prob-
abilities for a large population of voters by characterizing the reliability of the
signals.9 Each voter obtains a slightly di¤erent signal, but since the signals are
based on the realised preference pro…le, his or her beliefs are constrained by the
realities of the situation.
Voters are assumed to take this perturbed information about the realised
pro…le as a relevant proxy for the expected aggregate Borda scores. This as-
sumption is not reasonable if the relationship between the preference pro…le and
the realised Borda scores is systematically distorted, and if the voters could be
assumed to know how it is distorted. If the results reported here are correct, i.e.
if strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency, they imply that voters would
get better information on the expected Borda scores if they were also able to
obtain information on preference intensities and on the behavioural dispositions
of other voters. It is possible to take intensities into account in the signals by
assuming, for example, that they are based on the sums of utilities. However,
the signals referred to in this paper are based only on the ordinal preference
pro…le. They are thus ‘systematically distorted’ in the sense that voters are as-
9 Lehtinen (2006a) discusses a similar signal-extraction model in more detail.
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sumed not to be able to take intensity information concerning other voters into
account. This assumption is made because it considerably simpli…es the appli-
cation of the signal extraction model to the various setups. It is also perfectly
possible to study how other kinds of systematic distortions a¤ect the results,
but since this is already a long paper, this is left for a future study.
This signal extraction model is embedded in simulated games that are based
on the impartial culture (Tsetlin, Regenwetter & Grofman 2003, Gehrlein 2002)
assumption. A simulated game ? consists of a set of randomly generated payo¤s,
beliefs based on these payo¤s, and other informational assumptions, as well as
voting outcomes under the di¤erent behavioural assumptions. The uniform
distribution on [1,2,...,6] was used to generate a pro…le of N=201 voters in
each simulated game ?.10 The voters then obtained a perturbed signal on each
candidate’s Borda score which was based on the realised number of voters who
preferred one candidate to another.
Let ? ?1?? be a random variable that obtains the value 1 when voter ? ranks
candidate ? highest, and zero otherwise. The number of voters who rank candi-
date ? …rst, N ?1 , could then be viewed as the sum of ? random variables ? ?1??,
one for each voter ?: N ?1 =
P?
?=1?
?
1??. Similarly, the number of voters who rank
candidate ? second, N ?2 , could be viewed as the sum of random variables ? ?2??:
N ?2 =
P?
?=1?
?
2??. The impartial culture assumption implies that the probability
that such a Bernoulli trial (for example, ? ?1?? and ?
?
2??) will result in outcome
1 is 13 . ?
?
1 ??
?
2 ??
?
1 , and ?
?
2 could thus be viewed as random variables with a
binary distribution ? ?1 » ?(?? 13).
If all voters voted sincerely, the Borda scores for candidates ? and ? would
be given by
?? = 2N ?1 + N ?2 ?
and
?? = 2N ?1 + N ?2 ?
Voter ?’s expected Borda scores for candidates ? and ? are given by the following
signals:
??? = 2N ?1 + N ?2 + ???? (4.6)
and
??? = 2N ?1 + N ?2 + ???? (4.7)
where ?? and ?? are standard normally distributed random variables, and ?
is a scaling factor that re‡ects the reliability of the signals. The probability
that candidate ? will obtain a higher Borda score than candidate ?, given the
signals ?? and ?? can be derived by formulating another random variable for
10This particular number was chosen mainly in order to obtain comparability with some
earlier simulation studies of voting rules (Merrill 1984, 1988). It is easy to study the e¤ect of
the number of voters on the results, but this was not done for the present paper.
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the di¤erence11 between the two signals, ???:
??? = ?? ¡ ??? (4.8)
Let us also de…ne ??? = 2N ?1 + N ?2 ¡ 2N ?1 ¡ N ?2 , and ??? = ??? ¡ ???. Then
the signal ??? could be written as
??? = ??? +???? (4.9)
i.e. as the sum of two independent random variables. Let n? denote the realised
number of voters of type t. For a comparison between ? and ?? ??? = 2? ?1 +
? ?2 + ??
? ¡ (2??1 +??2 + ???) is
??? = 2 (?1 + ?4) + ?3 + ?5 ¡ 2(?2 + ?5) ¡ ?1 ¡ ?6 +???
= ?1 ¡ 2?2 + ?3 + 2?4 ¡ ?5 ¡ ?6 +????
For a comparison between ? and ? it is
??? = 2?1 ¡ ?2 ¡ ?3 + ?4 + ?5 ¡ 2?6 +????
and for a comparison between ? and ? it is
??? = ?1 + ?2 ¡ 2?3 ¡ ?4 + 2?5 ¡ ?6 +????
It is shown in Appendix B that the variance of ??? is 2? , and that of ??? is
2?2. According to the central limit theorem, ??? can be approximated with a
normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero, and a variance of
2? +2?2? ??? » ?(0? 2? + 2?2). This approximation restricts the applicability
of the model to situations with a fairly large number of voters. Since the mean
of ???? ???? is obviously zero, normalising ?
?? yields
??? =
??? ¡ ????p
?2?
=
???p
2? + 2?2
=
2N ?1 + N ?2 + ??? ¡ (2N ?1 + N ?2 + ???)p
2? + 2?2
?
(4.10)
The probability that candidate ? will obtain a higher Borda score than candidate
?? ??(??) is thus given by the standard normal cumulative distribution function
©:
??(??) = 1 ¡ ©( ?
??
?p
2? + 2?2
)? (4.11)
11 The signals could be formulated in such a way that the di¤erence in the Borda scores
is taken …rst, and the random variable ??? is added to this expression; ??? = 2N ?1 + N ?2 ¡
2N ?1 ¡ N ?2 + ????. I chose to add the random component to each Borda score because
doing so automatically precludes cyclic beliefs: the beliefs are derived after each Borda score
has been perturbed. The ordering of the realized signals for Borda scores is automatically
transitive. This way of formulating the signals thus obviates the need to specify how the voters
should update their beliefs once the signal information has provided intransitive beliefs. The
downside is that the range of reasonable values for the parameter ? now inevitably depends
on the number of voters.
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Applying this equation gives more familiar-looking expressions for beliefs.
For example, a type-one voter ranks the candidates in the order xyz, and his or
her beliefs are given by p?(12)=p?(xy)=1-©( ?
??
?p
2?+2?2
)=
1-©(2N
?
1 +N?2 +???¡(2N?1 +N?2 +???)p
2?+2?2
), p?(13)=p?(xz)=1-©( ?
??
?p
2?+2?2
), for exam-
ple. Note that the variables concerning the preference pro…le (N?1 , N?2 , N ?1 ,
and N ?2 ) are the same for all voters, but the random perturbances (?? and ??)
are di¤erent for each one, making each voter’s belief slightly di¤erent.
4.5 Setups and simulation
A setup is a combination of assumptions used in a set of ? = 2000 simulated
games. Expected utility setups di¤er with respect to the degree of reliability of
the voters’ information (?) ? their propensity to vote strategically (?) ? and the
degree of correlation between voter types and preference intensities (?) (see next
paragraph). In uniform setups each voter’s utilities are drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0,1], while in setups with intensity correlation voter types three
and …ve have systematically higher preference intensities for their second-best
candidate (?), and voter types one and six have systematically lower preference
intensities for their second-best candidate (?). These setups are identical to
the corresponding uniform setups with respect to all parameters except voters’
preference intensities. In order to generate setups with correlation between this
parameter and voter types without a¤ecting the interpersonal comparisons or
the preference orderings, the individual utilities were derived as follows.
U1, U2, and U3 were …rst generated from the uniform distribution on [0,1]
for each voter. U1 and U3 were then used for de…ning the voter’s utility scale
as the [U3,U1] interval, but U2 was not used for any purpose. (The reason for
this is explained in section 4.7.) Instead, a standardised intensity e?2 for each
voter’s second-best candidate was generated from the uniform distribution on
[0,1]. This standardised intensity expresses what a voter’s utility for his or her
second-best candidate would be if the scale was the [0,1] interval. Let us refer to
these standardised second-best utilities as intrapersonal intensities. In setups
with intensity correlation, these intensities were multiplied by a parameter C,
0.5?C·1 for those who put ? second (voter types one and six) so that the new
correlated intensities e???12 and e???62 were given by
e??2 = ? e?2? (4.12)
In order to compensate the decreases in utility for voter types one and six, the
intensities for voters of types three and …ve (i.e. for ?) were given by
e??2 = 1 ¡ ? e?2? (4.13)
These adjustments make the average utilities for ? higher and the average util-
ities for ? lower than in the uniform setups, while keeping the overall average
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utility …xed. In uniform setups, ? = 1. C thus denotes the degree of correlation
between preference intensities and voter types.
These standardised intensities were then scaled back into the original [?3? ?1]
utility scale. Let ?¤2 denote voter’s intensity expressed in terms of the original
[?3? ?1] scale. Since the relationship between the standardised intrapersonal
utility for the second-best candidate and the original scale is given by
e??2 = 1 ¡ ?1 ¡?¤2?1 ¡ ?3 ? (4.14)
?¤2 is given by:
?¤2 = ?3 + e??2 (?1 ¡ ?3)? (4.15)
Let ?? ? denote the utilitarian winner in a simulated game ?? and? ???(?? ? ? ?)
the winner in an EU-behaviour setup. Let ??? ? denote an indicator function
that obtains the value 1 when ?? ? = ? ??? (?? ?? ?)? Utilitarian E¢ciency in
an EU setup is thus given by:
???? (?? ? ??) =
1
?
X?
?=1
??? ? ¤ 100? (4.16)
Utilitarian E¢ciency in the SV setup, ???? , is calculated similarly. Let us say
that EU behaviour is welfare-increasing in a setup if the utilitarian e¢ciency is
higher than in the SV setup:
????(?? ? ? ?) ? ???? ? (4.17)
If the converse holds, EU behaviour is welfare-diminishing. Let us also say
that strategic voting is welfare-increasing in a setup if EU behaviour is welfare-
increasing.
4.6 Simulation results
4.6.1 Preliminaries
What is of interest is how the degree of correlation (C), the reliability of the
voters’ information (?), and the voters’ propensity to engage in strategic voting
(?) a¤ect utilitarian e¢ciency. All these parameters a¤ect the results, but at
least two must be …xed each time the results are reported.12 The simulations
were conducted with ? = 0? 0?05? ???? 0?5, ? = 0? 4? ???? 16, and ? = 0? 0?25? ???? 1.
The choice of parameter values is arbitrary to some extent, but there are some
alternatives. For example, since the signal extraction model cannot be used with
12 The FORTRAN codes for generating the results, and the result tables with all combi-
nations of parameter values are obtainable from the author on request. In order to check
the computer code with the number of runs used (2000) for each setup, the IMSL library of
FORTRAN codes and access to a supercomputer are required. The simulations were con-
ducted with a Sun Fire 25K server (UltraSPARC IV processor) at the Center for Scienti…c
Computing, Otaniemi, Espoo, Finland.
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Figure 4.1: Utilitarian e¢ciencies in setups with di¤erent degrees of correlation.
The degree of reliability is not excessively low (? = 4)?
? = 0 because it would involve dividing by zero, the choice was not to present
the results with this value of ?. The results for ? = 1 were not always presented
either because the conditions for strategic voting imply that nobody votes that
way strategically13 . Randomness a¤ects the voters’ beliefs as much as the real
preference pro…le when the variance of B?? equals the variance of R??? i.e. when
2N=2?2. A somewhat natural maximum value for ? is thus ? =
p
? ¼ 14?177?
4.6.2 The degree of intensity correlation and the reliabil-
ity of the signals
Figure 4.1 shows the utilitarian e¢ciencies in setups with di¤erent degrees of
intensity correlation. It is easy to see from this …gure that strategic voting is
welfare-increasing in all setups except those in which ? = 0, and C is higher
than about 0.81. Choosing a range of reasonable values for parameter ? can be
done by evaluating the percentage of voters that vote strategically. When ? = 0?
about 60 to 62 per cent of the voters actually gave a strategic vote. When ? =
0?25 and 0.5 the percentage …gures were about 10-12, and 1.5-1.8 respectively.
Estimates for how common strategic voting is (e.g., Alvarez, Boehmke & Nagler
13Simulations were conducted with ? = 1, however, in order to check the consistency of the
computer model: the results for SV behaviour and EU behaviour with ? = 1 have to be the
same.
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Figure 4.2: Utilitarian e¢ciencies in various setups with ? = 16
2006, Cox 1997) suggest that ? = 0?25 is the most plausible value. Results that
can be displayed with only one value of ? at a time will thus be reported as
? = 0?25.
Figure 4.2 shows utilitarian e¢ciencies in setups with ? = 16. A compari-
son of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 shows that strategic voting is slightly more welfare-
increasing when the reliability of the voters’ information is high than when it is
low. The reliability of the voters’ signals thus turned out to be less important
than expected, and less important than other parameters. As before, strategic
voting was more welfare-increasing in setups with intensity correlation than in
uniform setups.
4.6.3 What happens if some voter types do not engage in
strategic behaviour?
The logic of counter-balancing implies in many voting rules that if some voter
types never vote strategically, strategic voting may be welfare-diminishing. If
the strategic votes for a candidate are not counter-balanced with strategic de-
sertions of the same candidate, the voting results no longer adequately re‡ect
the di¤erences in preference intensities between the candidates. It is unlikely,
however, that the welfare consequences of strategic voting are a¤ected at all if
the selection of those who engage in it is random, i.e. if there are no systematic
di¤erences in the behavioural dispositions of di¤erent types of voters. If it is
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Figure 4.3: Utilitarian e¢ciencies with ? = 4 in setups with di¤erent degrees of
correlation when type-four voters engage in SV-behaviour
assumed, for example, that a randomly selected half of the population of voters
engages in SV behaviour, there will simply be less strategic voting, and the
model will yield the same welfare e¤ects as that in which all voters engage in
EU behaviour, although these e¤ects will be weaker.14
The Borda rule di¤ers from other voting rules in that the bene…cial welfare
consequences of strategic voting do not depend heavily on whether all voter
types engage in strategic behaviour or not. The reason for this is that a single
voter type may confront two di¤erent strategic situations, and the incentive
structures of these two situations provide partial counterbalancing within a single
voter type. Although a voter may have a strategic incentive to report a higher
Borda score than his or her preference ordering implies for a given candidate
in situation 1, another voter of the same type may have a strategic incentive
to report a lower Borda score than his or her preference ordering implies for
this same candidate in situation 2. The conditions for strategic voting, together
with the transitivity restrictions, however, imply that a single voter cannot have
an incentive to vote strategically in both situations at the same time.
It also matters which voter type(s) do not engage in EU behaviour. A further
look at Table 4.2 on p. 48 shows that the Borda score of candidate ? may be
both increased and decreased by the strategic actions of type-one voters. Coun-
14This was also veri…ed in the simulations.
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Figure 4.4: Utilitarian e¢ciencies when type-two voters engage in SV-behaviour
terbalancing thus works partially in the sense that the strategic votes for ? are
counterbalanced by the strategic votes against ? cast by voters of the same type,
but the strategic votes for ? and those against ? are not counterbalanced by the
strategic actions of type-one voters. Note, however, that such counterbalancing
within a voter type requires heterogeneity of preference intensities and beliefs
because the two strategic situations depend on systematically di¤erent beliefs.
It is thus unlikely that this kind of counterbalancing will occur if the voters have
exact information on other voters’ preferences.
Given the preference structures in setups with correlation between intensities
and voter types and the directions of change as presented in table 4.2, utilitarian
e¢ciencies should be highest in setups with correlation in which only type-four
voters engage in SV behaviour, and lowest in setups in which only type-two
voters engage in SV behaviour. The di¤erence should be rather small, however,
if only one voter type refrains from strategic voting, because in that case there
remain many voters who may have the incentives to vote strategically for all
three candidates.
Figure 4.3 shows utilitarian e¢ciencies in setups in which type-four voters
engaged in SV behaviour and other voter types engage in EU behaviour, and
…gure 4.4 shows similar results when type-two voters engage in SV-behaviour.
Comparison with …gure 4.1 shows that, although the utilitarian e¢ciencies
are somewhat lower when some voter types do not engage in strategic behaviour,
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Figure 4.5: Utilitarian e¢ciencies in setups in which voters engage in strategic
voting only in situation 1
the e¤ect is not particularly strong. Furthermore, the di¤erence between the
setups in which di¤erent voter types engaged in sincere behaviour is relatively
small. Setups in which type-one and type-three voters engaged in SV behaviour
were also investigated. As expected, the utilitarian e¢ciencies were broadly
speaking between those derived from the extreme cases in which type-two or
-four voters engaged in SV behaviour.15
4.6.4 Sincere and non-sincere manipulation
Van Hees and Dowding (forthcoming) have recently argued that there are two
kinds of manipulation, and that although one may be normatively suspect the
other is less so. A voter engaged in ’sincere manipulation’ gives a vote to a
candidate ? in order to increase the chance that this candidate will win, whereas
one engaged in ’non-sincere manipulation’ gives a vote to candidate ? in order
to increase the chance that another candidate ? will win. Since van Hees and
Dowding consider the Borda rule an example of a voting rule in which non-
sincere manipulation may occur, it may well be justi…ed to consider situation 1
as representing non-sincere manipulation and situation 2 as representing sincere
manipulation.
15These results are available from the author on request.
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Figure 4.6: Utilitarian e¢ciencies in a setup where the voters engage in strategic
behaviour only in situation 2
It is natural to ask how the welfare consequences di¤er between sincere and
non-sincere manipulation given that only one situation a¤ects voters’ decisions
in a setup. Figure 4.5 shows the utilitarian e¢ciencies from setups in which
the voters engage in strategic voting in situation 1 but not in situation 2 (only
non-sincere manipulation), and Figure 4.6 displays similar results for setups in
which the voters engage in strategic behaviour only in situation 2 (only sincere
manipulation). There are clear di¤erences in welfare implications between the
two situations, but it is rather di¢cult to say whether the results are in favour
of sincere or non-sincere manipulation. With only non-sincere manipulation it
would be better if the voters engaged in EU behaviour only if the correlation
between intensities and voter types were strong, whereas sincere manipulation
seems to be welfare-increasing irrespective of the degree of correlation.
4.7 Interpersonal comparisons
Since these results are based on utilitarian e¢ciencies, it is necessary to make
interpersonal comparisons of preference intensities because it must be assumed
that it is possible to add one person’s utility to another person’s utility. Since
such comparisons are generally considered the most suspect for epistemic (choices
do not provide easily interpretable information: (Myerson 1985)) and conceptual
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(they are meaningless with vNM utility functions) reasons, the welfare criterion
has to be justi…ed.16
Condorcet e¢ciency is the percentage of voting games in which the Con-
dorcet winner is selected, given that it exists. Figure 4.7 displays Condorcet e¢-
ciencies. Many voting theorists would no doubt consider the result that strategic
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
60
65
70
75
80
85
C
U
E E
U,
UE
SV
UESV
UEEU(?=0)
UEEU(?=0.25)
UEEU(?=0.5)
UEEU(?=0.75)
UEEU(?=1)
Figure 4.7: Condorcet e¢ciencies with ? = 0?4
voting is welfare-increasing acceptable only if Condorcet e¢ciency was used as
a normative criterion, on the grounds that it does not require the comparability
of di¤erent voters’ utility scales. Given that Figure 4.7 shows unambiguously
that strategic voting decreases Condorcet e¢ciency, taking this position would
mean that the results show precisely the reverse of what was claimed: strategic
voting will always be welfare-diminishing. However, such an interpretation of
the results is not correct for the following reasons.
Refusing to use an intensity-based welfare measure in a model in which inten-
sities a¤ect the voters’ behaviour implies a methodological bias. If intensities are
important for individuals, they should be normatively important for the whole
electorate. Strategic voting is bene…cial only because it allows voters to express
intensities indirectly, even under a voting rule in which such information is not
explicitly collected.
If the result that strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency obtains with
all di¤erent and at least mildly reasonable preference scales, then it does not
16See Hammond (1991b, 2004) for surveys on interpersonal comparisons.
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depend on any particular interpersonal comparison. If it is thus robust to inter-
personal comparisons, we can be assured that we know something more about
the consequences of strategic voting even though we do not know which inter-
personal comparison is correct. The model was tested with various di¤erent
interpersonal comparisons. Since the ways in which the results were tested for
robustness, as well as the qualitative conclusions from the robustness analysis
were exactly the same as those presented in Lehtinen (2007) for parliamentary
agenda voting, the analysis will not be reproduced here. The robustness analy-
sis showed that EU behaviour remains welfare-increasing irrespective of the
interpersonal comparison used.
The simulations conducted thus far have featured random interpersonal com-
parisons of preference intensities because the utilities are derived from the uni-
form distribution on the [0,1] interval. It could always be argued that the choice
of individual utility scales is arbitrary. This arbitrariness ultimately derives
from the fact that it is impossible to obtain exact information on individual
di¤erences in utilities. Epistemological considerations thus indicate that we will
never know which interpersonal comparison is correct. Robbins (1938) noted
that even though a Brahmin’s claim that he is ten times more capable of hap-
piness than an untouchable may be repugnant, he cannot demonstrate his own
more egalitarian view by scienti…c means. This would seem to imply that …xing
a preference scale is entirely arbitrary because any scale will be equally good
from a scienti…c point of view. This argument is valid, but it does not neces-
sarily follow that we should not impose any bounds on individual utility scales
because we are involved in the normative evaluation of a voting scheme, and in
such an enterprise ethical judgments are also important.
Consider the following example with three voters A, B, and C.
? ? ?
?(2) ?(1
2
) ?(1
2
)
?(1
2
) ?(1
4
) ?(1
4
)
?(0) ?(0) ?(0)
Table 4.3: An example with three voters
The numbers in parentheses indicate cardinal interpersonally comparable
utilities. Here the utility sums are 2, 1 12 ? and 0 for ?, ? and ?, respectively.
No doubt, many of us might think that ? rather than ? should be selected
even if the utilities were interpersonally comparable and even if A’s high utility
for ? outweighed B’s and C’s utilities for ?. We would be willing to argue
that voter A’s great satisfaction from ? does not compensate for the fact that
two voters would be obtaining their worst outcome. We would thus be willing
to say that ?, the Condorcet winner, should be selected. If we are using this
argument, however, we are looking at interpersonal comparability, although this
is di¤erent from the utilitarian argument. The comparison consists in the idea
that alternatives ? and ? are compared in terms of the number of individuals
who would gain utility in passing from ? to ? as opposed to the number who
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would lose (cf. Hildreth 1953).
If we are willing to grant the normative relevance of preference intensities
in the …rst place, the proper conclusion to be drawn from this example is not
that Condorcet winners should be used, but rather that the utility scales cannot
vary boundlessly. That the individual scales of utility are somewhat similar is
based on the normative judgment that each individual’s utility should weigh
somewhat equally in the social- evaluation function.17 Making the utility scales
di¤erent for di¤erent individuals will thus accommodate the fact that di¤erent
individuals are likely to care about the results of the vote to di¤erent degrees.
However, making it unlikely that one voter’s utility scale will be ten times wider
than another voter’s scale will prevent too much divergence from the normative
one-man-one-vote principle. The variability in individual utility scales is not
limited due to the belief that real people’s scales do not vary all that much, but
rather because this methodological choice provides a way of taking into account
important normative considerations.
4.8 Conclusions
Strategic voting is welfare-increasing under the Borda rule in various con…g-
urations of assumptions. All the results reported here are derived from the
logic of counterbalancing : intensively supported candidates are most likely to
gain strategic votes and least likely to lose them. Ceteris paribus, correla-
tion between voter types and preference intensities makes strategic voting more
welfare-increasing.
It seems fairly likely that setups with intensity correlation correspond more
closely to real-world conditions than the uniform setups. This would be the case
if some candidates were typically fairly tolerable to a large number of voters
even if they had about the same number of supporters that put them …rst in
their preference ordering (and some other candidates would have a narrower
support base). The results thus provide a further dimension to the claim made
by various authors that the Borda rule selects reasonable compromises: the
utilitarian winner is one kind of compromise candidate.
Although no explicit comparison of di¤erent voting rules is given in this
paper, there is good reason to claim that the Borda rule has two advantages
over some other rules. First, strategic voting seems to be welfare-increasing
even if the voters have unreliable information on other voters’ preferences. Sec-
ondly, the welfare consequences of strategic voting are bene…cial under this rule
even if di¤erent types of players have heterogeneous behavioural dispositions
or manipulative skills. Even if some voter types do not engage in strategic be-
haviour, strategic voting increases utilitarian e¢ciency. The Borda rule yields
high utilitarian e¢ciencies even when some voter types engage in sincere behav-
iour because counter-balancing functions to some extent even at the level of the
single voter type. Voters of the same type may have an incentive to increase
17See Dhillon and Mertens (1999) for an axiomatic defence of this kind of utilitarianism.
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(situation 2) or decrease (situation 1) the Borda score of their second-best candi-
date, depending on their beliefs and preferences, because there are two di¤erent
strategic situations they may face under the Borda rule.
Since even ‘non-sincere manipulation’ is welfare-increasing under the Borda
rule, it could be concluded that the title of this paper is neither a joke nor a
metaphor: the Borda rule is also intended for dishonest people.
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Chapter 5
Unrealistic assumptions in
rational choice theory
Abstract
The most common argument against the use of rational choice mod-
els outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions
about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of
assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors
are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary
from application to application, e¤ective criticism of economic model
building should be based on model-speci…c arguments showing how
the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some
modeling results in imperialistic applications are relatively robust
with respect to unrealistic assumptions.
Keywords: Unrealistic assumptions; Economics Imperialism; Ratio-
nal choice; As if; Robustness
5.1 Introduction
Economics has become an imperialistic science. Economic methods are increas-
ingly used for explaining phenomena in …elds that have traditionally been oc-
cupied by other sciences. The term ‘rational choice theory’ has come to denote
theories that apply economics to new …elds of research.1 Economics imperialism
is thus a matter of extending theories based on rational individuals into new
areas. Yet even economists used to argue that the homo oeconomicus assump-
tion should not be used to model human behavior outside the domain of market
institutions. However applicable the self-interest assumption is in economic do-
mains, it seems to give a particularly poor account of individual motivation in
1 The traditional game and decision theories are, of course, also called theories of rational
choice.
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other areas. Have people just become generally more rational, or are market
institutions invading new areas of social life? If neither is the case, the as-
sumptions of strict rationality and self-interest do not seem to be realistic in
imperialistic applications of economic methods.
The accusation of unrealism is re‡ected in the common reactions against the
use of economic models outside their traditional domain; people are not really
‘sel…sh’, social relations are more fundamental than economic relations, and im-
perialism thus puts the cart before the horse (see e.g., Za…rowski 1999). We …nd
these arguments wanting, since they misconstrue the explanatory properties of
rational choice models. Our objective in this paper is to analyze how unrealistic
assumptions may or may not matter for particular explanatory enterprises. Our
claim is that behavioral and psychological assumptions may have di¤erent kinds
of explanatory roles in di¤erent rational choice models. Some applications rely
on substantive psychological assumptions, whereas others require certain kinds
of behavioral patterns, and some get by with only scant reference to the struc-
ture of the situation. Therefore, the legitimacy of imperialistic applications of
economic theorizing has to be assessed on a case by case basis. What follows
is an attempt to provide criteria according to which such assessments can be
made. Our aim is thus not to o¤er a sweeping defense of rational choice, but to
pinpoint the possible weaknesses upon which e¤ective criticism can be based.
Since the explanatory properties of many rational choice models rely crucially
on the robustness of the modeling result with respect to problematic modeling
assumptions, we especially emphasize the value of explicit robustness analysis
in such criticism. We will argue that if a result is demonstrably robust with
respect to the unrealistic psychological or behavioral assumptions, the falsity
does not matter.
Since the assumption of self-interest has been considered particularly unre-
alistic in non-economic domains, and since this has been explicitly put forward
as an argument against economic applications in other social sciences, our ar-
guments are most relevant in terms of discussing the legitimacy of economics
imperialism. Nevertheless, what we say about unrealistic assumptions is, in
principle, applicable to any social science, including economics itself.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by providing an account
of the role of microfoundations and folk-psychology in rational choice theory in
section 5.2. We note that a literal intentional or psychological reading of ratio-
nal choice models requires the mediation of real intentional processes. We will
then argue that since the assumptions of expected utility maximizing behavior
and self-interest are merely templates for constructing empirically interpretable
rational choice models, appraising the realisticness of these assumptions makes
sense only if the appraisal concerns the arguments used to operationalize these
assumptions into a substantial model. It is pointless to criticize or approve of
these assumptions in the abstract because they are empirically empty. Since
it is clear that not all rational choice models can be interpreted literally as
accounts of intentional actions of agents, we proceed in the next section to dis-
cuss the various ways of interpreting as-if clauses that often accompany rational
choice models. As-if clauses are usually thought to refer to the use of unreal-
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istic assumptions. We argue that this need not be the case, since assumptions
can be psychologically unrealistic in that they attribute implausible thought
processes to the agents, yet at the same time be behaviorally realistic in the
sense of correctly describing individual behavior. The possibility that a rational
choice model is behaviorally realistic even though psychologically unrealistic is
particularly relevant for models in which the structural constraints rather than
individual psychological processes are the causally most relevant factors. In sec-
tion 5.4 we discuss the way in which it is possible to analyze which factors are
really relevant in a model by providing an account of robustness analysis. We
will thus look at ways in which the validity of a modeling result may be insen-
sitive to false assumptions, and argue for the importance of explicit robustness
analysis by discussing some well-known examples from rational choice theory.
One largely overlooked reason for the success of rational choice models is the
fact that they often provide explicit frameworks for evaluating the normative
acceptability of various institutional arrangements. Section 5.5 discusses the
role of unrealistic assumptions in such comparative institutional analyses. The
sixth section concludes the paper.
5.2 Operationalizing folk psychology
Those who use economic methods in new …elds of research often justify their
approach by arguing that their contribution consists of providing microfounda-
tions.2 Generally speaking, microfoundations give an account of the individual
behavior of the agents underlying the aggregate result in the institutional con-
text under study. Insofar as rational choice theorists and economists present
explicit requests for microfoundations, and they often do, they seem to be in
the business of making theories more rather than less realistic. The perceived
problem with them clearly lies in the fact that they are so intimately cou-
pled with rational choice that they, in turn, seem to be unrealistic. If rational
choice is taken to be based on ordinary intentional psychology, the correspond-
ing charge of psychological unrealism is usually that it is too exacting or too
narrow a formalization: rational choice models either assume unrealistically so-
phisticated cognitive capacities or leave out important psychological non-goal-
oriented causes of action. In this section we discuss the most common accusation
concerning the lack of realism: the consistent pursuit of sel…sh interests is not
psychologically realistic.
Why could we not provide irrational microfoundations? The sociologist Ray-
mond Boudon (1998, 2003) argues that if a phenomenon can be shown to derive
from individuals’ rational choices, there is nothing left to be explained. It is
enough to show that it can be understood in terms of rational choice theory.
John Harsanyi (1982a, 1982b) goes even further in claiming that a normative
2 However, the links between standard microeconomic consumer theory and methodological
individualism in any substantial sense are strenuous. If there are any individuals to be found
in micro-theory, virtually nothing follows from their utility maximization at the aggregate
level. This is the content of the famous Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results (Kirman 1989).
68 UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
theory of rationality is necessary even for explanations of irrational behavior.
Behavior is thus always either simply correct or deviant. If the latter, a fur-
ther explanation is needed. This perceived explanatory asymmetry becomes
understandable if one thinks of rational choice theory as essentially a formaliza-
tion of folk psychology. What is meant by ‘folk psychology’ depends largely on
the discursive context. Sometimes the term is used to refer only to the abstract
interpretive schema of beliefs and desires, sometimes to all pre-theoretical inter-
pretive practices, and sometimes to a fully ‡edged pseudo-scienti…c folk theory
of human cognition.3 However, here we limit our use of the term to refer to pre-
theoretical psychology based on intentional states of belief and desire, although
other kinds of mental states, such as emotions, are also often included in the
concept.
Thus conceived, rational choice theory would be nothing more than a for-
mal way of analyzing purposeful, intentional action. This view is explicitly
endorsed by prominent rational-choice-oriented political scientists such as John
Ferejohn and Gary Cox (1999), and by the sociologist James Coleman (1990).4
The supposedly inherent intelligibility of intentional action would also provide
a good reason for stopping the micro-foundations project at the level of indi-
vidual behavior because there would be no more black boxes left to be opened
(Boudon 2003). Intentionality would be the rock bottom of social inquiry. If we
adopt this interpretation of rational choice as a formalization of folk psychology,
the question to ask about imperialistic applications is whether they attribute
credible intentional states and processes to the agents.
If economics were a formalization of folk psychology, it would seem nat-
ural to say that folk-psychological and decision-theoretical notions have the
following structural similarities: probabilities correspond to degrees of belief
and preferences to desires. However, it is not altogether evident that econo-
mists themselves accept a folk-psychological interpretation of rational choice.
Consider some historical changes in their self-understanding that took place
some half a century ago. Lionel Robbins (1952) and Frank Knight (1994[1935])
were the last major …gures in mainstream economics to argue that it was based
on psychological notions, which in turn were based on introspection. In con-
trast, modern decision theory was founded on the idea that people’s preferences
could be elicited by observing their choices in experimental settings using the
reference-lottery technique or a similar procedure (see e.g., Hirshleifer and Ri-
ley 1992). This means that, in principle at least, constructing von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) utilities does not involve any mental attribution to the
subjects. In fact, if the epistemic credibility of individual preferences in a given
model is based on nothing else than folk-psychological reasoning, the model will
3We are indi¤erent between simulation theory and the theory theory of folk psychology,
and in general wish to avoid commitment to speci…c philosophical positions concerning the
nature of intentional states.
4Alexander Rosenberg (1992, see also 1980) argued some …fteen years ago that economics
should be conceived of as a formalization of folk psychology. He also claimed that it was
doomed to stagnation because we cannot obtain better and better information on people’s
desires and beliefs.
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not be acceptable to economists. Consider economists’ attitudes towards inter-
personal comparisons of utilities. Introspection and empathetic identi…cation
are the primary means of making empirical interpersonal comparisons. How-
ever, economists strongly argue against the use of interpersonal comparisons of
utilities in economic models because there are no choices comparable to those
made in a reference lottery experiment from which we could construct a scale
of interpersonally valid utility numbers.5
The formal machinery of expected utility theory and revealed preference
theory form the content of rationality as consistency (or ‘thin rationality’)
(Sen 1985). In principle, rational choice theory need not appeal to any kind
of psychological factors because it relies on a purely formal account of con-
sistent choice behavior. However, although rational choice models explain by
invoking people’s preferences and beliefs, the theorists hardly ever even try to
obtain information on individuals’ real preferences, conceived of as pure behav-
ioral dispositions. Instead, economic applications of rational choice usually seem
to rely on general intuitions and concepts (such as incentives) that are at least
extensions of folk-psychological notions. Similarly, insofar as games are consid-
ered useful in describing, explaining or predicting some real-world phenomena,
there has to be some way in which the payo¤s are related to real people’s pay-
o¤s (see Blackburn 1995; 1998). The basis for constructing a payo¤ structure
for a game is usually the theorists’ judgment, which in turn may well be based
on identi…cation with real subjects in some real situation (see Rubinstein 1991,
Binmore 1994, pp. 98, 165). Here, knowledge of psychological factors such as
the players’ intentions and goals becomes important for determining their pay-
o¤s (Mueller 2004). Therefore, even though the theorists do not always admit it,
speci…c applications of rational choice often rely on psychological assumptions,
the credibility of which is crucial in ensuring the credibility of a speci…c model.
In contrast to formal consistency, rationality as self-interest (or ‘thick ra-
tionality’) (Sen 1985) provides a substantial account of what motivates real
people. It is not best viewed as a normative account of what should motivate
people. Indeed, as Sen (1987, p. 16) pointed out, it would be absurd to say
that self-interest is a requirement of rationality. Rationality as self-interest is
rather an assumption in empirical models that speci…es what is assumed to mo-
tivate the individuals concerned. The assumption of self-interest takes many
di¤erent forms. It is operationalized 6 in a fairly weak manner in the traditional
microeconomic theory of market demand for commodities, because consumers
5 Myerson (1985) makes this argument most forcefully, but it dates back at least to Roy
Harrod (1938). Harrod also links it with the scienti…c respectability of economics. ‘[M]arshall
says in the principles that the marginal utility of two pence is greater in the case of a poorer
man than in that of a richer . . . It may be urged that the economist hereby goes outside his
proper “scienti…c” …eld . . . Whether the nth unit of X has greater or less utility to a given
individual may be made the subject of test. He can be given the choice. But there are no
scienti…c means of deciding whether the nth of X has greater or less utility to individual P
than the mth of Y has to another individual Q. The choice can never be put’ (pp. 395-396).
6 We use the term ‘operationalization’ as referring generally to the process of providing
empirical content for the assumptions of self-interest and utility maximization. We do not
mean to suggest that this is necessarily related with making theoretical concepts measurable.
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are merely assumed to prefer having more rather than fewer (e.g., Hausman and
McPherson 1996). Sometimes an economic rational choice model is able to pro-
vide an explanation or a prediction by merely describing the agents’ economic
incentives in a very broad way.7 Examples of such models include the market
for lemons (Akerlof 1970) and job-market signaling (Spence 1973). The plausi-
bility of rational choice in economics is therefore, to a large extent, grounded on
the relatively straightforward and non-controversial operationalization of thin
rationality into thick rationality. Folk-psychological intuitions seem to be an
important resource in assessing the realisticness of modeling assumptions for
both advocates and critics of rational choice theory. The …rst crucial issue in
the assessment of imperialistic applications is thus the psychological plausibility
of the operationalization of self-interest.
What rational choice means in a given model depends crucially on the op-
erationalization of self-interest, i.e. on the content of the preferences or payo¤s
and the structure of the choice situation. The assumptions of (expected) utility-
maximizing behavior and self-interest, if abstracted from an institutional con-
text, are merely templates, not proper targets for criticism or advocacy. More
generally, the assumption of rationality does not imply much without auxil-
iary assumptions concerning the exact shape of the relevant individuals’ utility
functions and beliefs, and most importantly what they take to be the choice
alternatives (Simon 1985, Kavka 1991). Consequently, non-speci…c criticism of
these assumptions does not make much sense because few would be willing to
seriously argue that there are no rational choice models with reasonably realistic
assumptions. Hence, the arguments used in operationalizing the utility max-
imization or the homo oeconomicus assumption into an empirically speci…ed
hypothesis of individuals’ behavior are the proper targets of critical discussion
and model-independent empirical assessment.8
Let us now consider an example of a theory, Niskanen’s (1971; 1975) model
of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat, in order to illustrate the relevance of the
arguments made above. Niskanen’s model was designed to explain the growth
of the public sector. The basic model is based on two important assumptions.
First, bureaucrats are assumed to maximize the size of the budget, and sec-
ond, the relationship between the bureau and the ‘sponsor’ is one of bilateral
monopoly. The sponsor represents the relevant legislative committee, the whole
legislature, or better yet, the whole population. The main conclusion is that
the public bureau produces more than the sponsor wants.
This conclusion cannot be derived from the model if the bureaucrats do
not maximize the budget. The credibility of the model is thus crucially depen-
dent on the operationalization of self-interest. Furthermore, it is the weakness
of such arguments that has led to the widespread suspicion that Niskanen’s
budget-maximization hypothesis is not particularly compelling. Assuming that
bureaucrats maximize utility is not su¢cient for predicting their behavior since
7Myerson (1999) characterizes the whole of economics as the science of incentives.
8 In fact, such arguments have been subject to criticism even within economics. It was
argued during the marginalist controversy in the 1940’s that corporate pro…t maximization
was not consistent with individual utility maximization by …rm managers.
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here utility maximization really means the rational pursuit of one’s goals, and
in order to predict what o¢cials will do, we must know their goals (Downs
1967, p. 82). The bureaucrat in Niskanen’s model is supposed to intentionally
maximize the budget. In support of this assumption, Niskanen (1971, p. 38)
postulated that a bureaucrat’s ‘salary, perquisites of o¢ce, public reputation,
power [and] patronage’ were all positively related to the size of the bureau. This
is an example of an operationalization argument for a particular application of
the self-interest assumption. Whether the desire for these goods overrides other,
presumably more ‘altruistic’ goals is di¢cult to determine. However, there are
also several empirically more tractable reasons why budget maximization is not
a convincing operationalization of self-interest. First, the budget-maximizing
hypothesis is only sustainable if it can be shown that the bureaucrats can in‡u-
ence the size of the budget in the …rst place (Udehn 1996, p. 75), but it is, in
fact, the sponsor who holds the purse strings (Mueller 1989, p. 259). Secondly,
the easiest way for top managers to increase their salaries is to be promoted to
another bureau, and getting promotion may require slashing rather than max-
imizing the budget of the current bureau (Margolis 1975). This case clearly
shows that assessing whether an account of action is adequate in a model also
requires evaluating whether the institutional structure is speci…ed in the cor-
rect way. Evaluating such institutional factors is thus part and parcel of the
analyzing the empirical operationalizing assumptions.
If a rational choice model relies on substantial intentional attribution, the
successful derivation of the explanandum from some set of reasonably oper-
ationalized preferences and a suitable solution concept is not su¢cient for a
successful explanation. Explanation relying on folk-psychological notions re-
quires the mediation of practical reasoning as the explanatory mechanism. If,
as is often the case, the idea that agents would consciously perform complex
valuations between innumerable trade-o¤s is blatantly implausible, a literal in-
tentional reading of rational choice is not possible. Rational choice theorists
often justify attributions of seemingly unrealistic cognitive powers by claiming
that individual errors in reasoning cancel out in the aggregate. The problem
with this argument is that there is overwhelming empirical evidence suggesting
that people have many kinds of cognitive biases, and that they therefore deviate
systematically from the predictions given in a purely ‘rational’ model (see e.g.,
Camerer 1995 and Sha…r and LeBoeuf 2002 for recent reviews). The validity
of the canceling-out argument cannot be determined without explicitly evalu-
ating whether the systematic irrationality implies systematic consequences in
the model, although the burden of proof might be said to lie with the user of
demonstrably unrealistic assumptions. Curiously enough, there are disappoint-
ingly few models that show how systematic violations of rational prescriptions
a¤ect the aggregate-level conclusion of a model outside the domain of tradi-
tional economics (but see Quattrone and Tversky 1988),9 but the recent rise
in popularity of behavioral economics shows that this may change in the near
9 There are, however, some experimental results suggesting that cognitive biases do matter
at the aggregate level (see e.g., Camerer 1995; 1998).
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future.
An extreme case in point of a model that cannot be taken seriously when
interpreted psychologically is the Beckerian theory of rational addiction, ac-
cording to which present drug use is a rational investment decision in which the
constantly increasing enjoyment provided by the drug consumption is weighed
against the inevitable social and medical costs (Becker & Murphy 1988). In this
case it is not even the cognitive limitations of the agents that make the model
implausible, it is the obvious empirical misspeci…cation of the causal factors in
drug consumption, that renders it absurd (Rogeberg 2004). Calling every pos-
sible factor in‡uencing the agents’ behavior incentives or changes in the budget
constraint is at best only metaphorical, and often confusing and misleading. Ac-
cordingly, it is often the case that the straightforward folk-psychological reading
of a rational choice model is not the most sensible one in the …rst place, and
that criticisms of psychological unrealism would therefore fall on deaf ears.
5.3 Behavioral realism and as-if methodology
Standard decision theory starts from the premise that if a person’s preferences
satisfy a set of axioms, his or her actions can be described as if he or she were
maximizing a vNM utility function. Notice that it would be a category mistake
to say that a person’s actions could be described as maximizing a vNM utility
function without the ‘as-if’ clause, since such a function is only a representation
of a person’s preferences (or choices). vNM utility functions are not unique,
and can be determined only up to an a¢ne transformation. This means that
if a person’s choices can be described as if she were maximizing a vNM utility
function U, they could also be described as if she were maximizing the trans-
formation V=aU+b (a?0). We might choose to assign a higher utility number
to some choice alternative x under function U rather than under function V
(U(x)?V(x)), but this obviously does not mean that the person has a stronger
preference for x when his or her actions are described by U than when they
are described by V.10 This is why using the ‘as-if’ clause, when employed in an
expected utility model, implies nothing about whether or not it is reasonable
or realistic to assume that a person’s actions can be described according to a
utility maximization model. Whether it is realistic to use such a description
depends merely on whether the person’s choices satisfy the axioms.
On the other hand, the ‘as-if’ clause is often used in economic methodology
speci…cally to refer to the adoption of unrealistic assumptions. Milton Fried-
man (1953) is famous for promoting as-if methodology. He argues that even
though expert billiard players do not intentionally make complicated mathe-
matical calculations for predicting the trajectories of the balls, their actions can
be described as if they made such calculations using physical theory. To put
this more precisely, if we wish to explain the trajectories of the balls, calculations
provided by physical theory provide us with more useful information than the
10Luce and Rai¤a’s (1957) classic book remains one of the clearest expositions of these
issues.
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players’ intentions do. The players’ probably just think along the lines of, ‘If
I use light force with a little top-spin, I will have a good cue-ball position for
the next shot over there.’ On the other hand, accounting for the trajectories
requires a minimal attribution of goals: the players must be assumed to de-
sire to pot the balls.11 It is perfectly possible, at least in principle, that the
assumption that the players behave as if they had calculated the trajectories
of the balls using physical theory is a realistic one. It may be realistic in the
sense that it accurately accounts for the realized trajectories, but it is obviously
unrealistic in terms of describing the players’ mental states. Let us say that a
theory containing an ‘as-if’ clause is behaviorally realistic if it allows for describ-
ing human behavior in a realistic way, and let us say that it is psychologically
(or intentionally) realistic if the mental processes it evokes can be truthfully
attributed to the agents.12
If a rational description of micro-behavior is at least roughly realistic in its
behavioral assumptions, a model based on such a description could be used to
explain or predict some interesting aspects of macro phenomena. As Uskali Mäki
(1998) pointed out, whether the use of an as-if clause is truly instrumentalist
depends on the explanatory set-up in question. Friedman’s argument could
thus be seen …rst and foremost as an argument against the necessity of …nding
out what the players’ real thought processes are. It is an argument against
‘verstehen’ methodology, because it is based on the futility of …nding out players’
intentional states. Fritz Machlup puts it as follows:
The ‘extreme di¢culty of calculating’, the fact that ‘it would be
utterly impractical’ to attempt to work out and ascertain the exact
magnitudes of the variables which the theorist alleges to be signif-
icant, show merely that the explanation of an action must often
include steps of reasoning which the acting individual himself does
not consciously perform (because the action has become routine)
and which perhaps he would never be able to perform in scienti…c
exactness (because such exactness is not necessary in everyday life).
To call, on these grounds, the theory ‘invalid’, ‘unrealistic’ or ‘inap-
plicable’ is to reveal failure to understand the basic methodological
constitution of most social sciences. (Machlup 1946, p. 534)
For some purposes, the best description of people’s behavior need not be in
terms of their conscious intentional states. Machlup goes to great lengths to
show that the pro…t-maximization assumption is, in fact, behaviorally realistic
for the explanatory purposes of the theory of the …rm, even though it is not
psychologically realistic.
11 Friedman also gives an example in which no goals need to be attributed to the ‘agents’.
The leaves of a tree position themselves as if they were seeking the maximum amount of
sunlight.
12 Our main aim is not to interpret what Friedman really said or meant. We just found it
convenient to use his well-known views to introduce the distinction between behavioral and
psychological realisticness.
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Even if a rational choice model apparently attributes unrealistic psycholog-
ical capabilities to the agents, this psychological unrealism may not matter if
the resulting behavior is plausible, at least in the aggregate, for some other
reason. The problem with arguments that promote the use of ‘as-if’ clauses for
the purpose of making unrealistic assumptions about the intentional processes
of individuals is that they provoke the need for additional arguments to …nd
out the range of models or phenomena for which an ‘as-if’ clause is even behav-
iorally realistic. In the case of the billiard players, the assumption of trajectory-
calculating behavior was further justi…ed in the idea that the players would not
be expert players if they did not hit the balls approximately as predicted by the
physical theory. Friedman ultimately uses an evolutionary-selection argument
to support the claim that …rms always maximize pro…ts but he does not present
such an argument for individual rationality. Satz and Ferejohn (1994) suggest
that rational choice theory is best applicable in circumstances in which selec-
tive pressures force individuals into utility-maximizing behavior. Even though
they provide an otherwise structuralist account of rational choice theory, this
particular argument seems to imply that players do have to behave rationally
for rational choice theory to be applicable. We agree with Satz and Ferejohn
that selective pressures are relevant for delineating the applicability of rational
choice models, but the abstract argument in itself does not tell us when they
are applicable and when they are not.13
Even though the idea that rational choice is formalized folk psychology seems
to contradict the idea that rational choices are products of structural constraints,
both are endorsed by many prominent rational-choice-oriented political scien-
tists such as John Ferejohn (1975, with Fiorina; 1991; 2002) and Gary Cox
(1999). However, accusations of incoherence are premature here, since we claim
that both legitimizations of rational choice modeling may be valid given that
di¤erent models explain di¤erent kinds of things in di¤erent ways. Although it
may not make much sense to claim simultaneously that a particular model can
be used because individual errors in reasoning cancel each other out, and that
the structural constraints allow us to ignore psychological assumptions alto-
gether, both kinds of claims can quite reasonably be made in di¤erent modeling
situations. However, appeals to structural explanation via markets or selection
ring hollow in cases in which there are no market institutions and no adequate
selection pressures.
An example of a selection argument for maximizing behavior that is at least
initially plausible is the market account of the supply of religious services, es-
pecially in such a little regulated and relatively diverse region as the US (see
e.g., Finke 1997; Iannaccone 1997). Not every preacher, sect leader or cultist
needs to be a cynical exploiter, nor indeed a perfectly honest but economically
calculating entrepreneur. However, in an environment in which new ‘religious
…rms’ are constantly being established, and in which each one has to live on
the donations of its members, the demand for religious services has to be met
13Money-pump arguments have often been coupled with selection pressures. See, however,
Cubitt and Sugden (2001) for a critical account of such arguments.
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as e¢ciently as possible for a particular church to survive.14 In this case, talk
of a market is not totally devoid of substance, and there indeed seems to be
competition creating selection pressure that could structurally account for the
apparently rational behavior of religious …rms.
So far we have argued that the utility numbers in rational choice models
are practically never actually elicited from choice behavior for the purposes of
explaining particular real-world phenomena. The main reason for this is that
it is notoriously di¢cult to obtain accurate and reliable information on indi-
vidual utilities and beliefs, and practically impossible to use such information
for directly predicting or explaining behavior in particular situations.15 The
operationalization of self-interest thus usually relies on folk-psychological intu-
itions and postulated institutional structure. However, these assumptions are
empirical in the end, and should receive much more model-independent empiri-
cal attention than they usually do.16 Nevertheless, unrealistic psychological or
even behavioral assumptions sometimes do not need excuses in the …rst place,
since they may not have any real explanatory role in a model. We explore this
possibility further in the next section.
5.4 Explaining without preferences
If economic models are used beyond the traditional boundaries of economics,
it would seem natural to assume that the assumption of self-interest is di¢cult
to apply because people would seem to act in a more self-interested manner in
markets than in matters of politics, family, crime, or religion. However, it is
possible that it has virtually no explanatory role in these models regardless of
the manner of operationalization. As noted above, one way to account for this
is to say that it is really the structural constraints on people’s behavior rather
than self-interest that are the most crucial causal factors. The assumption of
self-interest is not explanatorily important in a model if it can be replaced with
another behavioral assumption without changing the analytical results. If it can
thus be replaced, the model is robust with respect to the behavioral assumption.
Herbert Simon is famous for emphasizing the need to take the role of in-
formation into account in the study of individual behavioral dispositions and
14 In this case, the more interesting results of the theory concern the instruments used to
keep customers loyal to a particular …rm and to avoid free-riding in the religious collective.
15 Mosteller and Nogee (1951) were the …rst to try, and the …rst to fail, to do this.
16 Many rational choice theorists subscribe to some version of the hypothetico-deductive
view of theory testing. One version of this doctrine is usually attributed to Friedman (1953).
He emphasizes that the realisticness of the assumptions does not matter because the empirical
testing of predictions derived from a theory is the only ultimate arbiter for evaluating them,
and that assumptions cannot be tested independently. Whatever plausibility this view has
with respect to models or theories that really allow for deriving testable predictions, it is
mere window-dressing when the theories are not in fact tested. We agree in broad terms (but
only in broad terms, see e.g., Monroe (1997)) with Green and Shapiro’s (1994) assessment
that rational choice theorists have had only limited success in terms of empirically tested and
veri…ed theories. These issues concerning testing are relevant to the topic of this paper, but
we cannot delve too deeply into them here because they are broad enough to deserve much
more comprehensive treatment.
76 UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
calculative capabilities. However, it is worth noting that Simon is commonly
taken to entertain the view that explaining individual behavior is the goal of
rational choice theory (e.g., Langlois 1986), while most rational choice theo-
rists and economists explicitly argue that the theory is designed for explaining
aggregate-level phenomena. It is generally agreed that satis…cing is a more real-
istic theory of individual behavior than maximizing, but as long as the modeling
results are not a¤ected by this di¤erence, the fact that maximizing is analytically
more convenient su¢ces to explain why Simon’s theory is not widely applied.
Instead of having a major causal role, constraints on possible preferences are
often more important in the derivation of the results. Correspondingly, the
formal properties of preferences (e.g., transitivity) are often more important
than the assumption of self-interest. This is because they ensure the analytical
tractability of the equilibrium, which is seen as necessary for any understanding
of the aggregate macrobehavior of interest.
In analytic model building, robustness has a primarily epistemic role in pro-
viding support for the claim that a modeling result (an equilibrium allocation or
a dependency between variables derived from comparative statics) is not a mere
artifact of particular modeling assumptions. Robustness in this epistemic sense
is a measure of reliability with respect to erroneous assumptions and is therefore
…rst and foremost a property of models, not of a phenomenon or a process (see
Wimsatt 1981). In contrast, explanation requires dependence on rather than
independence of the modeling result over some other features of the model, and
that the dependence actually corresponds to a (causal) relation in the world
(Woodward 2003). We are thus able to identify the explanatory relationships
in a model or a family of models by examining how hypothetical changes in the
values of the variables or parameters would change the analytical results, and
what these changes would leave intact. For example, if in a particular model
a dependency between the institutional setting and a resource allocation is ro-
bust with respect to various behavioral assumptions, the model could be used
to structurally explain empirical phenomena (allocations) even if the behavioral
assumptions are unrealistic.17 As we will show, robust results often correspond
to very general and resilient systemic properties of processes or mechanisms, but
this empirical resilience has to be distinguished from robustness in the epistemic
sense used here.
Let us now consider a few examples from economics and the social sciences
in order to see the relevance of robustness considerations. It is often claimed
that the predictions of neoclassical microeconomics are best borne out in situ-
ations of anonymous and essentially non-strategic market exchange. This good
…t holds even in controlled behavioral experiments. However, this in itself does
not yet show that actual self-regarding calculation or even consistent maximiz-
ing behavior is necessary for market outcomes. Gary Becker (1962) shows how
the main results of standard demand theory can be derived even if people are
assumed to try to stick to whatever choices they made previously or choose
17 In a loose sense, the institutional setting “programs for” the allocation (Jackson & Pettit
1992). However, we prefer not to limit our discussion on robustness to cases in which the
possible microbehaviors constitute the explanatorily relevant macrofeature.
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randomly. Becker’s insights are vividly demonstrated by Gode and Sunder’s
(1993) computerized market experiments, in which “zero-intelligence” computer
sub-programs submit random bids and o¤ers in a double auction resulting in
aggregate allocative e¢ciency. In these exercises it is really the budget con-
straint rather than any behavioral assumption that is the explanatory factor
responsible for the appearance of rational exchange.
Thomas Schelling’s (1978) famous ‘checkerboard’ serves as a non-market
example of a model that can explain macrophenomena with only very weak
constraints on the agents’ preferences. It is a paradigm of explanation accord-
ing to ‘the logic of the situation’. It can explain racial segregation even if the
preferences concerning the racial make-up of one’s neighborhood are extremely
weak: for non-intended segregation to emerge, it is su¢cient that people prefer
not to live in a neighborhood in which the substantial majority of inhabitants
belong to another race. Here the preferences do matter, since total indi¤er-
ence to the racial make-up of one’s neighborhood would not lead to segregation.
Nevertheless, it is the logic of the situation that is responsible for the ampli…-
cation of even mild aversion towards being in the racial minority to clear-cut
aggregate segregation. The segregation result comes about with a wide range
of preferences for living in a neighborhood with at least some other members
of the same race. The modeling result is thus quite, although not completely,
robust with respect to behavioral assumptions.
Duverger’s (1954) law states that the plurality rule with one elected repre-
sentative per electoral district (…rst-past-the-post) leads to a ‘two-party system’.
More precisely, such electoral rules lead to a distribution of votes with two large
parties in parliament. This result is robust with respect to di¤erent speci…ca-
tions of individual behavior because it may come about through the so-called
mechanical e¤ect: a larger-than-proportional share of the seats automatically
goes to the two large parties under the plurality rule. Again, however, the
strength of the result depends on individual behavior through the so-called psy-
chological e¤ect (see e.g., Riker 1982, Fey 1997). If voters who would vote for
a small party realize that their candidate has no chance of winning, they may
vote strategically for one of the major parties rather than waste their vote on a
hopeless case. Such behavior obviously strengthens Duverger’s law.
Anthony Downs (1957) argued that parties choose policies in order to obtain
votes in elections, rather than obtain votes in order to formulate policies (p. 28).
He showed that this followed from applying the assumption of self-interest to
party politics. Party o¢cials are assumed to be interested in obtaining power,
i.e. in getting into government. Once they do so, they want to remain there.
He then showed that if we assume that party positions can be represented as a
one-dimensional continuum (from left to right), the two positions will converge
in the middle of the distribution of voters (pp. 115-117). The reasoning behind
this is that each party loses almost18 no voters by moving toward the centre,
but gains some votes from the other party.
18 The quali…er ‘almost’ derives from the fact that the parties lose those who are too alienated
to vote at all.
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Since the fact that the major party positions are located close to each other
was well-known before Downs, his main contribution was not in making this
observation, but rather in showing that this would be the outcome of rational
behavior on the part of the parties (p. 93). Although the model is so familiar
by now that it seems obvious, Downs had to derive the consequences of rational
choice so that we could see how the logic of party positions works. We can
thus see, once again, that the assumption of self-interest does not imply all that
much in itself.
Paul MacDonald (2003) argues that a scienti…c realist should insist on the
realisticness of behavioral assumptions since realism assumes that real processes
are at work in successful scienti…c endeavors. However, if the structural con-
straints are the primary explanatory factors in a rational choice model, and if
the model is robust with respect to behavioral assumptions, its causally relevant
assumptions do not concern them. It is thus perfectly possible to be a scienti…c
realist and acknowledge the scienti…c value of models with unrealistic behavioral
assumptions if the results are robust. MacDonald’s argument would be plau-
sible only if realists did not accept any kind of unrealistic assumptions. This,
however, is just blatantly false about the realist position. Mäki (1989; 1992,
a well-known realist engaged in the philosophy of economics, has emphasized
the distinction between realism as an attribute of a theory’s assumptions, and
realism as a general philosophical doctrine.
This brings us to a related issue. As some authors have remarked, although
it is possible to judge whether an assumption is intuitively realistic in isolation,
it is not possible to determine in isolation whether the lack of realism matters
for the explanatory purpose in question (cf. Friedman 1996). For example, an
assumption may be realistic for one level of aggregation or explanatory purpose,
but unrealistic for another (Levins 1993). Hence, in order to evaluate whether
the problematic assumptions really matter for a particular explanatory purpose,
judgments of psychological or behavioral realism should always be speci…ed in
terms of a contrast, i.e., an alternative psychological or behavioral assumption.
Since an explicit robustness analysis always provides a contrast, analysis of a
model’s robustness with respect to the behavioral assumptions is a necessary
part of all assessments of model validity. As with appeals to as-if utility max-
imizing, appeals to robustness should be backed up by additional arguments
or, preferably, demonstrations of robustness. Since problematic assumptions
are included in a model in order to ensure its analytic tractability in the …rst
place, demonstrating that a modeling result is robust with respect to unrealistic
behavioral assumptions is usually easier said than done. Robustness analysis
is thus often exceedingly di¢cult, or downright impossible, to carry out with
analytical models.
It would seem to follow from these considerations that proper assessment
of whether behavioral assumptions are realistic requires a fairly thorough un-
derstanding of the particular model under investigation. For better or worse,
vague appeals to the idea that assuming self-interest is intuitively unrealistic in
matters of family, politics, and crime, for example, have not convinced and will
not convince rational choice theorists, who have repeated ad nauseam that ‘you
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cannot beat something with nothing’. If this metaphorical claim implies that a
critic of rational choice assumptions is always responsible for presenting a fully-
‡edged alternative model, we cannot say we agree. It would be quite bizarre
if the only acceptable way of criticizing the assumptions of a rational choice
model would imply taking part in the rational choice enterprise. Nevertheless,
the possibility of robustness with respect to a behavioral assumption implies
that the opponent of rational choice ought to provide some kind of alternative
account of what would happen in the situation in question if the problematic
assumptions were changed.
For example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) present a robustness analysis of some
cases in economics in their well-known article. They show that in some models
the punishment incurred by agents for irrational behavior is mild to the point of
being non-existent, but the consequences of the model change dramatically due
to such ‘near rational’ behavior. The reception given to this article shows that if
a model demonstrably lacks robustness with respect to problematic behavioral
assumptions, rational choice theorists will take the criticism seriously. However,
we think that the burden of proof should again lie on those insisting on using
blatantly unrealistic behavioral assumptions in the …rst place.
5.5 Unrealistic assumptions and comparative in-
stitutional analysis
Let us now discuss an altogether di¤erent class of models and arguments for
their use. Our aim is to provide an account of the role of judgments concerning
unrealistic assumptions in designing institutions. An important function of the
social sciences is to provide guidance for decision-makers about how various
institutions function. We believe that the success of rational choice theory is
at least partly attributable to the fact that it has provided a framework for
analyzing the welfare implications of various institutional arrangements. Such
exercises are obviously valuable even though normative evaluation is not strictly
speaking an empirical scienti…c endeavor.
The structure of the framework is the following. It is assumed that there
is a set of individuals with a …xed set of preferences, i.e., they are described
in terms of a preference pro…le.19 Rational choice models are then focused on
deriving the aggregate-level consequences or outcomes of the di¤erent behaviors
that the various institutions induce. These outcomes may then be evaluated
in terms of the preference pro…le. The framework is thus able to assist in
institutional design by providing results that have the following form: institution
X fares better than institution Y with respect to problem P because X satis…es
individual preferences better than Y in situations relevant to P. Let us now
consider how unrealistic assumptions concerning the preference pro…le (rather
than the motivational basis) could be justi…ed in such analysis by taking voting
19 The preference pro…le is, roughly speaking, a collection of all individuals’ preferences, i.e.
it contains one preference ordering for each individual.
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theory as an example.
It is often convenient to compare various di¤erent institutional arrangements
by assuming that the individual preferences are randomly generated. For exam-
ple, there is a tradition in voting theory to study the performance of di¤erent
voting rules by randomly generating a pro…le of individual preferences. The
voting rules are then evaluated on the basis of how often they select the best
candidate, which is de…ned on the basis of those random preferences (see e.g.,
Merrill 1984, 1988). There seems to be complete unanimity among voting theo-
rists that randomly generated preference pro…les do not resemble real electorates
even remotely. Nevertheless, this assumption is considered adequate for compar-
ing di¤erent voting rules. It is obviously not adequate for comparing voting qua
institution to other possible institutions such as markets or demand-revealing
mechanisms. The idea behind this argument is fairly simple. It makes sense
to use a random preference pro…le rather than one that endeavors to imitate
real pro…les because the analyst is mainly interested in comparing how di¤erent
voting rules can cope with some particular problems such as path-dependence
or excessive power of the agenda-setter, and random pro…les are known to create
the maximum amount of problems in voting rules (see e.g., Tsetlin, Regenwetter
& Grofman 2003). Using a deliberate distortion of reality, a caricature (Gibbard
& Varian 1978), allows for examining how di¤erent voting institutions deal with
particular problems. Using unrealistic assumptions may thus have a reason-
able methodological function even if we know how to describe reality in a more
realistic way (i.e., if we know what kind of a distribution truthfully describes
real electorates). It is also obviously necessary to keep the preference pro…le
…xed in the di¤erent voting rules because otherwise the outcomes could not be
compared.
The role of judgments concerning the realisticness of assumptions in insti-
tutional design is the following. Voting rules (and many other institutions) can
be evaluated according to di¤erent criteria. Since the ultimate verdict on the
acceptability of a given institution depends not merely on how the institution
fares with respect to various criteria, but also on how these criteria are weighed,
the results of a comparative institutional study using random pro…les may be
misleading if the selected criteria are not very important. It becomes necessary
to assess the realisticness of the random pro…le assumption when we need to for-
mulate an overall judgment concerning di¤erent voting rules in order to make
policy decisions.
There is also an important argument for promoting interdisciplinary inte-
gration that is based on behavioral rather than formal consistency across var-
ious …elds in the social sciences. Public choice theorists, in particular James
Buchanan (1972; 1986, pp. 36-38; 1989, pp. 29, 64f), have argued that in-
dividuals should be assumed to act in a self-interested manner in analyses of
political institutions, because otherwise the results from such analyses could
not be compared to those that can be obtained through market institutions.
Buchanan argues that consistency is particularly important in the normative
comparison of market versus public organizations (Buchanan 1986, pp. 32-38;
see also Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003). These arguments could be seen as ap-
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plications of the general idea presented above: in order to compare institutional
arrangements, we need to keep some admittedly unrealistic assumptions …xed
across those institutions. Similarly, if the assumption of self-interest is unrealis-
tic, but we design institutions assuming that individuals are self-interested, the
institutions will be badly designed because they will be responsive to irrelevant
issues (cf. e.g., Frey 1994, Hausman 1998).
5.6 Conclusions
Economics and rational choice theory have traditionally been viewed as epito-
mes of methodological individualism. The explanatory schema that would seem
to follow from this conception is the following. The rational choice theorist be-
gins with a set of preferences. He or she then formulates a model by specifying
an institutional context and the individuals’ possible strategies in this context.
By solving the model for equilibrium he or she derives an explanation or pre-
diction for some question of interest. This rough schema is otherwise correct,
but it provides a misleading picture of the role of preferences in rational choice
theory. The rational choice theorist does not begin with a set of preferences in
the sense that he would go out and try to …nd out what the real preferences are.
Neither does he start with data on preferences that someone else has collected.
It is rather that, in order to explain an aggregate or macrolevel phenomenon,
he postulates or argues that the preferences must have such and such properties
because of folk-psychological or institutional considerations. Whether unrealis-
tic assumptions concerning the properties of preferences really matter depends
on where the explanatory power in the model in question resides.
Some imperialistic models o¤er explanations by aggregating interdependent
intentional action. The crucial issue is the plausibility of the way in which self-
interest is operationalized. Assessing the operationalization arguments includes
formulating a judgment about the plausibility of the intentional states (beliefs
and desires) attributed to the agents and of the psychological possibility of the
practical reasoning required by the solution, and also of the way in which the
institutional background is included in the model. If the rationality is alleged to
be of the as-if kind, the crucial question to ask is whether the structural features
allegedly guaranteeing the rationality of individual behavior are indeed in place.
Finally, the result of an imperialistic model may be claimed to be fully or partly
robust with respect to the unrealistic assumptions, and in such cases it usually
corresponds to a very general and abstract systemic property. In any case, the
most e¤ective (theoretical) way of criticizing an imperialistic model would be to
demonstrate that unrealistic psychological or institutional assumptions actually
matter in terms of the conclusions, although we agree that the burden of proof
should in principle lie upon those using the unrealistic assumptions in the …rst
place. Explicit robustness analysis would thus be a valuable theoretical means
of assessing the merits of economic models applied outside the traditional …eld
of economics.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: A farewell to
IIA
Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) has been un-
der criticism for decades for not taking account of preference in-
tensities. Computer-simulation results by Aki Lehtinen concerning
strategic voting under various voting rules show that this intensity
argument does not need to rest on mere intuition. Voters may ex-
press intensities by voting strategically, and that this has bene…cial
aggregate-level consequences: utilitarian e¢ciency is higher if vot-
ers engage in strategic behaviour than if they always vote sincerely.
Strategic voting is thus unambiguously bene…cial under a utilitarian
evaluation of outcomes. What has been considered the main argu-
ment for IIA turns out to be one against it. This paper assesses
the implications of these results for interpretations of Arrow’s theo-
rem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in a discussion on the
methodological and philosophical arguments concerning preference
intensities and IIA.
Keywords: Strategic voting; IIA; Utilitarian winner; Observability;
Strategy-proofness
6.1 Introduction
The normative and descriptive relevance of preference intensities and the nor-
mative validity of Arrow’s (1963) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
have been under debate for decades in social choice theory. It has been argued
since its inception that IIA does not take preference intensities into account.
A choice-theoretical de…nition of IIA is as follows. Let p and p0 denote
pro…les of individual preferences: p assigns a preference ordering Â? for each
voter ? 2 ? : p = (Â1?Â2? ????Â? )? Let pj? denote the restriction of the pro…le
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p to the subset ? of ?. Let ?(Â? ?) denote the social choice from pro…le p on
??
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If for all ?? ? 2 ? and all individuals,
pjf???g = p0jf???g ! ?(Â? ?) = ?(Â0? ?)? (6.1)
In other words, if the two pro…les p and p0 rank each pair of alternatives in the
same way, then the social choice from the two pro…les should be the same.
Donald Saari (1998, 2001, 2003a) has recently argued that IIA is not norma-
tively acceptable because voting rules that satisfy this condition fail to respect
the rationality of voters. His proposal is to replace it with a condition called
binary intensity IIA (see also Saari 1995). This requires that the aggregate
ranking of each pair of alternatives is to be determined by each voter’s relative
ranking of that pair, and by the intensity of this ranking. The latter is deter-
mined by how many other alternatives are ranked between them. Saari argues
that the Borda count (BC) satis…es this condition, and respects the rationality
of voters by asking them to report a full preference ordering. Naturally, the BC
does not satisfy IIA. Those who have not been willing to abandon IIA tend to
emphasise its close link with strategic voting.1 The BC is commonly considered
to be highly manipulable.2
If there remain proponents of IIA, and if they view the debate related to it
as an inevitable trade-o¤ between rationality and intensities on the one hand,
and susceptibility to strategic manipulation on the other, they have embarked
on an enterprise that is doomed to failure. The simulation results in Lehtinen
(2006b, forthcoming, 2007) suggest that utilitarian e¢ciency (the frequency with
which the alternative with the highest sum of utility is selected) is higher if voters
engage in strategic behaviour than if they always vote sincerely. Strategic voting
is thus unambiguously bene…cial under a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes.
What has been considered the main argument for IIA thus turns out to be one
against it. These results show that the traditional intensity argument against it
does not need to rest on the mere intuition that it rules out intensity information.
They illustrate how all of the voting rules studied take intensity information
into account if and when IIA is violated through strategic voting, and this has
bene…cial aggregate-level consequences.
The discussion in this paper focuses on two interrelated topics concerning IIA
and preference intensities. The …rst relates to the fact that Lehtinen’s results,
as well as the intensity arguments against IIA that were presented before Saari’s
contributions, were based on a cardinal notion of preference intensity.3 Saari’s
notion of the intensity level upon which the binary intensity IIA is based is
best characterised as an ordinal notion (Risse 2001, Dowding 2006). Given that
Lehtinen’s results are based on the cardinal notion, what they show is that
cardinal intensities a¤ect the results under all voting rules.
1See, e.g., McLean (1987, p. 154). Arrow (1983 [1977]a, p. 168) also makes this argument,
and Saari (2001, pp. 45, 137) acknowledges it.
2Saari (1990b, 2003b) disagrees with this judgment, however.
3 I mean contributions by Hildreth (1953), Rothenberg (1961, pp. 132-136), Coleman (1966),
Campbell (1973), Ng (1979) and Mackay (1980), for example.
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I will show that IIA is also violated in amendment agendas by analysing
an example taken from Lehtinen (2007). This example is used to show that
majority-rule agendas also take preference intensities into account if voters en-
gage in strategic behaviour. It follows that Saari’s arguments concerning the
transitivity of preferences and the intensity level should not be understood as
providing support for the Borda rule and against the majority rule, even though
they are convincing qua arguments against IIA.
Secondly, I will draw on the methodological and philosophical implications
of Lehtinen’s results on strategic voting in my interpretation of Arrow’s theorem
and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Hence I will discuss the methodological
and philosophical arguments concerning preference intensities and IIA.
The traditional criticisms against preference intensities can be formulated
in terms of three arguments for IIA. The strategic-voting argument states that
strategic voting is to be avoided, and a voting rule that satis…es IIA precludes
strategic voting. The observability argument states that since it is possible
to observe preference orderings, but not preference intensities or interpersonal
comparisons of utilities, allowable information must be restricted to preferences
for pairs of alternatives, and this is what IIA does: ’Modern economic theory
has insisted on the ordinal concept of utility; that is, only orderings can be ob-
served, and therefore no measurement of utility independent of these orderings
has any signi…cance [...] The condition of IIA extends the requirement of observ-
ability one step farther.’(Arrow 1983 [1967], pp. 75-6).4 The epistemological-
moral argument against preference intensities and for IIA states that cardinal
von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities should not be used in social-welfare
judgements because they “re‡ect only individuals’ attitudes towards gambling”
(Arrow 1951, p. 9-11).5 The idea here is that vNM utilities are not appropriate
in this context because they inevitably contain attitudes towards risk.6
I will respond to these arguments as follows. My main argument against
the observability argument is a tu quoque: I will show that ordinal utility is not
observable in voting contexts either. I will thus not attempt to show that prefer-
ence intensities are observable, or that we have particularly precise information
on interpersonal comparisons. I will rather establish that observability cannot
be used as an argument for ordinal and against intensities in evaluating voting
rules. The epistemological-moral argument su¤ers from a similar shortcoming:
voting choices re‡ect attitudes towards risk under all voting rules whether we
like it or not. A reasonable voting model should explicitly take this into account
rather than try to avoid the problem by using only ordinal utilities. Further-
more, risk attitudes are not measured in terms of utility functions in Lehtinen’s
4 See also Arrow (1963, p. 110).
5 Arrow no longer puts forward this argument in the second edition of Social Choice and
Individual Values (1963). See also Rawls (1971, pp. 172, 323) and Pattanaik (1968).
6 Arrow has also justi…ed the IIA condition by referring to its ‘intuitive appeal’ (Arrow
1983[1952], p. 51), arguing that it has ‘strong pragmatic justi…cation’ (Arrow 1983 [1967],
pp. 70, 76), and that it restricts the available information to feasible outcomes (1983[1952],
p. 51, 1983 [1967], p. 76, 1983 [1967], p. 164). The …rst two are not discussed here because
they merely appeal to intuition and thus do not seem to be genuine arguments. The third is
discussed in connection with the observability and strategic-voting arguments.
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models, but are formalised merely in terms of voters’ beliefs.
I will take it for granted that intensities of preference are intrinsically rele-
vant for evaluating voting outcomes normatively. I believe that voting theorists
agree with this judgment7 , and I will thus not attempt to argue for it. This
being the case, rebutting the observability and epistemological-moral arguments
should su¢ce to establish that voting outcomes ought to be evaluated on the
basis of utilitarian criteria. Then, given a utilitarian evaluation of voting out-
comes, strategic voting should be considered an argument against IIA rather
than for it, because strategic voting typically increases utilitarian e¢ciency (or
average utility) as compared to sincere voting under all commonly used voting
rules. The main reason for this is that voters’ behaviour depends on preference
intensities when they vote strategically but not when they vote sincerely: the
utilitarian winner is likely to get more strategic votes than other alternatives.
Information on preference intensities can only be obtained through strategic
voting (cf. Coleman 1966).
6.2 The observability argument
Social choice theory has been criticised from the outset for ignoring preference
intensities. Dahl (1956, p. 90) provides a typical example of such criticisms:
By making "most preferred" equivalent to "preferred by the most"
we deliberately bypass a crucial problem: What if the minority
prefers its alternative much more passionately than the majority
prefers a contrary alternative? Does the majority principle still make
sense?
Those who have opposed the use of preference intensities and vNM utilities
in social-welfare judgements have based their criticism on epistemological con-
siderations. Here are Arrow’s reasons for not incorporating preference intensities
into social choice theory.
The oldest critique of social choice theory ... is that it disregards
intensity of preference. Even with two alternatives, it would be ar-
gued that a majority with weak preferences should not necessarily
prevail against a minority with strong feelings ... The problem in ac-
cepting this criticism is that of making it operational. Theoretically,
is there any meaning to the interpersonal comparison of preference
intensities? Practically, is there any way of measuring them, that is,
is there any form of individual behavior from which the interpersonal
comparisons can be inferred? (Arrow 1977b)
Arrow introduced IIA in order to impose an observational requirement on
social choices. The idea was that the available information has to be restricted
to ordinal utilities because preference orderings are observable but intensity
7But see Plott (1976, pp. 541-2).
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is not. Indeed, he makes it perfectly clear that cardinal utilities (preference
intensities) would be important for social choice and welfare if we could observe
them directly (Arrow 1987).
Arrow (1973a) argued that ‘In a voting context, the ordinalist-cardinalist
controversy becomes irrelevant, for voting is intrinsically an ordinal comparison
and no more’ (see also Frohlich & Oppenheimer 1999). Strasnick (1976, p. 243)
formulates the di¢culty of observing preference intensity in a voting context as
follows: ‘There is no sense in which the magnitude or degree or intensity of a
choice is observable in the choice itself ’.
This, however, does not mean that voters’ choices are una¤ected by pref-
erence intensities. An example in which the outcomes depend on preference
intensities even under a voting rule (the majority rule with an amendment
agenda) in which voters may express a preference directly only for pairs of al-
ternatives is given in section 6.4. It shows that voting is intrinsically an ordinal
phenomenon only in the sense that voters can merely state whether one alter-
native is better than another in pair-wise contests. However, if voters engage
in strategic behaviour, preference intensities inevitably re‡ect their choices, and
a¤ect the outcomes even under a rule that seemingly collects only ordinal in-
formation. Before discussing this example I will present a rudimentary version
of the Enelow’s (1981) model of strategic voting, and discuss Saari’s arguments
concerning IIA.
6.3 Does the majority rule lose information on
rationality and preference intensities?
It used to be common to distinguish between di¤erent aspects of the IIA con-
dition.8 The independence (or irrelevance) aspect refers to the fact that the
social ordering (or choice) between any two alternatives must depend only on
individual preferences for those alternatives, and not on individual preferences
for other irrelevant alternatives. The ordering aspect requires that the social
ordering (or choice) of any two alternatives must be based only on individual
orderings of these alternatives and on nothing else. This aspect explicitly rules
out preference intensities.9
It is generally acknowledged that if relative intensities of preferences are
somehow available then the ordering aspect of IIA need not be accepted, but
the irrelevance aspect has been considered unassailable (Ng 1979, p. 115). How-
ever, it is not quite compelling either because the ‘irrelevant’ alternatives are
not, strictly speaking, irrelevant. IIA does not distinguish between alternatives
that are not even included in the set of available alternatives and those that
8 See Sen (1970, p. 89) Mackay (1980, p. 79), and Kemp & Ng (1987).
9 If IIA is formulated in such a way that it refers to cardinal-utility pro…les, we end up with
an impossibility result because cardinal utility without interpersonal comparisons does not
make the impossibility result vanish (Sen 1970, Kalai & Schmeidler 1977). Accordingly, the
standard view is that the most reasonable way to eschew Arrovian impossibility is to make
interpersonal comparisons.
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belong to that set but do not seem to be under explicit consideration at a given
stage of voting. The truly irrelevant alternatives belong to the former set (cf.
Hansson 1973, Bordes & Tideman 1991). Fortunately, voters’ choices do take
into account preferences for all the alternatives they consider. Even preferences
for alternatives outside the pair for which they are voting at a given stage a¤ect
their decisions if they maximise expected utility, as in Enelow’s (1981) model.
Saari’s claims concerning IIA are perfectly justi…able. What is not so clear is
whether these arguments can be used for defending the BC against the majority
rule used in agenda voting, or any other voting rule for that matter. As Thomas
Risse (2001, 2005) points out, arguments concerning IIA do not settle his dispute
with Saari (2003a, 2006) concerning the BC and the Kemeny rule (see also Saari
& Merlin 2000) because both violate IIA. Given, however, that Saari’s target of
criticism, at least previously (1995), was agenda voting and the majority rule,
what I have to say about agendas may be relevant to this debate as well.
Saari’s IIA criticisms cannot be viewed as arguments for the BC because
IIA also is violated in agenda voting, and the majority rule in agenda voting
takes cardinal as well as ordinal preference intensities into account. In order to
illustrate this, let us consider Enelow’s (1981) model of strategic voting under
amendment agendas.
Let ? = f?? ?? ?g denote a set of available alternatives, ?? voter ?’s utility
function, and Â? voter ?’s preference relation de…ned on ?. Table 6.1 shows the
possible preference orderings and a normalisation convention for voters’ utilities:
?? denotes voter ?’s intensity of preference.
type of voter
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ? ?
x y z x y z ? ?(¢) = 1
y z x z x y ??(¢) = ??
z x y y z x ? ?(¢) = 0
Table 6.1: Voter types and utility normalisations with three alternatives
Alternatives are put to a sequence of pair-wise majority comparisons in an
amendment agenda.10 Two alternatives are put to a majority vote against each
other in the …rst round of voting. The winner of this …rst contest is then put to
vote against the third alternative in the second round. Figure 6.1 presents the
three possible amendment agendas.
Voter ?’s subjective probability that a given alternative ? beats another al-
ternative ? (?? ? 2 ?) in a pair-wise second-round contest is denoted ????. In
agenda A, and in the …rst round of voting, voters choose a branch in the vot-
ing tree by comparing expected utilities for lotteries (?? ?;????? 1 ¡ ????) and
(?? ?;????? 1 ¡ ????). Note that merely formulating the voters’ choice situation
under incomplete information shows that they are making a choice not between
the pair f?? ?g, but rather between two lotteries that also involve the third alter-
native ?. It follows immediately that their ‘choice between x and y’ in the …rst
10See Miller (1995) for a discussion on di¤erent agendas.
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      x             y
 x        z   y        z
      x            z
 x        y   z        y
      y            z
 y        x   z       x
                   (A)                                           (B)                                         (C)
Figure 6.1: Amendment agendas with three alternatives
round may provide information concerning their preference intensity between
this pair of alternatives. Expected-utility expressions need to be formulated in
order to show this.
Maximising expected utility implies giving one’s vote to the branch in the
voting tree that has the greatest expected utility. A voter will vote for the
left-hand branch under agenda (A) if
???? ¢ ? ?(?) + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ ? ?(?) ¸ ???? ¢? ?(?) + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ ??(?)? (6.2)
Consider now voter types one and four. Both prefer ? to ?, but the preferences
of type-four voters are ordinally more intensive because they separate the pref-
erences between these alternatives with ? by preferring ? to ? to ?, whereas
type-one voters prefer ? to ? to ?.11 Type-four voters have a dominant strategy
to vote sincerely for ? under agenda A. Applying utility normalisation for a
type-one voter to equation 6.2 yields:
???? ¢ 1 + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ 0 ¸ ???? ¢ ??1 + (1 ¡ ????) ¢ 0? (6.3)
Type-one voters will thus vote strategically for the right-hand branch (y) if:
??1 ?
????
????
?
When they do, they are e¤ectively expressing a cardinally strong intensity for ?
and ? over ?, and a cardinally weak intensity between ? and ?. Hence, they are
able to express their preference intensity between ? and ? by deciding whether
to vote strategically or not. In contrast, type-four voters never vote for ? in
the …rst round, and thereby reveal a strong intensity of preference for ? over ?.
Voters thus express their ordinal and cardinal intensities under agenda voting,
but they do this only in a probabilistic sense.
One might be willing to argue that since the BC always collects information
on ordinal intensity, it should be preferred to majority voting under agendas.
However, the normatively important intensity information is cardinal rather
than ordinal. What is thus really relevant is the question of which voting rule
11 If indi¤erence is ruled out by assuming that 0 ? ?? ? 1 for all voters, this intensity must
also be cardinally stronger.
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best re‡ects cardinal preference intensities on the aggregate level.12 If the judg-
ment that only aggregate-level cardinal information matters for normative eval-
uations is defensible, it is normatively irrelevant whether it is possible to obtain
information on ordinal intensity from each person separately or not. From this
perspective, trying to replace IIA with a condition like Saari’s binary intensity
IIA, or any condition that fails to take voters’ behaviour explicitly into account,
is not fully satisfactory as a criterion for the choice between various voting rules.
One possible reason why individual-level ordinal intensity information should
be collected is that it is intrinsically related to rationality. It is simultaneously
information concerning the transitivity of preferences. Saari’s rationality argu-
ment against IIA could be formulated as follows. Since IIA restricts the relevant
information to preferences for pairs of alternatives, a voting rule that satis…es
it does not allow for taking into account connecting information between the
di¤erent pairs. Thus, even though one condition for Arrow’s theorem explicitly
requires voters to have transitive preferences, this transitivity is trumped by
IIA.13
Again, Saari’s argument is entirely convincing as a criticism of IIA: if there
were a voting rule that satis…ed IIA, such a rule would lose the information
on voters’ rationality. There are no such rules, however, because voters are
rational when they engage in strategic voting, and they will violate IIA under
all voting rules if they maximise expected utility.14 To put it di¤erently, if
voters are rational, it is not possible to distinguish between di¤erent voting
rules by applying the rationality argument against IIA. Indeed, I presume that
Saari agrees with me here because his point has been that voting rules that
satisfy IIA are incapable of distinguishing the cyclic preferences of (non-existent)
irrational individuals from cyclic preference pro…les. If there is a rationality-
related argument that could distinguish between di¤erent voting rules, it must
concern the recognition of irrational voters from rational ones when not all
voters are rational.
The important case is thus one in which at least some voters are irrational.
It would be best to ignore their votes, but as this will probably be impossible
under all voting rules, the task becomes one of trying to determine how these
voters will a¤ect the voting outcomes. One might argue that the BC forces
voters to be rational because it requires them to provide a full ranking of the
alternatives. It might have such edifying aspects, but it is just as plausible
that irrational voters will provide truncated ballots. Nevertheless, there may be
perfectly rational voters, rational in the sense of having transitive preferences,
who also provide truncated ballots. If, for example, a voter prefers ? strongly
to ? and ?, and is not willing to distinguish between the latter two, he or she
may just provide a Borda score for ? and ignore the rest. If and when it is not
12Lehtinen (forthcoming a, b) provides results that are relevant to a comparison between
the BC and agendas. I will not summarise those results here because my main goal is not to
compare particular voting rules.
13 In addition to previous references to Saari, see Saari and Sieberg (2001, 2004).
14Saari agreed in a private conversation (April 2006) that this characterisation of the rela-
tionship between IIA, rationality and strategic voting was apt.
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possible to distinguish rational from irrational voters in practice, I conclude that
the rationality argument is valid against IIA but cannot be used as an argument
for BC against any other voting rule.
6.4 IIA is violated in amendment agendas
The Condorcet winner (the alternative that is preferred by a majority to all
other alternatives) is always selected under the majority rule if the voters vote
sincerely (Farquharson 1969) and if they vote strategically under complete in-
formation (McKelvey & Niemi 1978, Moulin 1979). It would thus seem that
the Condorcet winner is observed since it will be the outcome under the ma-
jority rule. I will now use a simple example (from Lehtinen 2007) to show that
this result does not hold under incomplete information (see also Ordeshook &
Palfrey 1988). It follows that IIA is violated even under the majority rule and
an amendment agenda when voters maximise their expected utility.
In fact, the idea that IIA is incompatible with expected utility maximisa-
tion has already been acknowledged by all those who have argued that it does
not allow voters to express their intensities of preference or cardinal utilities
(see in particular Hammond 1991a). Assume that the preferences of three vot-
ers ?, ?, and ?, can be described as in the following table:
A B C
y (1) y (1) x (1)
x (0.9) x (0.9) z (0.9)
z (0) z (0) y (0)
Table 6.2: Example 1
The numbers in parentheses denote voters’ utilities. The sum of utility for
the utilitarian winner ? is 0.9+0.9+1=2.8, and for the Condorcet winner ? it
is 1+1+0=2. Thus, ? should be selected according to the utilitarian criterion
instead of the Condorcet winner ?. If all voters vote sincerely, the Condorcet
winner ? will beat the utilitarian winner ? in the …rst round and ? in the second
round, and emerges as the …nal outcome.
Let us now see what would happen if the voters maximise expected utility
under incomplete information. Assume that all three voters have identical beliefs
such that ??? = 0?7, and ??? = 0?9. Voters ? and ? are of type …ve. They will
vote strategically for ? in the …rst round because ?5 ?
???
???
(0?9 ? 0?70?9 = 0?7778).
Voter ? has a weakly dominant strategy to vote for ? in the …rst round of
voting. Thus, ? is the outcome if the voters maximise expected utility because
it beats ? in the …rst round and ? in the second round. The utilitarian winner ?
is chosen if they maximise expected utility but the Condorcet winner ? is chosen
if they vote sincerely. A Condorcet winner is thus not necessarily chosen under
the majority rule.15
15 If satisfying IIA is desirable, selecting a Condorcet winner is desirable because ‘IIA implies
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Let us now proceed to show that IIA is violated in this example. Whether
it is de…ned in terms of pairs of alternatives or in terms of a set of relevant
alternatives16 is not particularly important here, as long as it is formulated in
choice-functional terms and the social choice function refers to actually chosen
alternatives. Let us thus assume that ?(?) denotes a choice made by society
in voting from a set of alternatives ? ½ ?. Arrow’s (1963) treatment assumes
that all voters vote sincerely so that each one chooses the alternative that he
or she prefers the most. Let ??(?) denote individual i’s choice from a set of
alternatives ?? and Â?his or her preference ordering, and let ?(? Â ?) denote
the number of voters who prefer alternative ? to ?. Arrow requires that the
individual choices ful…l equation (6.4):17
??(?) = f?j? 2 ? : 8? 2 ? : ? Â? ?g? (6.4)
The method of majority decision is de…ned by
8?? ? 2 ? : ?(?) = ?$ 8? 2 ? : ?(? Â ?) ? ?(? Á ?)? (6.5)
A Condorcet winner (CW) is de…ned by
?? = f?j? 2 ? : 8? 2 ? : ?(? Â ?) ? ?(? Á ?)g? (6.6)
A Condorcet winner is always chosen in the method of majority decision because
(6.4) guarantees that the social choice according to (6.5) always selects it.
Consider now example 1. It is easy to see that IIA is violated: ? was chosen
when all voters voted sincerely, but ? was chosen if some voted strategically.
Two di¤erent outcomes emerged from a single preference pro…le from the two
di¤erent behavioural assumptions. It is also possible, of course, to obtain two
di¤erent outcomes from a single pro…le and only the behavioural assumption of
expected utility maximisation if the voters’ beliefs are di¤erent in two di¤erent
cases.
The example is of importance for three reasons. First, it shows that attitudes
towards risk and preference intensities will inevitably a¤ect voting choices if
voters maximise expected utility under incomplete information. Secondly, IIA
is violated even under the majority rule if voters maximise expected utility and
if there are at least three alternatives. It is well known that many commonly
used voting rules (plurality, runo¤, Borda, etc.) may fail to select a Condorcet
winner. This means that insofar as Arrow’s theorem is considered a theorem
about voting rules, the IIA condition is violated under all democratic voting
rules that consider at least three alternatives (cf. Hansson 1973).
Finally, ordinal utility is not observable either in the sense that the se-
lected alternative need not be the Condorcet winner under the majority rule
and amendment agendas. The sum-of-utility criterion has been criticised for
the Condorcet criterion’ (Arrow 1997, p. 5). An argument against the plausibility of IIA is
thus simultaneously an argument against the normative appeal of Condorcet winners.
16See Ray (1973), Sen (1986), and Bordes & Tideman (1991).
17The assumption that all preferences are strict is used here.
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not being observable (e.g., Arrow 1973b). Preference orderings would be ob-
servable if the Condorcet winners were always selected under the majority rule,
but this is not the case. The possibility of strategic voting thus undermines
the observability argument. Therefore, preference orderings are not observable
either, and observability is not a valid argument for ordinal utility and against
intensities in a voting context. The claim that preference orderings are scientif-
ically respectable because they can be observed is an invalid argument against
intensities in voting theory even though this argument may have some weight
in other contexts.
It would, of course, be easier to collect information on preference orderings
than on intensities by other means than voting. We could, for example, simply
ask the voters about their preference orderings. The problem with any proce-
dure other than voting itself, however, is that insofar as the results are used
for making decisions, the individuals have an incentive to misrepresent their
preferences. If, on the other hand, the results are not used for making deci-
sions, voters, particularly representatives in parliaments, have an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences in order to give signals to their constituencies.
Collecting information on preference orderings is thus easier than collecting in-
formation on preference intensities, but it is ultimately not possible to obtain
fully reliable information on either of them.
It is not possible to prove the general claim that intensities will a¤ect the re-
sults under all voting rules here. However, it is clear that insofar as an expected-
utility model can be formulated for any voting rule, it can be shown that pref-
erence intensities will a¤ect the outcomes under this rule. What follows from
this is that if the epistemological-moral argument is to be e¤ective against us-
ing intensities in voting theory, one has to deny that voting is characterised
by decision-making under uncertainty. Surely, however, nobody is willing to
argue that voters have complete information on other voters’ preferences in an
electorate of dozens, thousands or millions. Real-world voting is clearly charac-
terised by decision-making under uncertainty, as Coleman (1966) argued long
ago.
6.5 The epistemological-moral argument
Since I am arguing for a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes in voting theory, it
would seem natural to take Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955, 1977) theorems as a decision-
theoretic justi…cation for a utilitarian position. Harsanyi claims that the theo-
rems show that von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities represent preference
intensities, and that they can be used to provide an argument for utilitarian-
ism. I do not draw on these theorems because I fully accept the criticism that
Harsanyi’s utilitarianism is ‘utilitarianism in name only’18 : the theorems do not
really provide an argument for utilitarianism.
18 See Sen (1976, 1977, 1986), Weymark (1991), Roemer (1996, pp. 138-150), and Mongin
(2001).
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Arrow and Rawls …rst presented what I call the epistemological-moral ar-
gument as a criticism of Harsanyi’s position. According to the argument, vNM
utilities should not be used in social-welfare judgements because they inevitably
contain morally irrelevant information on attitudes towards risk. The moral
part is that attitudes towards risk are irrelevant to social-welfare judgments and
they should therefore not be taken into account, and the epistemological part is
that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions can only be constructed from
choices involving risk.19 Hence, attitudes towards risk inevitably a¤ect social-
welfare judgements if these judgements are based on von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities.
Harsanyi has persistently argued that vNM utility functions may be used
for social-welfare judgements: they functions express a willingness to take risks
in order to obtain some particular alternative (Harsanyi 1987). Hence, they
express the relative intensity with which a person prefers one alternative to
another (see also Harsanyi 1978, 1979, and Ng 1999).
Harsanyi (1992, pp. 682-684) argues that Arrow and Rawls confuse ‘process
utility’ and ‘outcome utility’ (see also Harsanyi 1993). Process utility, or ’util-
ity from gambling’, refers to the enjoyment from playing a game that involves
risk, while outcome utility relates to the prizes one may obtain. Harsanyi is
right in that the reduction of the compound-lotteries axiom precludes process
utilities and thereby ‘utility from gambling’. The vNM theory thus rules out at-
titudes towards enjoyment from gambling by assumption. Harsanyi is also right
in pointing out that outcome utilities are ethically important. His arguments
could be taken to account for why we think preference intensities are morally
relevant. The problem with his argument about process utility and outcome
utility is that it does not really provide a response to the criticism: attitudes
towards process utilities are not what a carefully stated epistemological-moral
argument should be all about. Arrow (1983 [1973]c, p. 107), for example, ar-
gues that vNM utilities incorporate attitudes towards risk. The epistemological-
moral argument also concerns attitudes towards risk that are related to voters’
willingness to engage in strategic behaviour, not just attitudes towards enjoy-
ment from gambling, and these attitudes are also irrelevant to social-welfare
judgements.20
Arrow and Rawls’ position is buttressed by a well-known decision-theoretical
epistemological consideration: standard expected utility theory does not provide
any way of distinguishing between the psychological sensations of diminishing
marginal utility (or diminishing intensity of satisfaction) and risk aversion, if
all we are given are a person’s choices under uncertainty. Indeed, Harsanyi
(1992, p. 685) admits this. Choices under risk do re‡ect preference intensities,
just as he claims, but this argument does not change the fact that attitudes
towards risk also a¤ect these choices. Hence, while vNM utilities incorporate
ethically relevant information concerning preference intensities, they also incor-
porate ethically irrelevant information concerning attitudes towards risk.
19See e.g., Alchian (1953), Baumol (1958), or Fishburn (1989).
20Here I am disregarding the entirely di¤erent question of whether the riskiness of the choice
alternatives in an election should be taken into account.
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Harsanyi has successfully shown that choices under uncertainty re‡ect pref-
erence intensities, and that these intensities are morally relevant. Neverthe-
less, the epistemological-moral argument remains valid because vNM utilities
inevitably re‡ect morally irrelevant attitudes towards risk. However, this ar-
gument can be used against using preference intensities in social choice theory
only if it is possible to collect reliable information on ordinal utilities that do
not re‡ect attitudes towards risk. As shown in the previous section, this is not
possible.
6.6 Conclusions
Social choice theorists have not been willing to abandon IIA mainly because
it is closely related to excluding strategic voting. However, strategic voting is
desirable rather than undesirable under most commonly used voting rules. The
basic reason for this is that it re‡ects preference intensities, and sincere voting
does not allow for this under most voting rules. This is why strategic voting
should be taken as an argument against IIA rather than for it. By the same
token, the strategy-proofness condition is also normatively questionable.
Arrow’s impossibility result and the closely related theorems given by Gib-
bard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) are unassailable as deductive proofs. How-
ever, we should not be concerned about these results because their most crucial
conditions are not justi…able. Fortunately, IIA and strategy-proofness are vio-
lated under all democratic voting rules, including the majority rule in agenda
voting. Given that Arrow’s theorem crucially depends on IIA, its importance is
called into question. Saari (1995, p. 196) once formulated the meaning of the
Arrow theorem as follows: it asserts that the ignored information is vital and
that it is impossible to construct a procedure that systematically discards infor-
mation on preference intensities. But why should anyone want such procedures
in the …rst place?
None of the arguments discussed in this paper, the epistemological-moral, the
observability, and the strategic-voting argument, is successful as an argument
for using only preference orderings and Condorcet winners in voting theory.
There seems to be no good reason for evaluating voting outcomes on the basis
of Condorcet winners rather than utilitarian winners. Utilitarian winners are to
be preferred on genuine ethical grounds, however, because they take preference
intensities into account.
The above arguments thus give rise to three methodological conclusions.
First, given that the three main arguments for IIA and against intensities fail,
there is no reason to favour Condorcet winners over utilitarian winners in wel-
farist evaluations of voting rules. Secondly, the notion of cyclic preferences and
the absence of a Condorcet winner have been given an all too prevalent role in
voting theory. The possibility that the preferences are cyclic is only one among
many factors that may in‡uence voting outcomes. Beliefs, information and
preference intensities are also important. Models that take into account only
preference orderings provide a misleading picture of voting rules because such
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models are based on the false empirical assumption that voting is characterised
by choice under certainty.
The third methodological conclusion is that the theory of strategic voting has
not addressed the right questions. If strategic voting is bene…cial under many
commonly used voting rules, it does not seem very fruitful to seek strategy-
proof voting mechanisms or to …nd out which voting rules are least susceptible
to strategic voting. The relevant question concerns how much strategic vot-
ing increases (or perhaps decreases) utilitarian e¢ciency under various voting
rules under di¤erent assumptions on the voters’ willingness to take risks, prefer-
ence intensities and interpersonal comparisons. There are signi…cant di¤erences
between di¤erent voting rules in these respects.
:
Appendix A
Deriving the beliefs
The belief of a player who has obtained a signal ??? will now be derived. In what
follows the subscripts denoting the individuals (?), the candidates (? and ?),
and the simulated game (?) are omitted in order to make it easier to read the
formulas. The signal (equation 2.9) may be written as
? = ?+?? (A.1)
? is a random variable with mean zero and variance ?2. Since variable ? is stan-
dard normal, the signal ? can be viewed as a sum of two normally distributed
random variables ? » ?(0? 1) and ? » ?(0? ?2).
Let ?? (= 1) and ?? (= ?) denote the standard deviations of ? and ?,
respectively. We will now derive a conditional distribution for the variable ?,
? (? ? 0j? = ??? ).
The density of ? is
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and the density of ? is
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Now ? + ? = ? so that ? = ?¡ ?. Let us now use
? = ?? ??? (A.4)
? = ?¡ ??
Since Q and R are two independent random variables, their joint density is given
by the product of their densities (e.g., Casella & Berger 1990, p. 210)
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Using (A.4) we get
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The probability ?(? ? 0j? = ?) is given by the cumulative distribution function
of ?:
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We will need to make two changes of variables in order to derive a functional
form that can be used in computer simulations. Let ? =
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This is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random vari-
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Appendix B
Deriving the variance of S??
Let us start by deriving the variance of ???. It will then be easier to calculate
the variance for an individual voter’s Borda score. Therefore, let us de…ne the
di¤erence in each individual’s Borda score for candidates ? and ?, ???? ? as a
function of the random variables ? ?1????
?
2????
?
1??, and ?
?
2??:
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According to the de…nition of variance,
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Since each individual type is independent of the others, the variance of ??? is
the sum of the variances of ???? ? ?
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Appendix C
Excerpt: De
welzijnsgevolgen van
strategisch stemmen
Sociale keuze theorie werd gelanceerd toen Kenneth Arrow liet zien dat niet
gelijktijdig kan worden voldaan aan een stel ogenschijnlijk redelijke voorwaar-
den voor een maatschappelijke welvaartsfunctie. Arrow’s theorema wordt alge-
meen zo geïnterpreteerd dat er uit blijkt dat er iets mis is met alle stemregels.
Het is gebaseerd op twee …loso…sche ideeën. Het eerste is dat interpersoon-
lijke nutsvergelijkingen nietszeggend zijn, en het tweede is dat uit individu-
ele keuzen alleen voorkeurordeningen maar niet voorkeurintensiteiten kunnen
worden afgeleid. Deze twee ideeën vormden een aanleiding voor de cruciale
Onafhankelijkheid van Irrelevante Alternatieven (OIA) conditie. Die stelt dat
de sociale keus alleen afhankelijk zou moeten zijn van individuele voorkeuren
voor paren alternatieven. Sociale keuze theorie en de OIA-conditie zijn altijd
bekritiseerd voor het niet behoorlijk in aanmerking nemen van voorkeurinten-
siteiten. Echter, Allan Gibbard en Mark Satterthwaite lieten in de jaren zeventig
zien dat Arrow’s voorwaarden logisch equivalent zijn met een stel voorwaarden,
waaronder de zogeheten strategiebestendigheidsvoorwaarde. Een stemregel is
strategiebestendig indien geen enkel individu een drijfveer heeft om zijn of haar
voorkeuren verkeerd voor te stellen door strategisch te stemmen, dat wil zeggen
door een stem te geven aan een kandidaat die niet het hoogst staat in iemands
voorkeurordening. Aangezien strategisch stemmen algemeen wordt gezien als
een onwenselijk fenomeen en strategiebestendigheid nauw verbonden is met OIA
onderschrijven de meeste stemtheoretici nog altijd de normatieve geldigheid van
OIA en daardoor Arrow’s theorema.
Echter, de welzijnsgevolgen van strategisch stemmen zijn niet eerder nadrukke-
lijk bestudeerd binnen een formeel kader dat de verzorgingsstaat voorstaat.
Dit Ph D proefschrift biedt een formeel kader waarbinnen de gevolgen van
strategisch stemmen gedetailleerd geëvalueerd kunnen worden. Utilitaire doel-
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matigheid wordt gede…nieerd als het percentage simulatie runs waarin de kan-
didaat voor wie het totale nut het hoogste is, geselecteerd wordt. Gezegd wordt
dat strategisch stemmen welvaartverhogend is als de utilitaire doelmatigheid
hoger is bij strategisch gedrag dan onder oprecht gedrag. De belangrijkste
uitkomst is dat strategisch stemmen welvaartverhogend is in alle stemregels
die bestudeerd zijn onder een scala van redelijke onderstellingen omtrent de
voorkeuren en opvattingen van stemmers. De reden is dat indien stemmers zich
bezighouden met strategisch gedrag, zij ook hun voorkeurintensiteiten kunnen
uiten maar onder oprecht gedrag hebben alleen voorkeurordeningen invloed op
de uitkomst. De in dit proefschrift aangedragen modellen van strategisch gedrag
laten zien hoe voorkeurintensiteiten invloed hebben op individuele keuzen door
het formuleren van verwacht-nut condities.
Het mechanisme dat de verbinding levert tussen individueel gedrag en uitkom-
sten op macroniveau en dat er voor verantwoordelijk is dat strategisch stemmen
welvaartverhogend is, wordt het tegenwicht vormen tegen strategische stemmen
genoemd. In een electoraat met een groot aantal stemmers die hun beslissin-
gen nemen op basis van onvolledige informatie hebben sommige individuen
typisch een drijfveer om strategisch te stemmen voor een alternatief, zeg x,
maar tegelijkertijd hebben anderen een drijfveer om precies hetzelfde alternatief
x strategisch te verlaten door voor een ander alternatief y te stemmen. De
voorwaarden voor strategisch stemmen op het punt van de structuur van de
voorkeuren van stemmers en hun informatie verschillen in verschillende stem-
regels, maar zij wijzen er altijd op dat, ceteris paribus, een alternatief dat een
hoog totaal nut heeft, waarschijnlijk veel strategische stemmen zal winnen en
weinig zal verliezen. Dus is het waarschijnlijk dat weinig strategische stemmen
tegen de utilitaire winnaar een tegenwicht vormen tegen veel stemmen vóór.
Het tegenwicht vormen verklaart aldus hoe strategisch gedrag het individuele
voorkeurintensiteiten mogelijk maakt de macroniveau uitkomsten op een vo-
ordelige manier te beïnvloeden.
Het resultaat, dat strategisch stemmen welvaartverhogend is, heeft twee
fundamentele methodologische implicaties. Ten eerste betekent het dat Ar-
row’s theorema en het Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorema niet echt betekenen dat
alle stemregels gebrekkig zijn. Ten tweede dat, hoewel stemtheoretici voorheen
geprobeerd hebben manieren uit te denken om strategisch stemmen te verhin-
deren, de belangrijke vraag eerder is, te zien welke stemregels het meest prof-
iteren van strategisch stemmen.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit vier wetenschappelijke publikaties en een afs-
luitend essay. Het eerste essay biedt een model van onvolledige informatie dat
gebaseerd is op statistische signaalextractie, en dat geschikt is voor computer-
simulatieonderzoek naar stemmen. Het epistemologisch basisidee hier is, dat het
voor een onderzoeker niet noodzakelijk is exacte informatie te verkrijgen over de
individuele opvattingen indien het individuele gedrag en daardoor de uitkomsten
op macroniveau kunnen worden gekarakteriseerd met redelijke onderstellingen
omtrent de gemiddelde kwaliteit van de informatie van de onderzoekers en hun
gemiddelde mate van vertrouwen in hun informatiebronnen. Het belangrijkste
voordeel van het gebruik van dit model vloeit voort uit het feit dat het mogelijk
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maakt een stel heterogene opvattingen te genereren die op een redelijke manier
afhangen van de betrouwbaarheid van de signalen van de onderzoekers en hun
vertrouwen daar in.
De essays twee en drie bestuderen de welzijnsgevolgen van strategisch stem-
men in drie verschillende stemregels. Het kader wordt in zijn geheel in het tweede
essay opgevoerd en toegepast in het derde. Het tweede essay biedt tevens een
antwoord op kritiek dat het kader gebaseerd is op het maken van aanvechtbare
interpersoonlijke nutsvergelijkingen. Getoond wordt dat strategisch stemmen
welvaartverhogend is met alle mogelijke en ten minste minimaal redelijke in-
terpersoonlijke vergelijkingen. Het laat zodoende zien dat het resultaat, dat
strategisch stemmen welvaartverhogend is, krachtig is wat betreft verschillende
interpersoonlijke vergelijkingen.
De veronderstelling van krachtig wordt in het vierde essay uitgewerkt. Het
biedt een …loso…sch kader voor het evalueren van onrealistische onderstellingen
in rationele-keuzemodellen. De hoofdlijn is dat indien een model aantoonbaar
krachtig is wat betreft zijn gedragsonderstellingen, hun onwaarheid het model
niet op een ernstige manier ongeldig maakt.
Het afsluitend essay behandelt de diverse argumenten die zijn opgevoerd ten
gunste van de OIA-conditie in het licht van de resultaten omtrent de welz-
ijnsgevolgen van strategisch stemmen. Betoogd wordt dat de OIA-conditie in
stemcontexten altijd wordt overtreden en dat dit niet beschouwd dient te wor-
den als een negatief resultaat: er is geen dwingende reden om te voldoen aan
OIA. Ook wordt betoogd dat Donald Saari’s kritiek op OIA, hoewel volledig
dwingend als kritiek op OIA, geen enkele stemregel in het bijzonder, zoals de
Bordaregel, steunt.
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